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ABSTRACT 
This thesis addresses the question "Is there a moral right to health 
care, and, if so, what does it entail?" In nearly all Western countries except 
the United States, the idea of a right to health care is taken for granted. 
However, since a right to health care has been assumed in most countries, 
the foundation of that right is unclear, and today, as health care systems 
are feeling ever-tightening budget constraints, difficult rationing decisions 
face all countries. Without a clear foundation for the right, countries are 
left with little guidance in these rationing decisions. A clear foundation 
should assist in the prioritization of health care interventions. The 
elements of health care which make it morally special and secure us a 
human right to it should be reflected in the prioritization of services. 
Chapter two attempts to clarify the concept of rights. The right to 
health care being discussed is a moral, positive in rem right, i.e., a morally-
justified, resource-intensive entitlement to health care which can be 
claimed against society at large. Rights have been given considerable 
moral status, and they are entrenched in our system of moral justification 
such that considerations of rights "trump" all non-rights considerations. 
However, positive rights are dependent on scarce resources to be fulfilled. 
As a result, the content of a positive right is dependent on the amount of 
resources available to a given community. Thus, positive rights entail 
different things in a developed nation than in a developing one. 
Chapter three examines several theories of justice for strengths and 
weaknesses vis-a-vis health care, and three arguments are identified as 
stronger than rest: the right to a decent minimum, Robert Veatch's 
egalitarianism, and Norman Daniels' Just Health Care. Chapter four 
presents Jack Donnelly's constructivist theory of human rights and applies 
it to health care. The priority setting mechanisms of the three main rival 
theories are compared to those of the constructivist theory. The central 
concept of the constructivist theory, dignity, contains the subtlety to yield a 
sensible prioritization of services. The moral importance of health care 
lies in its ability to maintain and enhance the dignity of individual lives. 
The constructivist theory suggests that health care interventions should be 
prioritized by their relative ability to allow individuals to live a life of 
dignity which calls for a community definition of dignity. 
Chapter five examines several rationing tools. Because low priority 
services also make some contribution to dignity, it is not enough to 
prioritize condition/treatment pairs and effortlessly fund the list as far as 
the budget allows. We should labour to fund as much of the list as 
possible by controlling costs high on the list. The concept of dignity assists 
us in this task: of each rationing device (e.g., waiting lists, technology 
assessment, etc.) we must ask "Does this method, as being applied, assist or 
detract from the health service reaching its goal of enhancing the dignity 
of individuals' lives?" 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
"Is there a moral right to health care, and, if so, what does it entail?" 
is the specific question I have undertaken to answer. In nearly all 
Western countries except the United States, the idea of a right to health 
care is taken for granted; certainly, the concept is taken as a given in New 
Zealand. Most health care delivery systems have grown-up with this as a 
basic tenet. Inasmuch as this is correct, an analysis of a right to health care 
may seem dull or common. However, since a right to health care has 
been assumed in most countries, the foundation of that right is unclear, 
and today, as all health care systems are feeling ever-tightening budget 
constraints, difficult rationing decisions face all countries. Without a clear 
foundation for the right to health care, countries are left with little 
guidance in these rationing decisions. Hence, an analysis of the right to 
health care is useful to those involved in rationing. The question of a 
right to health care is far from mundane for an American--in fact, it is 
central to many resource allocation decisions. Unfortunately, 
demonstrating a right to health care leaves its content inadequately 
defined, although the foundation will necessarily be reflected in the 
content. Thus we are faced with the two-pronged question: Is there a 
right, and what is its content? A clear foundation for the right to health 
care should assist in the prioritization of health care interventions. The 
elements of health care which make it morally special and secure us a 
human right to it should be reflected in the prioritization of services. If it 
is health care's ability to save lives, for example, which makes it morally 
important, then life-saving medical care should get highest priority. 
I found my way to medical ethics with the question of whether 
there is a moral right to health care because it was obvious to me that 
there was something ethically wrong with the system of health care 
financing and delivery in the United States. I wanted to ferret out the 
problem, and demonstrate where the system had gone wrong. On one 
hand, it seemed people should be able to claim a right to health care in 
many situations. On the other hand, many proponents of the right to 
health care were claiming too much. Many have used this as evidence 
against a right to health care: since we cannot possibly afford to pay for all 
desirable health care it is nonsensical to speak of a right to health care, the 
1 
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argument goes. How can one establish a right and maintain reasonable 
limits on it? Further complicating the picture, problems. with health care 
delivery are multifactorial: economic and political, as well as ethical. It is 
not simply ethical inadequacies that have lead to the current undesirable 
situation. This chapter will highlight what is at stake in the discussion of 
a right to health care by describing issues in US delivery with brief 
mention of analogous problems in other western countries. This initial 
discussion will be largely factual with little attempt to separate ethical 
from economic or political difficulties. After all, good applied philosophy 
should be planted firmly in the real world. Then the layout for the 
remainder of the thesis will be sketched. 
My early research in this area lessened the sense of urgency. 
The United States .. .is on the verge of a 'massive 
crisis' in health care. The nation devotes a greater 
share of resources to health care than do other 
countries. Yet it lags behind several large 
industrialized societies in primary indices of 
health. There is a growing shortage of doctors. 
Medical services are unevenly distributed. Costs 
are spiraling.l 
Although it sounds like a pretty desperate situation and it looks like 
something out of a recent newspaper or periodical, it was written in 1970. 
This initially had a calming effect. After all, if people have been preaching 
imminent doom for 25 years and doomsday has yet to come, then it is 
probably all blown out of proportion. Unfortunately, closer inspection of 
the doom being preached shows that most of it is coming true. In 1970 the 
foreboding future for health care was that the (already too high) bill of 
US$63 billion might "reach $100 billion in the next five years and may 
even double and reach $200 billion in the early 1980s."2 US health 
expenditure was $248 billion in 1980 and $323 billion by 1982! Despite 
these expenditures, the problems of uneven distribution of health care 
and poor rankings in the primary indices of health persisted. Although I 
was initially assuaged, on further consideration, perhaps things have been 
lThe Editors, "Health Care: Rx for Change." Saturday Review. (August 22, 1970): 
17. 
2senator Abraham Ribicoff, "The 'Healthiest Nation' Myth." Saturday Review. 
(August 22, 1970): 19. 
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in a state of crisis for some time. Predictions for the future have the USA 
total health expenditure exceeding $1.5 trillion by the turn of the century.3 
What is wrong with health care delivery in the United States? 
As suggested in the quote above from 1970, there is a combination 
of problems in American health care that is particularly difficult. 
American health care is inadequate in terms of cost, access and quality; 
hence it is difficult to repair or improve one of the areas without further 
damaging another area. This fact has thwarted many attempts at reform. 
By emphasising the negative impact on other areas, reforms which 
address only one of the problems are argued to be terribly inadequate. 
And reforms which encompass all areas are so broad as to be accused of 
"not retaining the strengths of the American system." As the system 
deteriorates in the background, the great majority of reform plans are cast 
aside for one of these reasons. 
The easiest problem to elucidate is that costs are out of control. As 
is illustrated in figure one, the United States spends far more per capita on 
health care than any country in the world. 
3Victor R Fuchs, "The Health Sector's Share of the Gross National Product." 
Science. 247 (1990): 534-538. 
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FIGURE 1: Per Capita Health Expenditure, Selected Countries, 1989 
American health costs totalled US$752 billion in 1991, and they are 
projected to reach US$1 trillion in 1994. However, the US has spent more 
on health care than other countries for a long time; the real concern is that 
the gulf between what the US spends and what other countries spend is 
widening. Expenditures on health care are threatening the US economy. 
Health care is gobbling up a progressively larger chunk of the total 
economy as is illustrated in figure two by health care's growing percentage 
of gross domestic product. 
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FIGURE 2: Total US Health Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 1960-1990 
Some argue that health care is draining funds from police, schools, and 
other social programs because between 1965 and 1992 health costs rose 
from 2.6 to 16 percent of the federal budget. Health care is definitely 
draining money out of individuals' pockets: since 1972, rising health 
insurance costs have eaten up half of workers' increased compensation 
(pay plus fringe benefits including insurance). 
The US system is primarily employment based, that is, employers 
pay the lion's share of health insurance premiums. Thus, the high cost of 
health care is adversely affecting America's ability to be competitive in the 
global economy. In 1989, US health care costs per capita were 40% higher 
than Canada's, 91% higher than West Germany's, 127% higher than 
Japan's, and 182% higher than the United Kingdom's.4 
This expansion in costs has been in the face of unprecedented cost 
containment efforts such as utilisation review, second surgical opinions 
before surgery, co-payments, and diagnosis related groups (DRGs). Left 
unchecked, we can only speculate what health expenditures would be. 
This has lead many to the conclusion that health care demand is a "black 
hole"--that, if allowed to, health care could consume infinite resources 
4c J Schieber and J Poullier, "International health spending: Issues and trends." 
Health Affairs. 10 (1991): 113. 
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without eliminating demand much the way infinite matter and even 
light are sucked into a real black hole. 
Although the increasing expenditure on health care is economically 
frightening and demands political attention, the most ethically difficult 
issue is the poor access to health care in the USA. At any one time about 
33 million people (15% of the population under age 65) are without health 
insurance in the United States, and millions more have inadequate 
coverage for catastrophic illness. Perhaps the most significant fact is that 
full-year, steadily employed workers and their families, account for two-
thirds of people with no health insurance (in a system that is 
employment-based).5 This fact says different things to different people. 
Some ask why these working folk do not buy their own health insurance. 
Why should we feel guilty and compelled to overhaul the health delivery 
system because some people are not prudent? Others reply this is 
evidence of how expensive health insurance has become; even full-time 
workers cannot afford health insurance. There is truth in both positions. 
Not all of the uninsured are without insurance because they cannot afford 
it; about 23 percent of the uninsured had annual incomes of at least 
US$30,000 in 19866 (well above the 1986 median household income of 
$24,8977). However, there are also a large number of Americans who 
simply cannot afford health insurance and are not eligible for the 
government programs (Medicare or Medicaid). Compared with insured 
people, the uninsured are less likely to have a regular source of care, to see 
a physician in any given year, to obtain immunisations, and to receive 
adequate prenatal care. The uninsured are more likely to d,elay obtaining 
needed services, thereby compounding health problems.B 
Supdate: Americans without Health Insurance. Employee Benefit Research 
Institute Issue (EBRI) Brief no. 104 (Washington, DC: EBRI, 1990) as quoted in Peter 
Budetti, "Universal health care coverage--pitfalls and promise of an employment-based 
approach." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 17 (1992): 23. 
6D. Chollet, Uninsured in the United States: The Nonelderly Population Without 
Health Insurance, 1986 (Washington, DC: EBRI, 1988) quoted in Henry Aaron and William 
B. Schwartz, "Rationing Health Care: The Choice Before Us." Science. 247 (1990): 422. 
7u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1992 (112th 
edition.) Washington, DC, 1992: 445 (Table No. 696). 
8Reinhard Priester, "Biomedical Ethics Reading Packet #5: Distributing Limited 
Health Care Resources." (Minneapolis, MN: Center for Biomedical Ethics, April 1991) p. 
2. 
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The US health care system is also attacked by some for being of low 
quality. At least, people question whether health care is good value for 
money. The problem was clear in 1970: despite massive expenditures on 
health, the US lagged behind several large industrialised societies in the 
primary indices of health. In 1970, the US ranked 13th in infant mortality, 
18th in male life expectancy, and 11th in female life expectancy. Not much 
has changed. In 1989, the US ranked 22nd, 13th and 14th.9 Obviously, 
these are crude measurements of the health of a nation. Expensive health 
care with a significant impact on quality of life--like hip replacements and 
cataract surgery--would have little, if any, impact on these indices. And 
non-medical care factors like life-styles, environment and genetics play a 
significant role in these rankings. Still, though, these poor rankings are 
an indictment of the US health care system. 
How can a nation sustain such a system? 
Sketches of the US system as I have made above, although factual, 
are incomplete, and by omission they paint a worse picture than reality. 
Those Americans for whom the health system works well (a large 
majority of citizens) enjoy a level of health care available only to 
relatively few elsewhere in the world. Hospitals are superbly equipped 
with all of the latest technology, and most physicians are specialists with 
long years of training. These elements, of course, add to the high cost of 
health care, but from the well looked-after individual's perspective there 
is no better health system in the world. Things are not as bad as they seem 
for the uninsured, either. They have "access" to this same high tech 
system; access in the sense they are not barred from using it. Hospitals, on 
average, devote about 5 percent of their budget to charity carel o which pays 
for treating the uninsured indigent. The non-indigent uninsured are left 
with large medical bills to pay. Uninsured, acutely ill patients are not left 
untreated to die. 
9Health Care Expenditures and Other Data: An International Compendium from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Health Care Financing Review. 
(1989): 111-195. 
10Daniel Wikler, "The Clinton Health Care Reform: An Overview and Critique." 
Proceedings of the International Seminar on Bioethics (Dunedin: Bioethics Research 
Centre, 1993), p. 106. 
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Are these exclusively American problems? 
Are there problems with rising costs, poor access and quality in 
other Western countries? The short answer is yes, but it must be admitted 
that the 'health care crisis' is more acute in the US than anywhere else. 
The following graph demonstrates that other countries also are having 
difficulties with health care inflation. 
11 
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FIGURE 3: Total Health Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, Selected 
Countries, 1960-1990 
Although this graph is admittedly difficult to read, the tendency is clear: 
health care is consuming a progressively larger portion of the economy of 
each of these five major nations. The upward trend (i.e. the slope of the 
line) is less dramatic than in the USA, but the pattern is the same. And 
these nations are not isolated examples: health care as a percent of GDP is 
increasing in all OECD countries. 
The US does have an exclusive hold on the problem of access, in 
the sense of universal insurance coverage. All other industrialised 
nations (except South Africa) provide universal access to care for their 
citizens, and, at the same time, spend less per capita on health care than 
the United States. Universal insurance coverage, however, does not 
eliminate differential access: there are many examples of unequal access 
to health care in countries with public health services. The inadequate 
access of Maori in New Zealand is well documented. Pomare reports that 
Maori have an infant mortality rate which is 60% higher than non-Maori, 
Introduction 
and in 1982 Maori life expectancy at birth was 7 years less for males and 8 
years less for females than their non-Maori counterparts. Coronary artery 
disease is a particular health problem for Maori with age specific death 
rates far higher than for non-Maori; however coronary artery bypass graft 
(CABG) surgery rates are shockingly low. In 1983 and 1984, 822 and 825 
CABG surgeries were done in New Zealand, but only 10 and 14 of these 
surgeries were on Maori patients, respectively.ll Rates for heart valve 
operations are slightly higher among Maori (13.6 versus 12 per 100,000), 
but the difference in indication for the surgery is alarming. Rheumatic 
heart valvular disease is caused by rheumatic fever which is easily 
prevented by treating strep throat infections with penicillin. Green Lane 
hospital (which does 57 percent of all heart valve surgeries) statistics 
reveal that 84 percent of Maori operations are for rheumatic valvular 
disease, compared with 25 percent for European New Zealanders.12 These 
examples are not meant to imply New Zealand has a particularly poor 
health system; similar examples can be demonstrated for the lower 
socioeconomic groups of most countries. However, these examples 
demonstrate that differentiai access is not a problem for the US alone, a 
fact that is overlooked by most critics of the US health system and used by 
proponents of the status quo. The argument is simple: if this is the kind 
of equity a national health service can give us, then we should stick with 
what we have. 
As noted above, problems with health care delivery are complex, 
containing difficult economic, political as well as ethical elements. From 
all these angles, though, it would seem the most elementary question that 
must be answered before attempting to reform the health delivery system 
is whether universal access is a priority. Is access to health care a basic 
right? As illustrated with the Maori examples, providing universal 
insurance coverage is only one of the obstacles that must be removed to 
get equal access, but clearly it is the starting point. Legislation has been 
passed in the US to increase the access to health care for certain groups 
(Medicaid for the indigent and Medicare for the elderly), but universal 
health insurance has never been official policy. Furthermore, an 
11All of these statistics are from EW Pomare, "Groups with Special Health Care 
Needs." New Zealand Medical Journal. 101 (1988): 711-713. 
12core Services Committee,Core Services 1993/94 (Wellington: National Advisory 
Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services, 31 October 1992), p. 31. 
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employment-based approach to health care, like the US system, is not 
designed to provide universal health insurance coverage. Universal 
coverage can only be achieved by special arrangements to <;:over the non-
employed.13 Although it was not a statement of official government 
policy, the 1983 President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems 
in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research argued that 
Americans have no right to health care, but there is a social obligation to 
provide a decent minimum of health care.14 Many bills mandating 
universal coverage have been put before Congress during several 
administrations from Nixon through Clinton, but none has had a serious 
chance of becoming law. The importance placed on universal access has 
far reaching implications for the whole system. The question of a right to 
health care will be addressed from an ethical perspective leaving aside all 
pragmatic economic and political concerns except one. The fact that 
health care must get by within a limited budget will be an integral part of 
the argument. We simply do not have the resources to pay for all 
desirable, beneficial health care interventions. Thus our moral argument 
for a right to health care must contain the ability to set priorities and 
ration health care if it is to be useful. 
Rationing, unfortunately, has become an emotive word in health 
care. It seems to conjure up callous and inhumane images. Rationing is 
defined here as limiting the availability of beneficial care (an 
uncontroversial definition). Rationing by this definition includes all 
examples of patients not receiving "the best" treatment, all examples of 
withholding treatment that would yield a net benefit (benefits minus 
harms) to the patient. This includes providing treatment at a later date 
that is indicated today (i.e., waiting lists). As you can see, rationing does 
not contain any explicit reference to costs. (Something that is overlooked 
by many who think rationing is offensive.) Thus rationing includes some 
quite uncontroversial decisions as well as some more controversial acts. 
For uncontroversial examples, we treat uncomplicated infections with 
l3for a complete discussion see Peter Budetti, "Universal health care coverage--
pitfalls and promise of an employment-based approach." Journal of Medicine and 
Philosophy. 17 (1992): 21-32. 
14President's Commission, Securing Access to Health Care, Vol I. (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, 1983) partially reprinted in Contemporary Issues in 
Bioethics third edition, Tom Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters, eds. (Belemont, CA: 
Wadsworth, 1989), 559-565. 
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cheaper antibiotic when more expensive antibiotics with broader 
antibacterial spectrums would give marginally better cure rates; we do not 
order chest x-rays on everyone with respiratory complaints; and we do not 
send everyone with a sprained ankle for physiotherapy. In all these cases, 
the benefits of the additional treatment (however small) would outweigh 
the harms, but the treatment is seen as unnecessary. Few would find 
problems with these examples. Partly, these examples arise from attempts 
to control costs, but our ease in rationing here has much to do with the 
additional benefits gained being small. Of course, rationing includes more 
contentious examples also, but the examples given above demonstrate 
rationing should not be considered inherently evil. Furthermore, as the 
economists remind us, rationing medical care is nothing new: "the United 
States has always rationed medical care, just as every country always has 
and always will ration care."15 Rationing is a reality with which we 
should become comfortable. 
The resources that can be devoted to health care are scarce; that is, 
we cannot afford to pay for all possible beneficial health care. This is a 
premise that is accepted much more readily in New Zealand than in the 
United States. Much of the American medical literature on the topic of 
resource allocation argues against the need for systematic rationing. 
Consider the following passage by Arnold Reiman, former editor-in-chief 
of the New England Journal of Medicine: 
This, in essence, is the health policy debate of the 
1990s. Can we improve our health care system 
sufficiently, and soon enough, to avoid either 
systematic rationing or more restriction of access 
through pricing? .. .! am convinced we can. In a 
country that spends as much as we do on health 
care, there should be no need to deny medically 
necessary services (including the best of modern 
technology) to anyone .... All the evidence suggests 
that there are vast savings to be made through the 
elimination of unnecessary services and facilities.16 
15Victor R. Fuchs, "The 'Rationing' of Medical Care." New England Journal of 
Medicine. 311 (1984): 1572. 
16Arnold S Reiman, "Is Rationing Inevitable?" New England Journal of Medicine. 322 
(1990): 1810. 
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I would like briefly to address the two main arguments invoked in 
support of the "we do not need to ration health care" thesis. 
First is the efficiency argument. Much of the American literature 
emphasises the need to trim the "fat" from our system. America needs to 
eliminate unnecessary medical care, and eliminate inefficiencies in the 
delivery of necessary care. The underlying assumption is that we could 
avoid rationing by having a more efficient health care machine. A good 
starting point is to define efficiency. Pareto gives us the conventional 
definition of economic efficiency: a Pareto-improvement is a change that 
benefits someone and injures no one and a situation is efficient if it 
cannot be Pareto-improved, i.e., efficient arrangements are Pareto-
optimal.l7 Eliminating health care of no benefit or replacing 
interventions with less expensive alternatives and equal benefits are ways 
to increase the efficiency of the health care system. There are many 
examples of such efficiencies. One study showed that laboratory tests in a 
teaching hospital could be cut by 47 percent without any apparent loss in 
the quality of patient care.l8 Eliminating these lab tests would be a Pareto-
improvement: the money saved would benefit someone and no one 
would be injured. I agree that the New Zealand and especially the 
American health care systems have a long way to go in increasing 
efficiency. However, health care resources would still be scarce even in an 
ideally efficient system (leaving aside the low probability of reaching 100 
percent efficiency). As Aaron and Schwartz point out, efficiency gains are 
a one-time savings, and the upward trend of expenditures would 
consume even a large one-time savings in a few years.19 Say, for example, 
we are spending $1 trillion on health care this year, and, say, we can 
achieve an impressive 25 percent reduction in costs by eliminating all 
inefficiencies. Expenditure is reduced to $750 billion, but, after adjusting 
for inflation, total health expenditure has risen at 5.5 percent per year 
since 1950. After six years at that rate (it would be likely to take less time as 
17Discussed in David Freidman, "Should Medicine be a Commodity? An Economist's 
Perspective," in Rights to Health Care. Bole and Bondeson eds. (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 259-305. 
18AR Martin, et al, "A trial of two strategies to modify the test ordering behavior of 
medical residents." Ne-w England Journal of Medicine. 303 (1980): 1330-1336. 
19Henry Aaron and William B. Schwartz, "Rationing Health Care: The Choice 
Before Us." Science. 247 (1990): 418-422. 
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health expenditures have been increasing more rapidly in recent years), 
total (efficient) expenditure is well over $1 trillion, and we return to the 
question of rationing. 
There is another less technically precise, though more common, 
usage of "efficient." This usage seems to follow from. the physics 
definition of efficiency: the ratio of the work done by a machine to the 
work equivalent of the energy supplied to it. Some authors are referring 
to elimination of all high-cost or all low-yield interventiQns when they 
speak of "efficiency." Some argue we should eliminate expensive 
procedures, like liver transplants, to increase our efficiency. Others argue 
that the system would be more efficient if all low efficacy interventions 
were eliminated, say all treatments with less than 10 percent effectiveness. 
The argument is that if we can buy greater health gains in another area by 
forgoing these interventions, then efficiency is improved because greater 
health gains are purchased with the same resources. These propositions 
are not Pareto-improvements (regardless of whether they seem like good 
ideas). In both cases many people stand to gain from the changes but some 
people are also injured. Although the money saved by not funding liver 
transplants may be able to bring necessary health care to many people, 
those forced to forgo transplants are injured, gravely injured. Both of 
these purported efficiency gains are actually modes of rationing: the first 
is rationing by cost of care; the second is rationing by net benefit of care. 
These approaches are both rationing techniques, not efficiency gains (by 
Pareto's technical economic definition). 
The second argument is that we simply need to devote more 
resources to health care. Many claim there are so many examples of 
extravagant, wasteful, ridiculous expenditures in our society that it is 
obvious we should shunt more of our resources toward health care 
because health care serves such a vital function in society. Marcia Angell, 
for example, writes: "In a country that is this year [1985] spending about 
$300 billion on defense and $25 billion on tobacco, and in which $500,000 is 
spent for a 30 second television advertisement during the Super Bowl, we 
should be prepared to argue for spending whatever is necessary for 
effective medical care."20 The argument to spend more labours under the 
20Marcia Angell, "Cost Containment and the Physician." Journal of the American 
Medical Association. 254 (1985): 1207. 
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dual delusion that more health care is tantamount to better health and 
that life is infinitely valuable. In America this argument should carry 
little weight. The US already spends a great deal more on health care than 
the rest of the world, and our health is no better. And normal behaviour 
suggests life is not infinitely valuable. Anyone who smokes and believes 
smoking is bad for his/her health is deliberately trading health for the 
pleasure of smoking. Indeed, anyone who spends time or money on 
anything that does not increase life expectancy while there remains an 
expenditure that does--better food, more exercise, safer ear--is 
demonstrating that life, while it may be valuable, is not infinitely valuable 
in comparison to other things. 
Perhaps the argument to spend more on health care has some merit 
in New Zealand. Consistently, the average percentage of GDP spent by 
OECD countries on health care has been above that spent by New Zealand. 
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However, Scott and Scott "concluded that New Zealand's spending on 
health, although below the OECD average (as a percentage of GDP), was in 
line with the level of GDP per capita"21 (i.e., New Zealand's expenditure 
21 W Guy Scott and Helen M Scott, Comparison of Health Expenditure in OECD 
Countries. (Wellington: School of Commerce, Wellington Polytechnic, Sept 1990), p. 2. 
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on health was similar to other nations with similar GDPs). Thus, Scott 
and Scott argued New Zealand was spending roughly the appropriate 
level on health care. Regardless of whether New Zealand should increase 
its expenditure on health, the US and Canadian experiences suggest that 
not all health care needs could be met even by a dramatic increase in 
expenditure. Hence, the need to ration care would remain. 
I will attempt to maintain the focus on the specific question of 
whether there is a moral right to health care, although explication will 
require frequent (sometimes lengthy) references to general ethical 
theories. The objective is not to devise a new general ethical theory. It is 
simply to answer the question of whether or not a moral right to health 
care exists. Moulding a right to health care should have wider 
implications for other moral rights. It is my goal to explain my thoughts 
regarding health care well, and to sufficiently (but not thoroughly) suggest 
implications for other moral rights. This may leave my thoughts 
regarding resource allocation and justice outside health care 
unsatisfactorily vague, but I hope not. One point to make clear, though, is 
that health care is not properly viewed alone; it belongs within a complete 
system of moral rights. Examining only health care can lead to 
unsatisfactory conclusions, and that has been the error of many who have 
approached the topic. I hope I succeed in conveying the inter-relatedness 
of all moral rights without losing the focus of my argument on justice in 
health care. 
The idea of a right to health care is taken for granted in most 
Western countries. An analysis of the foundation of the right to health 
care is important because the foundation of that right is unclear. As all 
health care systems are facing increased budgetary constraints, all 
countries are confronted with difficult rationing decisions. A clear 
foundation should assist in the prioritization of health care interventions; 
hence, even those who take the right to health care for granted may profit 
from a clear explication of the foundation of that right. One objective of 
this thesis is to provide a cogent argument that many proponents of a 
right to health care envision too broad a right. Arguments that do not 
expressly address our obligations to other moral rights tend to overvalue 
health care. Most accounts make little contribution to the necessary 
rationing decisions that confront us both within health care and between 
health care and other moral rights (social goods). We require a 
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philosophical foundation that points to a content for the right to health 
care that allows us to avoid the black-hole problem (infinite demand for 
health care). It must contain the subtlety to distinguish between health 
care needs that entail a right and those which do not entail a right, and the 
foundation should allow us to make comparisons between health care 
and other moral rights. 
This thesis is in six chapters. In chapter two the concept of a right is 
explored and the necessary precision is added to the kind of right to health 
care we are discussing. A great deal has been written on the different 
aspects of a right to health care, and we must be precise about the right we 
are discussing lest we find our subject shifting awkwardly beneath us. In 
chapter three various possible foundations for the right to health care are 
critically examined. Several theories of justice--egalitarianism, 
utilitarianism, merit theory, Rawls's theory, and libertarianism--are 
examined for strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis justice in health care. 
None of the standard accounts of justice seems to yield what we expect of 
justice in health care. In chapter four the approach from a constructivist 
human rights theory is mapped, and offered as a new alternative standard 
of what we want from health care. The human rights approach is better at 
assisting us with the necessary rationing decisions than are the standard 
conceptions of justice in health care. In chapter five an attempt is made to 
spell out the content of a right to health care. The tendency to overvalue 
health care is discussed, and emphasis is placed on ways to limit the right 
to health care. Finally, chapter six briefly summarizes the conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2: WHAT KIND OF RIGHT? 
In bioethics we often discuss rights. Patients have a right to 
confidentiality. Patients have a right to informed consent. Patients have a 
right to refuse treatment. Women have a right to abortion. Foetuses have a 
right to life. Animals have certain rights that should not be violated by 
medical science. We are also frequently confronted with rights in political 
discussions: gay rights, women's rights, prisoner's rights, right to vote, right 
to die, right to an education, right to practice any religion we choose, etc. 
Rights are the buzzword in moral debates--both in medicine and elsewhere. 
What are rights? How can the same word be used in so many seemingly 
different contexts? This chapter will attempt to clarify rights language. 
"Does a right to health care exist?" is the question at hand. It seems the 
majority of people in Western society have an intuitive sense that people are 
entitled to some level of health care. For example, a 1987 survey showed that 
63% of New Zealanders agreed or strongly agreed with the statement 
"medical care should be available free-of-charge to those who need it."l In 
America, the Harris survey from roughly the same time found an impressive 
91% agreed with "everybody should have the right to get the best possible 
health care--as good as the treatment a millionaire gets."2 Both of these 
surveys, however, contained several questions and the degree of public 
enthusiasm for a right to health care varied with each question. At the very 
least, we can agree most people are disturbed by examples where good 
people have come to harm by the denial of basic health care. Unfortunately, 
this gut feeling that it is wrong when people are denied needed health care is 
insufficient in a systematic discussion of health care as a right. In fact, before 
the discussion can proceed with any precision one needs tq work through 
exactly what rights are and what sort of a right to health care is being 
proposed. 
ls. Jane Chetwynd, "New Zealanders' Attitudes to Health Care Policy." Community 
Health Studies. 13 (1989): 186-190. 
2survey by Louis Harris and Associates for the Loran Commission quoted in Daniel 
Callahan, "Allocating Health Resources." Hastings Center Report. (April/May 1988): 15. 
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As Jack Donnelly points out, "right" is a multifaceted word in the 
English language, especially within the language of philosophy.3 To this 
point, an important usage of "right" has been neglected. We often discuss 
what is and what is not right. It is not right to violate a patient's autonomy. 
Paternalism is not right in most situations. It is right to tell patients the truth 
regardless of what you might think they want to hear. In all of these contexts 
the verb to be is used with right, and the discussion is moral righteousness. 
Above, the verb to have was always used with a right. Surely, there is an 
important distinction between "having a right" and "being right," but how are 
these two related? It would not be right to deny necessary health care to a 
child, but can this be turned around to say the child has a right to such health 
care? More on this distinction and relation below, but for the remainder of 
this section we will be classifying rights in the sense of "to have a right." 
RIGHTS AS ENTITLEMENTS 
Rights are traditionally understood as entitlements a person possesses 
to some good, service or liberty. As entitlements, rights are to be contrasted 
with privileges, personal or group ideals and acts of charity. Only a person 
with a valid claim has a right. A rights bearer is in a position to make 
demands because of his/her entitlement. The philosophical foundation of 
any right is located in a justifying reason that directly supports the claim of 
entitlement. A clever argument for X does not always amount to an 
entitlement to X, and passionately arguing that one ought to receive a good or 
service is not adequate grounding for a rights claim. For example, while it 
may be a good idea to provide all school children with a personal computer 
for a myriad of reasons (e.g., preparation for the job market, increase their 
learning potential, etc.), it does not follow that school children have a right to 
a computer. It may even be possible to show that giving school children a 
computer would eventually increase the economic output of a nation so much 
as to exceed greatly the initial cost of the computers; still the children have no 
right to a computer. When arguable cases or claims turn out to be invalid, 
then one has no right. The notion of a moral right is usually translated into 
the language of justice. The language of rights is used to specify an area of 
3Jack Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights. (Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985), 3-9. 
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justified claims that are well guarded against political tradeoffs because they 
are rooted in moral principles. 4 
CLASSIFICATION OF RIGHTS 
There are several distinctions that need to be made with regard to 
rights. The first is between conferred and moral rights. Conferred rights are 
those granted by institutions, both legal and non-legal. Moral rights are rights 
that exist prior to and independently of any social conventions or legal or 
institutional rules. Moral rights are essentially human rights. s They are the 
rights claimed on behalf of all men and women in all situations. There is 
considerable overlap between conferred and moral rights, but neither group 
is a subset of the other. There are moral rights that are not conferred and 
conferred rights that are not moral.6 
Another distinction is between legal rights and moral rights. Legal 
rights are justified within a system of legal principles, and moral rights are 
justified within a framework of moral principles. Once again, there would be 
three subgroups: legal rights merely, moral rights merely, and both legal and 
moral rights. Although a conferred right need not necessarily be a legal right, 
this distinction is less important in philosophical discussion. For example, it 
could be the conferred right of a member of a certain private club to use the 
club's facilities before a club guest although there may be no such law. This 
"extra layer" in the description of rights unnecessarily complicates things. 
Particularly with the issue at hand--whether there is a moral right to health 
care--I cannot think of a scenario where the right would be conferred but not 
legal. For simplicity's sake, the conferred/legal/ moral distinction will be 
reduced to the legal and/ or moral distinction. Discussing that which will be 
4The content of this paragraph was drawn from Tom Beauchamp, 'The Right to Health 
Care in a Capitalistic Democracy," in Rights to Health Care. Thomas Bole and William 
Bondeson, eds. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 56-59. 
Sobviously, one could argue there are moral rights that are not human rights--extra-
human moral rights, if you will (e.g., animal rights)--but this section is to frame a discussion 
of a human right to health care. I make human rights tantamount to moral rights not 
necessarily to deny extra-human moral rights, but rather to emphasise the importance of 
moral rights. The concept of human rights is further explicated in chapter four. 
6Jt is important to notice here that "not moral" is different than "immoral." Of course, a 
conferred right could be immoral (e.g., the right of slave owner to beat a slave in eighteenth 
century America), but it could also be not moral in the sense that it is petty (e.g., cars should 
stop at a red light even when there is no cross-traffic). 
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eliminated is informative, though, to the extent it illustrates the complexity of 
the concept of rights. 
The next feature of rights to elucidate is the difference between 
negative and positive rights. The difference has long been pointed out by 
theorists. Wesley Hohfeld, the American attorney, distinguished between 
"liberties" and "claim-rights,"7 and British philosopher Jeremy Bentham drew 
a similar distinction. a A simpler and more contemporary word choice--and 
the choice used henceforth--is to call the two types of rights negative and 
positive, respectively. The crux of the distinction is whether recognising the 
right requires a specific action and resources or whether it does not. Positive 
rights require a specific action (e.g., the right to be repaid a debt), and 
negative rights require an omission of action, i.e., negative rights protect 
against interference (e.g., the right not to be assaulted).9 Furthermore, 
positive rights typically require resources in order to be fulfilled whereas 
negative rights do not. Presumably all that must be done to honour negative 
rights is to leave people alone. Thus the right to liberty is a, negative right 
because no one has to do anything to honour it; it is just that certain actions 
are prohibited by a right to liberty. Positive rights, on the other hand, are 
rights to receive goods and services. A right to food requires someone to give 
food (i.e., a specific action and a specific resource) to the needy person. 
CORRELATIVITY OF RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 
What is the relationship between rights and obligations? From the 
preceding discussion, it should be clear that a right entails the imposition of 
an obligation on others either not to interfere (negative right) or to provide 
something (positive right). Consequently, rights establish obligations, but do 
?wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1919, 3rd reprint 1964). 
8Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1970). 
9lt is worth noting that some authors have used positive rights to mean two separate 
things. Positive rights can mean rights conferred only on those who fall under the 
jurisdiction of a particular system of positive law. These positive rights are contrasted with 
human rights or moral rights which can be claimed on behalf of all men/ women in all 
situations. For this distinction I have used conferred/ moral. Within different contexts, these 
same authors use positive rights to denote rights logically correlated with other people's 
action. This can be confusing when reading the literature, so I have purposely avoided the 
dual usage. 
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all rights establish obligations? That is to say, are there rights without 
corresponding obligations? 
Bentham claims that all rights assign obligations: "For every right 
which the law confers on one party, whether that party be an individual, a 
subordinate class of individuals, or the public, it thereby imposes on some 
other party a duty or obligation. "10 This is the prevailing view. 
Rights without obligations? 
While all seem to agree the great majority of rights entail obligations, a 
few authors have posited that there are some rights without obligations. 
Feinberg argues that there are positive rights without obligations in situations 
where the goods in question are so scarce that there is no hope of fulfilling all 
the valid claims. During a severe famine, for example, it would be impossible 
to see that all receive sustenance, and after an earthquake which levels the 
local hospital it is impossible to fulfil a right to hospital care. Feinberg argues 
that the "deprived claimant in conditions of scarcity remains in a position 
morally to make a claim, even when there is no one in the corresponding 
position to do anything about it...But where there is no other person with a 
duty to fulfill the claim, its validity does the claimant no good."ll. While this 
is a persuasive example, it seems what is lacking is not duty I obligation but 
anyone capable of carrying out the obligation. This problem of extreme 
scarcity is discussed further below. 
David Lyons argues that many negative rights entail no obligations.12 
(Interestingly, he concedes that positive rights entail obligations.) To 
paraphrase, he takes the familiar example of the right to free speech, and 
argues it does not entail any obligations to forbear which do not already exist. 
What does the right to free speech guarantee us? It allows us to air our views 
without risk of physical assault or coercive measures from individuals or 
government. Lyons says, "Since others are prohibited in general from (e.g.) 
assaulting, threatening, coercing, and forcibly restraining" other individuals, 
then the right to free speech guarantees us nothing new. Lyons challenges the 
lOJeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1970), p. 206. 
llJoel Feinberg, "Rights: Systematic Analysis," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Warren T 
Reich ed. (New York: Free Press, 1982), p. 1510. 
12David Lyons, "The Correlativity of Rights and Duties." Nous. 4 (1970): 45-55. 
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correlativity of certain negative rights and obligations; he appears to think it 
is an argument against the right to free speech implying certain obligations 
that the obligations in question exist anyway. The argument seems to hinge 
on the obligations of a right to free speech being redundant. David 
Braybrooke, however, argues that superfluity does not mean the right to free 
speech entails no obligations.13 While it may be untidy that many or all of the 
obligations entailed by the right to free speech are simultaneously guaranteed 
by other rights, we need not invoke the other rights to exercise our right to 
free speech. Moreover, the right to free speech mandates a full package of 
subtle and not-so-subtle forbearance obligations that may be superfluous, but 
it is more efficient to exercise the right to free speech than to invoke the 
multitude of other relevant forbearance rights. Braybrooke maintains that all 
rights entail obligations. 
Obligations without rights? 
Looking at the correlativity thesis from the opposite perspective, we 
ask the question "Do obligations have corresponding rights?" Bentham says 
not all obligations have corresponding rights: obligations "may be either 
extra-regarding or self-regarding: extra-regarding have rights to correspond to 
them: self-regarding, none."14 Tom Beauchamp agrees, and distinguishes 
between two senses of obligation--weak obligations and strong obligations. IS 
Strong obligations are correlative with rights, but weak obligations have no 
corresponding rights. There are numerous examples of weak obligations that 
do not entail rights. Obligations of charity, love, and conscience, for example, 
do not correspond to rights. My obligation to be charitable is not correlated 
with the right of any particular needy recipient. If I choose to donate to a 
homeless shelter, a food bank, and the Cancer Society instead of my alma 
mater, the local church or the Red Cross, it is my prerogative. It fulfils my 
obligation to be charitable. In so donating, I do not fulfil the rights of the 
worthy recipients of the homeless shelter, the food bank or the Cancer 
Society. Furthermore, I do not violate any right of Wabash College, the local 
13David Braybrooke, 'The Firm But Untidy Correlativity of Rights and Obligations." 
Ca1Uldian Jour1Ull of Philosophy. 3 (1972): 351-363. 
14Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1970), p. 206. 
15'fom Beauchamp, "The Right to Health Care in a Capitalistic Democracy," in Rights to 
Health Care. Thomas Bole and William Bondeson, eds. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic, 1991), p. 60. 
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church or the Red Cross. Even if I were particularly affluent and notably 
generous to, say, the homeless shelter for ten years running and the shelter 
came to depend on my donation in order to stay open, I would not violate 
any right of the shelter if I decided to make the donation to another cause)6 
Strong obligations, on the other hand, have correlative rights, and are not a 
matter of prerogative. If I owe you a debt, I am obliged to repay it--even if I 
do not want to. 
Thus, by this paradigm there are three levels of morally correct actions: 
required acts (with strong obligations), expected acts (with weak obligations), 
and supererogatory acts (with no obligations). Examples of each would be 
refraining from harming others, doing some charitable works and risking 
your own life to save another, respectively. Only required acts entail rights. 
Expected actions (like being charitable) are likewise important to a moral life, 
but they involve considerable discretion. Supererogatory acts go beyond 
even weak obligations. Obviously, these actions are arranged from least to 
most morally laudable. 
To summarise, rights always entail obligations, but in some 
circumstances it is impossible to fulfil the obligations and in others the 
obligations already exist. Nevertheless, all rights have corresponding 
obligations. Obligations, however, do not always have corresponding rights. 
Many aspects of the debate over a right to health care turn on whether the 
obligation to provide health care goods and services is a weak obligation or a 
strong obligation. This debate was touched upon above, when discussing the 
difference between being right and having a right. It would not be right to 
deny health care to a child, but can this be turned around to say the child has a 
right to health care? There is certainly a weak obligation to provide health 
care to a needy child, and the morally righteous (in the sense of being right) 
would do so. The weak obligation and righteousness of the act, however, do 
not necessarily entail a right to health care for the child. 
16Jt has been pointed out to me that relationships develop and change over time, and 
perhaps the ten-year benefactor would be wrong to stop his annual donation unexpectedly. 
This is a point I do not dispute; weak obligations are strengthened by long-term associations, 
and the benefactors obligation is stronger in the eleventh year than it was during the first. 
However, even a weak obligation that has been nurtured by il ten-year relationship is a 
different sort of obligation than a strong obligation. 
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WHO IS OBLIGATED? 
We can add to the concepts of moral/legal and positive/negative by 
specifying upon whom the obligation is placed. In rem indicates that the right 
is logically correlated with the duties of other people generally, i.e. society at 
large. For the purposes of this thesis, in rem is meant to extend to the bounds 
of one's political community. Essentially, arguments for a government-
funded health system are at issue here; thus, in rem extends as far as a 
country's government would have it--a city-funded program to the city's 
boundary, a nationally-funded program to the nation's boundary, etcetera. 
There may, or may not, be valid moral claims against a broader in rem 
community, but the argument will be limited to the more moq.est conception 
of in rem. In personam indicates that the right is logically correlated with the 
duties of specific, nameable persons or entities. Any given right can be 
described with precision by assigning one term from each of the three 
descriptive pairs to it. For example, moral positive in rem rights are a specific 
subset of rights including moral rights that require resources to fulfil which 
can be claimed from society at large. 
Now we find ourselves with a number of ways to categorise rights--in 
fact, twelve in total. First, all rights can be merely legal, both legal and moral, 
or merely moral. Beyond this, any of those three categories can be 
subdivided into four subcategories, viz., positive in personam rights, negative 
in personam rights, positive in rem rights, or negative in rem rights.17 
17The four possible categories created by positive/ negative and in personam/in rem 
closely follows Joel Feinberg, "Rights: Systematic Analysis," in Enct;clopedia of Bioethics. 
Warren T Reich ed. (New York: Free Press, 1982), 1507-11. 
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TABLE 1: Schema of Rights 
Legal Rights 
Negative in personam Negative in rem 
Positive in personam Positive in rem 
Legal and Moral Rights 
Negative in personam Negative in rem 
Positive in personam Positive in rem 
Moral Rights 
Negative in personam Negative in rem 
Positive in personam Positive in rem 
What are some examples of these various rights? The majority of legal 
rights are either positive in personam (e.g., a person's right to the terms of a 
contract entered into voluntarily) or negative in rem (e.g., a person's rights not 
to be interfered with or attacked by anyone). The familiarity of these 
examples has lead some legal commentators to suppose that the other two 
classes are empty. That is, it has been suggested all in rem rights are negative, 
and all in personam rights are positive. The other areas cannot be excluded so 
easily, though. The negative in personam category is a small one that exists 
under narrow circumstances. One example would be if a specific 
businessperson agreed to not compete with another businessperson in a 
particular area. It is positive in rem rights that are the most interesting to our 
discussion. 
Positive in rem rights basically include rights to the things we can call 
social goods. Education, employment, housing, nutrition, retirement benefits 
and even health care are the things of positive in rem rights. Individuals can 
claim these rights from society in general (i.e., from the state) if the 
individuals meet the requirements of the various programs. These are the 
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things that together work to make our society a better place to live, utopian 
aspirations if you will. 
Where do human rights fit into this scheme? It was suggested above 
that moral rights are essentially human rights, but now we can be more 
precise. They are the rights claimed on behalf of all men and women in all 
situations. Ooser examination of the kinds of things claimed as human rights 
will demonstrate where they fit into the proposed framework. Are human 
rights legal, moral or both legal and moral? Oearly they need not be legal; in 
fact, we most often hear about human rights when a nation is not recognising 
them. There is no legal right in a totalitarian regime not to be tortured, but 
this is the kind of human rights violation which draws the most attention.18 
Are human rights positive or negative in content? There are many examples 
of both. Many claim the positive in rem rights in the preceding paragraph as 
human rights, and many also claim freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
the right to vote and other negative rights (liberties) as human rights. Are 
human rights in personam or in rem? While individuals can help ensure the 
enjoyment of human rights, all of the above examples are things claimed from 
the state, from society at large--in rem rights. In summary, human rights are 
moral, positive and negative, in rem rights. 
Having constructed this framework for rights, one would hope it 
would now be a simple task to pigeonhole any "right" imaginable into one of 
the twelve slots. However, like most such constructed frameworks, the lines 
of division are not so fine and black as would be ideal. In fact, some "rights" 
do not even sit in the grey zone: they appear to fit into two categories. For 
example, negative in rem rights usually require governmental interventions 
using public revenues, a fact that obscures any neat positive/negative 
distinction. Freedom from harm is one of the core liberties we expect the 
State to protect. This is the sacred liberty which justifies such things as a 
strong national defence and law enforcement agencies. Freedom from harm 
extends to health care as well. Consider various rights to have one's health 
protected. On the surface this seems a right to liberty, a right to be free of 
interferences that will negatively impact one's health, a negative in rem right. 
18In the particular example of the right not to be tortured, this human right is 
enshrined in international law. Thus, in a sense, most human rights are indeed legal rights. 
Nevertheless, the point is that we assert that citizens of all countries have basic human rights 
regardless of the positive law of their country or whether their country has signed the 
relevant international treaty. 
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But one is really asserting more than a negative in rem right here; one expects 
the state to protect citizens from pollution or the spread of contagious 
diseases via publicly funded state agencies--a positive in rem right. These 
rights to health protection contain both negative and positive elements within 
their broad scope. Likewise, the right to be protected from harm, a basic 
liberty, entails many positive entitlements. 
THE POSITIVE/NEGATIVE DISTINCTION 
Philosophers have often drawn a distinction between positive and 
negative rights as outlined above. Presumably all that must be done to 
honour negative rights is to leave people alone. The same is not true for 
positive rights. To honour positive rights someone has to provide something. 
The association of liberal individualism with negative rights is clear. 
Libertarians emphasise the individual's freedom from government and the 
protection of zones of privacy. However, positive rights require at least one 
person to yield some of his/her resources to advance the welfare of another 
person (or group of persons). In the case of positive in rem rights, all 
members of the community give up some of their resources to help either all 
members of the community or a subgroup of the community (e.g., a fire 
service potentially benefits everyone while a provision for the poor only 
benefits the impoverished). There is an inherent tension between positive 
and negative rights: the more resources society demands from each 
individual to honour positive rights, the more society infringes on the 
liberties of the individuals. To elucidate the point further, any moral 
framework with an extensive set of positive or negative rights is not going to 
leave much room for the other type. 
This inherent tension has lead to reductionist arguments that only 
positive or only negative rights are truly moral rights. Take, for example, 
Maurice Cranston's defence of the priority of negative rights.l9 He claims that 
negative rights are "universal, paramount, categorical moral rights" while 
positive rights are neither universal, practical, nor of paramount importance. 
Therefore, he concludes, positive rights actually "belong to a different logical 
category"; they are not truly moral (human) rights. From the other extreme, 
19Maurice Cranston, What are Human Rights? (New York: Basic Books, 1964), 36-54. 
Cranston actually argues for the priority of civil and political rights over economic and social 
rights, so he avoids any problems with the positive aspects of most negative rights. 
However, this is not far removed from arguing for only negative rights. 
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there is the argument that negative rights are essentially an instrument of the 
privileged to maintain the status quo. This side argues negative rights are 
useless without positive rights. After all, how many starving people are 
concerned with their right to free speech? 
Like many reductionist arguments, both of these seem to go too far. 
Certainly, there is something wrong with a libertarian argument that will not 
allow minimal levies against the rich to bring great gains for the poor. But it 
is equally unappealing to picture a society that takes positive rights so 
seriously as to greatly infringe on core negative rights. Further complicating 
the distinction is the argument (outlined above) that seemingly negative 
rights usually contain a large positive component of enforcement. Moreover, 
a formal statement of what a right is a right to simply does not tell us whether 
the right is positive or negative. Whether a particular right, as held by a 
particular person at a particular time, is positive or negative depends at least 
as much on circumstances as on the essential character of the right. Even 
straightforward examples of negative rights like one's right not to be tortured 
and positive rights like the right to adequate nourishment are subject to 
circumstances. Protection from torture is negative in New Zealand whereas it 
is quite positive in Haiti today. And a right to food is essentially negative on 
a Southland dairy farm where a small number of individuals could eat quite 
well without appreciably decreasing the output of the farm. This same right 
to food is somewhat more positive in Dunedin where arrangements would 
have to be made for cartage of the food and distribution; and a right to food is 
very positive indeed in Rwanda where the masses cannot be fed despite a 
resource-intensive international effort. Thus, even with rights that seem 
clearly positive or negative in character, particular circumstances result in a 
wide variation of positiveness. Less extreme circumstances would have an 
impact on the character of rights which are more mixed by nature. 
Where does this leave us with the positive/negative distinction? Are 
there too many problems for it to be useful? First, there is nothing theoretical 
that demands exclusion of one class from true moral rights; solid individual 
arguments can be made for a number of positive and a number of negative 
rights. Second, it must be conceded that the positiveness or negativeness of a 
right is not set in stone; depending on changing circumstances, the same right 
can be considerably more or less positive. However, amid these theoretical 
difficulties, an important distinction remains. 
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I am hesitant to discuss positive and negative in rem rights as though 
they are two species of a common genus. It is a widely held opinion that 
there are no absolute rights, i.e, there are no rights which apply to all people 
in all situations and cannot be overridden.20 Obviously, only one right could 
be absolute because one right must yield to another in conflicting traffic, and, 
hence, only one right could always have the right of way. Perhaps the most 
promising candidate to be an absolute right is the right not to be killed. 
However, even the right not to be killed--one of the most basic negative 
rights, the right to life--can be overridden under specific conditions. There 
are moral arguments for the just war, and soldiers have their lives taken 
during war; and some argue criminals forfeit their right to life by the nature 
of their crimes. Thus, all rights must be limited. The important difference 
between positive and negative rights lies in the way they are limited. 
Negative rights must be limited as to not infringe on the liberties of others. 
But positive rights require more robust limits. They are dependent on 
resources that are (although not by definition, but in point of fact always have 
and always will be) scarce. Positive rights can only be as extensive as 
resources will allow. 
Rights cannot be absolute. Negative rights must be limited; positive 
rights are more severely limited. So what? Both positive and negative rights 
are rights, and as such deserve to be taken quite seriously. To emphasise the 
prima facie priority of rights over other justifying principles, Ronald Dworkin 
writes of rights as "trumps."21 Rights as trumps succinctly carries a lot of 
meaning and has been widely used since Dworkin wrote it. This implies that 
rights are not on a level playing field with other types of moral or social goals. 
Rights have been entrenched in our system of justifications giving them 
priority over other considerations such as utilitarian calculations; rights 
considerations outweigh any amount of any non-rights consideration. One of 
the most powerful functions of rights is to protect individuals from claims 
based on principles such as utility. Rights carve out a protected area for the 
individual; they guard the individual against manipulations by the powerful 
state. To fail to respect an individual's rights is not simply a failure to 
discharge a duty. It is a particularly harmful affront to the individual. 
20Alan Gerwith, "Are there any absolute rights?" In Theories of Rights. Jeremy Waldron 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 91-109. 
21Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1977), p. 90. 
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Although they are both rights, the difference in the way positive and negative 
rights are limited is still important. 
We return to the problem of extreme scarcity. Several integral features 
of rights have been discussed: 1) rights are entitlements, 2) rights entail 
obligations, and 3) valid right-claims trump non-rights considerations. 
Positive rights in conditions of scarcity pose theoretical difficulties for rights 
which challenge these integral features. During extreme conditions, for 
example a famine, it is impossible to fulfil some very basic positive right-
claims. It is difficult to explain how one can have a valid claim which one 
cannot reasonably expect to be fulfilled. There are at least three responses to 
this theoretical quandary, and each should be examined for its ability to deal 
with both extreme scarcity and more moderate scarcity. 
Firstly, some conclude that positive rights are not rights at all. This, 
seemingly, avoids the problem of what to do when right-claims cannot be 
met: negative rights are not scarce. Perhaps there are moral claims to goods 
and services, but they do not amount to rights. It is ridiculous to say one's 
rights were violated because one was not fed during a famine. This is similar 
to Cranston's defence of the priority of negative rights discussed above. 
While this stand avoids the problem of right-claims which are impossible to 
fulfil, it goes too far. As discussed above, both positive and negative rights 
are valid, and changing circumstances have a significant effect on the 
positiveness of a right. 
Secondly, some philosophers argue that rights and obligations can 
become disconnected in conditions of scarcity. As outlined above, Feinberg 
argues that nothing can be done when resources are insufficient to fulfil a 
valid right claim, and that no one has an obligation to fulfil the claim.22 The 
unfulfilled claim remains valid and society should fulfil it when conditions 
change and resources become adequate. Furthermore, the unfulfilled right 
claim, as the argument goes, highlights to the relevant authorities that 
something needs to be done to alleviate the scarcity. While this approach has 
some intuitive appeal in very extreme circumstances like natural disasters, it 
is not particularly useful when its application is broadened. The instance of 
extreme scarcity is analogous to the ordinary scarcity which is a part of 
everyday life: they are only differences of degree. Indeed, resources are 
22Joel Feinberg, "Rights: Systematic Analysis," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics. Warren T 
Reich ed. (New York: Free Press, 1982), p. 1510-11. 
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scarce even in the richest of countries. Broadening the idea that obligations 
are removed in conditions of scarcity disregards the danger of routinely 
leaving "moral" rights unfulfilled. It was illustrated in the introduction that, 
despite tremendous expenditure, not all medical needs can be met. We 
require a moral standard for the right to health care which considers that 
resources are scarce and provides attainable moral goals for health care. A 
standard which is doomed to leave many "valid" claims unfulfilled due to 
scarcity is insufficient. The moral standard ultimately accepted must 
distinguish between health care needs which entail a right and health care 
needs which do not. 
Thirdly, one can argue that positive rights have to be framed in the 
context of how much resources are available in a given society. Making the 
content of rights dependent on the very shifting sands of resource availability 
seems not to give rights the "trump" status some proponents ascribe to rights. 
Unfortunately, this implies that one's right to adequate nourishment 
disappears in conditions of famine. Obviously this is not a desirable 
conclusion, and perhaps the answer lies in broadening the conception of in 
rem to include the global community during very extreme conditions (which 
seems to correspond to actual practice). However, this conclusion will not be 
further explored because this approach works well under more moderate 
conditions. 
Despite its weaknesses, the idea of the content of positive rights being 
subject to resource constraints is advocated as a better alternative than 
denying all positive rights or claiming that not all rights entail obligations. 
The inherent exhaustability of positive rights needs to be addressed; a theory 
that neglects this feature would be inadequate. Common sense demands that 
positive rights be limited in their content. How do we decide the content of a 
positive right? The exact content of these positive in rem rights will 
necessarily be under constant discussion. All of these social goods are worthy 
causes, but they each have an infinitely--or at least immensely--expandable 
appetite. Since a given society will only have so much wealth to redistribute 
on these items, there will be constant discussion of how big each program's 
piece of the pie will be. Further complicating the discussion, the pie itself will 
shrink or grow from year to year. Hence, society (or its representative 
members) has to make the difficult decisions about what items it can afford 
and what things it must deny its citizens, and this list will be constantly 
changing. Negative rights, too, are limited, but their content is not subject to 
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such constant re-evaluation. The content of a positive right is necessarily less 
fixed than that of a negative right. 
RIGHT TO HEALTH CARE 
Now that we have an explicit framework within which to discuss 
rights, we can return to the question at hand, "does a right to health care 
exist?" 
Negative Rights 
Negative in personam rights are a category that is seldom important, 
and they play little (if any) role in a right to health care. 
Is there a negative in rem right to health care? Of course, there is a 
negative right to health care in the sense that no one should prevent an 
individual from accessing the health service. Everyone would agree it is 
wrong for, say, an ambulance team to leave victims at an accident site for 
prejudicial reasons. Society at large is obligated to not interfere with 
individuals' attempts to use the health system. 
There is a more encompassing conception of the negative in rem right 
to health care which is more contentious. Some argue that the sort of 
collective protection we all take for granted logically could be extended to 
include a number of health care services. As Tom Beauchamp writes, this 
argument 
starts from the position that the general range of 
protection rightly afforded by government--and already 
afforded in most nations--naturally extends to health 
care. The government is constituted to protect citizens 
from risk to the environment, risk from external 
invasion, risk to public health, risk from criii'\e, risk 
from fire, the risk of highway accidents, and the like. 
We do not ask people to have their own firefighters, 
crimefighters, jet pilots, etc. It seems a natural 
extension that government would protect against risks 
to health and thereby would meet health care needs, 
especially given the significance of this benefit to 
individuals and to society.23 
2:Yfom Beauchamp, 'The Right to Health Care in a Capitalistic Democracy," in Rights to 
Health Care. Thomas Bole and William Bondeson, eds. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic, 1991), 64-65. 
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This argument is an important way to get our foot in the door, so to speak, 
with those who see the right to health care as a liberty only. Protecting 
citizens from public threats would entail many positive entitlements. 
Exploring the conclusions of a broadly conceived negative right to health 
presents irrefutable evidence to those who wish to deny any entitlements to 
health care. As emphasis is increasingly placed on social and environmental 
factors in the aetiology of disease, it would seem the entitlements which flow 
from a negative right to health care are growing. 
However, while this approach is persuasive and it builds upon 
already-present institutions, Beauchamp goes on to point out that it leaves 
unacceptable gaps. Unfortunately, there are many health care needs that are 
completely private needs and in no measure the result of a public threat. That 
is to say, even if we extend a negative in rem right to health care to its logical 
extreme to include treating all diseases with an infectious or environmental 
component, important diseases will be left out. In fact, some of the diseases 
overlooked in this account are ones we are intuitively most sympathetic to--
for example, genetic diseases like Tay-Sachs disease, cystic fibrosis and 
Duchenne's muscular dystrophy. Furthermore, this approach creates 
markedly different entitlements within the same disease category. Consider 
atherosclerotic heart disease. The man whose heart disease is a result of 
socially determined lifestyle factors would receive full treatment while the 
sufferer with familial hypercholesterolaemia would have no entitlement to 
health care. Thus, while a health service based on a broadly conceived 
negative in rem right would treat many conditions, it inherently falls short of 
the ideal vision of a health service. I concur with Beauchamp, that "an 
exclusively negative conception of the right to health invites chaos in health 
policy and is unsatisfactory both on theoretical and practical grounds. "24 
Nevertheless, this is an important argument. In the business of setting 
priorities for a positive right to health care it may be that many of the diseases 
which are a collective threat should receive high priority. 
Positive Rights 
In the USA (as in New Zealand), many people have a right to health 
care through specific contractual agreements with private insurance 
companies. These are legal, positive in personam rights--legally guaranteed 
24Jbid, p. 75. See also Tom Beauchamp and Ruth Faden, 'The Right to Health and the 
Right to Health Care." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 4 (1979): 125-6. 
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rights to health care goods and services which can be claimed from specific, 
nameable insurance companies. 
In a much celebrated article, Robert Sade argues passionately against 
the right to health care conceived as a moral, positive in personam right. 
Sade's first mistake is defining a right as "a freedom of action"25, neglecting all 
positive rights. The argument starts from what is called man's primary right--
the right to his own life--and then extends to a strong claim of individual 
property rights. To quote Sade, "In a free society, man exercises his right to 
sustain his own life by producing economic values in the form of goods and 
services that he is, or should be, free to exchange with other men who are 
similarly free to trade with him or not."26 The conclusion is that health care 
services are the property of the doctor to distribute as he/ she sees fit without 
interference or coercion from the government. To do otherwise, as the 
argument goes, would break the chain of natural rights which starts with the 
right to one's own life, and hence would be anti-life. 
Although the article takes several wrong turns, not the least of which is 
morally undervaluing positive rights in general, it does have one strong 
point. Sade makes an analogy between health care services and doctors and a 
loaf of bread and bakers.27 He argues that it is wrong to take bread from the 
baker without compensating her/him, and that it is a similar situation to give 
patients a right to health care and allow them to take services from the doctor 
without compensating her/him. To this point, the argument has merit: 
surely, it is not the sole responsibility of individual doctors to fulfil a right to 
health care. After all, medicine is a career and it is fair for doctors to want to 
earn a living. But Sade's conclusion does not follow from this line of thought. 
He argues that because it would be wrong to "steal" the doctor's services there 
can be no right to health care whatsoever; however, his argument only 
suggests that health care is not a positive in personam right. Contrary to Sade, 
there may be other ways of conceiving the right. 
25Robert M. Sade, "Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation," New England Journal of 
Medicine. 285 (1971): 1288. 
26Jbid., p. 1289. 
27sade makes too strong a claim of individual ownership for health care services. 
Doctors rely on communal resources during training and the accumulated knowledge of 
medicine, so health care resources cannot be strictly owned by them. This flaw in his 
argument is briefly addressed in chapter 3. 
34 
What Kind of Right? 
In New Zealand there is also a legal right to public health care, a legal, 
positive in rem right. Although the exact content of the "core services" is not 
specified in law, the Health Acts mandate the provision of a public health 
system. No such right exists in the United States. The prevailing legal view in 
the US seems to be that there are no constitutional restrictions against 
enactment of a right to health care, but a right to health care is not 
constitutionally guaranteed. 28 The USA does have examples of legal, positive 
in rem rights, however. The right to an education is a legally guaranteed right 
that an individual can claim from society in general. It is widely held that 
congressional enactments of health care programs are constitutionally 
permitted: Chapman and Talmadge have documented an extensive history of 
discussions about rights to health care in the US dating from the quarantine 
laws of 1796.29 Presumably, it would take nothing more than a bill from the 
legislature signed by the President to create a universal legal, positive in rem 
right to health care in the USA. 
A more difficult question is whether there is a moral positive in rem 
right to health care in New Zealand, the USA, or anywhere. This is the most 
direct way to approach the problem. There are a number of ways to argue for 
this moral right; usually it is based on an overarching theory of justice. The 
remainder of this thesis will be devoted to answering the question of whether 
there is a moral positive in rem right to health care and what its content might 
be. Although important, questions of the scope of a negative in rem or 
positive in personam right will not be addressed further. 
28w. T. Blackstone, "On Health Care as a Legal Right: An Exploration of Legal and 
Moral Grounds." Georgia Law Review. 10 (1976): 391-418. 
29c.B. Chapman and J.M. Talmadge, 'The Evolution of the Right to Health Concept in 
the United States." Pharos. 34 (1971): 30-51. 
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CHAPTER 3: FAMILIAR TERRITORY 
Having specified the kind of right to health care being discussed, 
possible foundations for the right should be examined critically. In this 
chapter several theories of distributive justice will be examined for 
strengths and weaknesses vis-a-vis health care, and a few non-justice 
approaches to a right to health care will be outlined also. As Norman 
Daniels states, "We are justified in claiming a right to health care only if it 
is derivable from an acceptable, general theory of distributive justice. 
Taken this generally, the point borders on a philosophical commonplace, 
despite the more general 'lay' practice of claiming rights wherever strong 
interests are felt. "1 Thus we can answer affirmatively to the question "Is 
there a moral positive in rem right to health care?'' if we can demonstrate 
that a general theory of justice demands it. 
Indeed, deriving a right to health care from a general theory of 
distributive justice is the most common approach. Distributive justice is 
such a far-reaching area that piecemeal adjustments (hopefully 
improvements) are possible, but comprehensive restructuring of health 
care resource allocation proves very difficult.2 The right to health care 
should follow the general theory in which it is based. Unfortunately, 
theories that seem to treat large portions of resource allocation well fall 
apart in some or many specific areas, i.e., no established theory of 
distributive justice seems adequate for all resource allocation situations. 
Difficulties arise because general theories of justice are blunt tools 
that have been developed to deal with human and societal inadequacies. 
Some have persuasively argued that a good society is simply one that 
provides necessary goods and services such as food, shelter and health care 
to those in need (regardless of their ability to pay).3 Certainly, all other 
lNorman Daniels. "Rights to Health Care and Distributive Justice: Programmatic 
Worries." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 4 (1979): 174-5. 
2Here I do not mean that restructuring is difficult for political reasons while I am 
well aware that this, too, is the case. My point is that purely (some would say merely) 
theoretical restructuring proves difficult. 
3Mark Siegler, "A Physician's Perspective on a Right to Health Ca,re." Joumal oft he 
American Medical Association. 244 (1980): 1591-1596. Siegler rejects the idea of a right to 
health care while embracing the idea that "every person receive competent, efficient, and 
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things being equat a society where everyone has something to eat, 
somewhere to sleep, and where people get the health care they need is a 
more desirable and more virtuous society than one where members 
cannot always get food, shelter or health care. These comparative 
judgments are made with no reference to justice or individual rights. 
However, this is not a new concept; David Hume made the point clear 
over 250 years ago: 
Justice takes its rise from human conventions ... and 
these are intended as a remedy to some 
inconveniences, which proceed from the 
concurrence of certain qualities of the human mind 
with the situation of external objects. The qualities 
of the mind are selfishness and limited generosity; 
and the situation of external objects is their easy 
change, join'd to their scarcity in comparison of the 
wants and desires of men ... .Increase to a sufficient 
degree the benevolence of men, or the bounty of 
nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying 
its place with much nobler virtues, and more 
favourable blessings.4 
Unfortunately we find ourselves in the conditions of justice: today's state 
of affairs is marked by a scarcity of public resources and an abundance of 
self-interest (or a shortage of benevolence). With nobler virtues in short 
supply we are forced to turn to justice. 
Alastair Campbell and Grant Gillett instructively point out that 
"theories of justice tend either to be process oriented or outcome 
oriented."5 Their division of theories of justice into two groups will be 
employed: interventionist theories (outcome-oriented) and liberal 
humane medical care." He feels "rights language is adversarial" and "the language of 
rights provides an impoverished moral vision of what a properly constituted society ought 
to provide its citizens in the way of health care" and rejects a right to health care for these 
among other reasons. He argues for access to health care based on "a well constituted 
society has duties and obligations that derive form the ideals of society or from a sense of 
decency or humanity or virtue." 
4David Burne, A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edition, Selby-Bigge, ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1978), 494-495. Quoted in Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the 
Limits of Justice. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 32. 
5 Alastair V Campbell and Grant Gillett, "Justice and the Right to Health Care," in 
Ethical Issues in Defining Core Services: Discussion Papers prepared for The National 
Advison; Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services, (Wellington, New 
Zealand: Government Press, July 1993), p. 13. 
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theories (process-oriented). Common to all theories of justice is the 
following minimal principle: like cases should be treated alike unless 
there is a relevant difference between them. Obviously, no two situations 
are identical; however, it is what the various theories of justice regard as a 
relevant difference that separates each of them. When examining theories 
of justice we must retain and apply our own intuitive sense of justice. 
Many agree an important test of a moral theory is whether it matches our 
intuitive responses to moral situations.6 In this chapter I will use this 
technique to discuss briefly several theories of distributive justice trying to 
point out each theory's strengths and weaknesses with respect to health 
care. It should be noted there is considerable diversity of opinion even 
within the broad classifications; however, due to space considerations, 
each theory will be dealt with only generally. 
Justice is roughly synonymous with fairness. It applies in an 
economic sense where individuals compete for scarce resources, but also 
in human actions in general where these affect others. Distributive justice 
is concerned with the way resources ought to be allocated in general and 
for specific things--like health care. It is helpful to think of resource 
allocation decisions as falling along a continuum from macro allocation to 
micro allocation. At the extreme macro- end of the scale we find decisions 
to questions like "How much public resources--the total allocated to all 
public goods--will be redistributed?" and "How much of the total resources 
is health care to receive?" Slightly less extreme we find "Given health 
care's slice of the total pie, how is that money to be divided up among 
various health services?" On the other hand, at the extreme micro- end of 
the scale we find questions like "Keeping in mind the range in cost of the 
drugs and the range of benefit provided by the drugs, which 
antihypertensive drug should this patient receive?" or "When should 
aggressive treatment be withdrawn in a case?" or "Who gets the final 
intensive care bed?" 
Whether a resource allocation decision is considered macro- or 
micro- is not inherent to the decision; it is relative to some other 
consideration. Hence, whether or not to have a cardiac unit in 
Christchurch is a microallocation decision when compared with how 
6Philip Petit, Judging Justice: An Introduction to Contemporary Political Philosophy. 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 35-38. See also John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 20-21. 
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much to allocate to Vote: Health, but it is a macroallocation decision when 
compared with who to operate on from the waiting list this month. Some 
call allocation decisions from the middle of the spectrum "meso-" 
allocation decisions, but the relative nature of the description persists. 
Reflection on the range of resource allocation decisions reveals 
some things. First, tough decisions on either end of the scale make the 
decisions at the other end less difficult. For example, if all (or nearly all) 
microallocation decisions were made very carefully to minimise 
expenditures, then resources would be less scarce for the macro- decisions. 
Conversely, if certain health services are removed from the system and 
certain expensive drugs are removed from the formulary by 
macroallocation decision makers, then (as unsatisfying as it may be) there 
is no microallocation decision to be made (in those excluded areas). 
Second, the exercise of resource allocation is a very different endeavour at 
either extreme of the scale. The microallocation decisions seem to be the 
domain of health professionals (either individual clinicians or a team of 
professionals involved in a patient's care), patients and families (where 
appropriate) alone. Whereas macroallocation decisions lend themselves 
to input from a variety of people including taxpayers, politicians, business 
experts, health professionals, and patients. The area in-between is less 
clear. At what point along the continuum are decisions the exclusive 
domain of health professional and patient?7 
· Failure to consider the full continuum of resource allocation 
decisions is the shortcoming of the various general theories of justice. 
The theories which treat macroallocation decisions quite well are less 
adequate in microallocation decisions and vice versa. Most ethicists 
committed to distributive justice have concentrated, perhaps unduly, on 
intra-medicine injustices: differences in access between rich and poor or 
urban and rural citizens, inadequacies in allocations to women's health, 
insufficient resources in mental health. These microallocation issues 
clearly warrant careful consideration; however, in addition one would like 
to see further consideration of macroallocation decision making, viz., 
public allocation decisions between various social goods. Paul Ramsey, in 
The Patient as Person thinks that the larger questions of how to choose 
7I have already tried to illustrate that macroallocation decisions affect 
microallocation decisions. In that sense doctor and patient are never alone, but presumably 
there would still be some latitude within which to operate in individual cases. My point is 
simply that input from "the rest of society" is inappropriate in microallocation decisions. 
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between medical and other societal priorities is "almost, if not altogether, 
incorrigible to moral reasoning."B To be sure, it is a difficult task, but 
'incorrigible to moral reasoning'? Thinking such as this and the writing 
that corresponds to it will long guarantee that philosophy does not have a 
seat at the public policy making table. To be fair, it would seem Ramsey's 
point is that public policy decisions are based on things so unrelated to 
theories of distributive justice that it is nearly impossible to apply sound 
moral reasoning to those decisions; and with that point I raise no 
objection. However, to even suggest that resource macroallocation 
decisions between various societal priorities are outside the purview of 
moral philosophy is absurd. Such a view denies the discipline of 
philosophy the abilities of any adult who has ever read the paper or 
watched the evening news. We all have an intuitive sense of what is just 
or unjust. The political cries of news conscious taxpayers can be heard at 
most dinner tables: "New Zealand can't afford to continue to subsidise 
tertiary education to the extent it used to." "Taxes should be raised to 
better fund the public health system." "New Zealanders won't stand for a 
two-tiered health system." "Primary and secondary teachers should have 
pay parity." Certainly Ramsey would not have us think these amateur 
libertarians and egalitarians are capable of intuitive reasoning that 
methodical moral philosophers are not. To the contrary, I propose that 
well-reasoned macroallocation arguments are where ethicists have the 
most to offer (with respect to resource allocation). And the ethicist's most 
important role is in the allocation decisions between society's various 
priorities--e.g., roads, education, museums and health care--the same area 
Ramsey seems to shun. If someone does not endeavour to "get the big 
picture" of public resource allocation, then that potentially allows for the 
biggest injustices to be perpetrated. After all, poor decisions on the more 
micro end of the macro-micro spectrum of resource allocation are often 
brought to our attention (e.g., specific patients who have been denied 
specific treatments because of lack of resources), but ethicists can fill a void 
by pointing out inconsistencies in society's allocation to various things 
(like defence and education). A well founded right to health care would 
take into account the full spectrum of allocation decisions. 
Bpaul Ramsey, The Patient as Person: Exploration in Medical Ethics. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1970), p. 240. 
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INTERVENTIONIST THEORIES (OUTCOME-ORIENTED) 
As the division suggests, interventionist theories are more 
concerned with the ultimate outcome of resource allocation than the 
process by which that outcome is achieved. If the outcome is not in fitting 
with the theory of justice, then the interventionist would have the state 
intervene to create a just distribution. For example, if the goal of a theory 
is simple equality of income and two people do not have equal incomes 
(regardless of the reasons that brought about their unequal incomes), then 
the state would equalise the two people's incomes. While outcome-
oriented theories contribute much to the discussion of resource allocation, 
most members of Western society would agree that State intervention 
should be held to a reasonable minimum. State intervention conjures a 
negative, heavy-handed, totalitarian image in Western society regardless 
of the ends that are being sought. For this reason, interventionist theories 
meet strong opposition by libertarians no matter how noble the goal of the 
specific theory. 
Egalitarianism9 
The first theory to be examined is egalitarianism which purports to 
hold that no individual differences are relevant. To be sure, all good 
egalitarians realise that all people are unique and different, but they deny 
that the differences are relevant to resource allocation decisions. In 
egalitarianism's pure form, all cases are to be treated equally out of respect 
for our common humanity. The most prolific contemporary advocate of 
egalitarianism, at least as it applies to health care, is Robert Veatch. Veatch 
advances the following principles as the basic tenets of egalitarianism: 
(1) Human beings are of equal moral worth in the 
sense that no human deserves a claim to more than 
or less than an equal share of available resources. 
(2) The natural resources of the world should be 
seen as always having had moral strings attached to 
their use. They have never been 'unowned' and 
available for appropriation and use without 
conditions attached. 
9for my understanding of egalitarianism--to the point which I grasp it-- I am 
indebted to Andrew Moore. Discussions with him pointed out important errors on my part. 
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(3) Human beings have a prima facie responsibility 
as moral agents to use the resources of the world to 
move society toward a distribution of resources that 
is more equal.l o 
Egalitarianism attempts to emphasise the sameness of individuals, and 
treat differences as irrelevant. As Veatch says, egalitarians strive for an 
equal distribution of resources. Minimal reflection, though, reveals that 
any attempt to equalise individuals in any one area encourages or even 
demands inequalities in other areas. The first question for any egalitarian 
is "Equality of what?"11 A few health examples make the case clear. If we 
aim for equality of health status, then justice mandates we direct resources 
(health care) to those who have sub-standard health. The individual 
differences in health status become highly relevant to allocation, and there 
are resultant inequalities in resources received. If we target equality of life 
span, then justice demands we direct resources to the young: despite 
similar health needs, young receive treatment preferentially to the elderly. 
Deciding what is to be equalised implicitly entails deciding what 
differences will be relevant and creates inequalities in other areas. 
Egalitarianism comes in at least two forms which will be referred to as: 1) 
strict egalitarianism and 2) pseudo-egalitarianism. 
While quite equitable on the surface, strict egalitarianism is easiest 
to criticise. While the question "equality of what?" remains, strict 
egalitarians want exact equality. Assume, for instance, the goal is an equal 
share of available resources. If all members of society are allocated an 
equal share of health care, the fortunate ones who live long, healthy lives 
as well as the unfortunate ones who die premature but sudden deaths 
(e.g., automobile accident, fall from a great height, suicide or homicide) 
will be allocated a share larger than they would use. On the other hand, 
unfortunate members of society with chronic illnesses and/ or illnesses 
that are particularly expensive to treat would not have a large enough 
share of resources to meet their needs. If we modify the position so that 
the goal is equality of overall resources, the sick could devote their share 
of resources from other areas to health care; and the well could use their 
lORobert Veatch, "Justice and the Right to Health Care: An Egalitarian Account," in 
Rights to Health Care. Thomas Bole and William Bondeson, eds. (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic, 1991), p. 85. 
11Andrew Moore, "Equality, Time, and Social Services," Unpublished paper, p. 1. 
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health care allocation on something else. One must ask if we wish to 
penalise the sick by requiring them to forfeit resources from other areas. 
In either form (an equal share of health care resources or an equal share of 
overall resources) strict egalitarianism is an inadequate, and at times 
irrational, theory. 
Pseudo-egalitarianism is a stronger, more applicable version, but 
notice how many inequalities it endorses. The pseudo-egalitarian wishes 
to distribute resources according to the most relevant and appropriate 
criterion in each area. For example, access to the finest educational 
institutions should be by intelligence and not by the income of one's 
parents. With regard to health care, Bernard Williams rightly states: 
"Leaving aside preventive medicine, the proper ground of distribution of 
medical care is ill health: this is a necessary truth."12 To each person 
according to individual need becomes the health care policy. The problem 
of the person with great health care needs--needs that far exceed that 
person's equal share--is alleviated in this construction. This is a 
particularly strong theory at the microallocation end of the scale: it 
adheres to an intuitive sense of justice that says sick people should be 
treated. It is consonant with the Hippocratic tradition which emphasises 
the responsibility of the doctor for the needs of the individual patient. 
The impact of the individual's treatment choice on the distribution of 
health care resources or its effects on the interests of others is irrelevant. 
However, the theory weakens when applied to the entire resource 
allocation scale. The most common criticism of this theory is that it 
denies the conditions of justice. Indeed, to each according to his need 
looks more like a principle describing distribution that would be possible if 
there were no problem of scarcity than a prescriptive principle of 
distributive justice designed to cope with the problem of scarcity. After all, 
the explosive health care expenditures of the USA outlined in the 
introduction are driven by health needs. Critics claim that this kind. of 
egalitarianism would place a great strain on public coffers. In response to 
this criticism, some egalitarians further qualify the statement: "to each 
12Bemard A. 0. Williams. "The Idea of Equality," in Justice and Equality. Hugo 
Bedau ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 127. 
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according to his essential needs."13 Critics reply that even this standard 
would be more expensive· than society can afford. Another proponent of 
egalitarianism, Gene Outka, carries the qualification one step further to 
"similar treatment for similar cases."14 This seems to abandon 
egalitarianism and return to the general concept of justice (like cases 
should be treated alike), but Outka's case actually embraces the ideals of 
egalitarianism (no personal differences are relevant to resource allocation 
decisions) while allowing for non-treatment in some instances where 
there is an essential need. Outka is willing to admit that resources may be 
too scarce to treat in all cases where need can be demonstrated: "the 
formula of similar treatment for similar cases may serve to modify the 
application of a need conception of justice in order to address the 
insatiability problem and limit frivolous use .... The goal of equal access 
then retains its prima facie authoritativeness. It is imperfectly realised 
rather than disregarded."lS 
Defining need is not straightforward, and further qualifying it is 
even more difficult. What separates a need from a mere preference or 
want? Perhaps in health care we could develop some objective criteria of 
well being which if not met would demonstrate a need. I am sceptical 
such a list of criteria with proper weighting can be developed, but for 
argument's sake let us assume it can. As outlined above, many critics 
claim we cannot afford to meet all objective health care needs; hence, 
some egalitarians have added qualifiers such as 'essential' needs. Even if 
we can arrive at a useful definition of need, modifying it is elusive because 
there is such a wide variation in what is considered 'essential'. 
Furthermore, what is required to 'meet' a need is a topic of debate. 
Consider surgery for cancer. Criteria for needing surgery for, say, bowel 
and prostate cancer could be developed relatively easily, but what it means 
to meet that need varies. In New Zealand, waiting lists for these elective 
operations are acceptable, but in the USA waiting lists would not be 
tolerated. For less urgent conditions, long waiting lists are accepted in 
13chiam Perelman, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument. trans. by John 
Petrie (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 23. Emphasis added. 
14Gene Outka, "Social justice and equal access to health care," In Ethics and Health 
Policy. Veatch and Branson, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976), p. 91-96. 
15Jbid., p. 93. 
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New Zealand, but not in the USA. Need, essential need, and what it 
means to meet these needs are not simple concepts. 
Veatch is aware of the difficulty of using need as the unqualified 
criterion of health care resource allocation: the most ill (i.e., the most 
needy) will wind up with all the resources. His stand is qualified to reflect 
the fact that some unfortunate people are incurably ill as well as the fact 
some people will not take advantage of opportunities they are given. For 
medical examples of the latter, many people (indeed most people to some 
extent) refuse to treat their bodies well with regard to diet, smoking, 
drinking alcohol, exercise, etc., and some people refuse preventative 
measures (e.g., immunisations) despite their availability. Veatch's final 
egalitarian statement is: "Justice requires everyone has a claim to health 
care needed to provide an opportunity for a level of health equal, as far as 
possible, to other persons' health."16 
Obviously, if sufficient qualifiers are added to the egalitarian ideal 
the resulting allocation could be within the resources of society. That is, 
the idea that health care is a resource allocation black-hole sucking in 
infinite resources can be avoided. However, the reasonable, sufficiently 
qualified egalitarian theory still makes no contribution to macroallocation 
decisions. It offers no way to compare needed health care with other social 
goods, other positive in rem rights. 
Egalitarians resist any two-tiered delivery system as unjust. The 
egalitarian right to health care requires that no one is to have access to any 
health care that is not also available to everyone else in similar need. 
From here a difficult problem arises. Either the level of health care to 
which everyone is entitled is set as high as technology allows or it is set at 
a level lower than that. In the former scenario (max tech care for 
everyone--levelling all care up) we are back to the problem of health care 
being more expensive than society can afford. In the latter scenario where 
the equal level of care is set at a point such that the overall expense of that 
care is within society's budget (levelling some care down and some care 
up), ill citizens with private resources are prohibited from buying high 
tech, beneficial health care that the public system does not offer and 
citizens are banned from advancing their health beyond a certain point. 
16Robert Veatch, "What is a 'Just' Health Care Delivery?" in Ethics and Health 
Policy. Veatch and Branson eds. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976), p. 134. 
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Surely something is amiss in a society where one can purchase luxury 
goods like yachts and expensive artwork but one cannot buy high tech 
health care. 
That leads to a final criticism of egalitarianism)? Some feel that 
everyone would readily agree to an unequal system as long as the worst off 
citizens were better off than they would be under a system of equal 
distribution. According to the critics, if the wealthy were allowed to pay 
for certain surgical procedures unavailable to the poor and this 
arrangement increased general surgical skill to a point where surgical 
outcomes improved significantly for the poor (as well as the rich), then 
everyone is ahead and no injustice is done. Another example is allowing 
the wealthy to avoid surgical waiting lists by paying for private surgery: 
this would benefit the worst off citizens, too, by shortening the waiting list. 
Egalitarians would respond that it is far more complex than that: the 
psychologically negative effects of different levels of health care for 
different classes of society far outweighs the benefit of any small 
improvement in outcomes. 
I do not take egalitarianism very seriously.l8 I unfortunately cannot 
divorce myself from my context, and I do not see egalitarianism as a useful 
theory of justice in our society. "All men were created equal" or more 
mildly stated we all deserve equal treatment because of the moral value of 
our common humanity or humanness seems only to extend to a few 
things in our capitalistic democracy. Certainly we all deserve an equal 
voice in the running of our government and justice demands equal 
treatment under the law, but, these issues· aside, egalitarianism has little 
place in our society. We all were not created equal, and our society makes 
little if any attempt to reverse the inequalities that have come about by 
luck of birth, natural endowment, individual initiative, or personal 
misfortune. Sure, there are many examples of laws written to blunt the 
impact of bad fortune, e.g., bankruptcy laws, unemployment benefits, 
provision for public education, but in none of these instances are we 
attempting to equalise the individuals of society. Education would come 
17 cf. Rawlsian justice below. 
18J have been accused of an inductive fallacy in the following three paragraphs. Just 
because our society is a certain way does not mean that it ought to be that way. My point is 
that society ought to perpetuate certain inequalities for the benefit of all, and health care 
is not a special area where equality must reign. 
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the closest, but even there it is obvious that the rich and/ or particularly 
talented have access to institutions that are an order of magnitude better 
than the public system. 
Some egalitarians would respond that this complaint is irrelevant. 
They might say the fact that our society tolerates, in fact encourages, so 
many inequalities is testimony to how immoral the society is. With these 
consistent egalitarians I can only disagree. Others, though, would agree 
that our society is not egalitarian. They might even agree that many 
inequalities are necessary and beneficial to an optimal society. A 
straightforward example is the inequalities of power that are necessary: a 
society requires a small number of people to be leaders, and the most 
effective leaders should hold those positions. This latter group of 
"egalitarians" would make a special case for the egalitarian treatment of 
health care. With regard to this group I agree with Charles Fried: 
For as long as our society considers that inequality 
of wealth and income are morally acceptable--
acceptable in the sense that the system that 
produces these inequalities is in itself not morally 
suspect--it is anomalous to carve out a sector like 
health care and say that there equality must reign.19 
I think Americans' reluctance to admit they do not take egalitarianism 
seriously is one impasse in the health care delivery system debate. In 
contrast to elsewhere in our society, we seem to want egalitarianism when 
it comes to health care. Many people are outraged when a treatment is 
available to one person but not another solely on the basis of ability to pay. 
Why? We cannot afford to pay for everything for everyone; should 
something not be available to those who can pay when we cannot provide 
it for those who cannot? I dare say the "levelling down" scenario would 
be the more repugnant of the two to Americans, but why are we hanging 
on to a desire to "level up" and provide everything to everyone? 
Utilitarianism 
The second outcome-oriented theory is utilitarianism which 
operates with the maxim "the greatest good for the greatest number." The 
relevant difference between individual cases in utilitarianism is how 
19charles Fried, "Equality and rights in medical care." The Hastings Center Report. 
6 (1976): 32. 
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much good consequences (utility) or bad consequences (disutility) would 
result from following either course. Utilitarianism attempts to maximise 
aggregate utility (and minimise aggregate disutility) in a system where 
each person counts as one and no one counts as more than one; all units 
of happiness and sadness are summed. Utility is defined as pleasure, 
satisfaction, happiness, or the realisation of preferences. Alleviating two 
units of sadness is equal to causing two units of happiness. Hence, 
utilitarian justice mandates that decisions be made to maximise utility. 
There are several different versions of utilitarianism, but the largest 
distinction is between two varieties: 1) act utilitarianism and 2) rule 
utilitarianism. The discussion will be limited to these two broad forms. 
Act utilitarianism is considered the more extreme as well as more 
difficult version because the act utilitarian always asks, "What will be the 
consequences of this action in this individual circumstance?" Rule 
utilitarians, on the other hand, justify actions by referring to general rules 
which have been calculated to increase overall utility if universally 
followed; however, in an individual circumstance the outcome of 
following a rule may increase or decrease utility. Rule utilitarians adhere 
to the principle of utility less strictly, but the difficulty of weighing the 
consequences of each and every action is obviated. In fact, a utilitarian 
moral theory can include rules that prohibit appeals to utility 
maximisation in individual cases (as long as the system of rules is shown 
to maximise overall utility). 
Utilitarianism is a powerful theory in which to ground a right to 
health care. Although the principle of utility does not explicitly include a 
right to health care, common sense says health care would be one of the 
goods that significantly contributes to maximising utility: utilitarian 
calculations would highly value medicine's ability to restore functioning, 
alleviate pain and suffering and prevent premature death. Although 
there are serious difficulties with utilitarianism that are discussed below, it 
is an influential theory that underpins many judgments considered 
intuitive or obvious. For example, few would argue that we should not, 
on the whole, attempt to maximise the health benefit brought about from 
public resource expenditure. And few people disagree with the concept of 
triage, based in utility. In triage, battle or disaster victims (patients) are 
divided into three groups: those requiring immediate treatment, those 
who can wait, and those who are beyond help. If doing the greatest good 
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for the greatest number is one's goal, then this is a quite just approach: the 
most victims are likely to have maximal recoveries (in context of their 
initial injuries). However, in a need based theory of justice it is 
questionable whether justice is served as all of the victims have needs. 
Other influential applications of utilitarianism in health care include 
quality adjusted life years (QALYs), cost-effectiveness analysis, and cost-
benefit analysis. 
Utilitarianism is particularly strong at the macroallocation end of 
the scale. Consider the following from H. Gilbert Welch: 
[W]e should remember that expenditures not 
directly related to health may be extremely 
important to the well-being of the poor. We must 
gain an appreciation of the value of other services, 
take a broad view, and be willing to ask ourselves 
hard questions. Are we sure that annual 
mammography is more important than a Head 
Start program? . Is treating drug addiction more 
useful than job training? Is one liver 
transplantation worth the price of housing for four 
families? The tradeoffs between health care and 
other social goods require careful consideration. 
When it is appropriate, we ought to be willing to 
advocate expenditures for food, housing, or 
education over those for medical care.20 
Most would consider Welch's questions reasonable, and they are patently 
utilitarian. If egalitarianism were a hands down better theory than 
utilitarianism, then these questions would not seem so reasonable; after 
all, the addicted patient and the patient with end stage liver disease both 
have legitimate, essential needs. Utilitarians recognise that job training 
and housing are important, too--sometimes more important than needed 
health care. Having praised utilitarian considerations, though, one must 
admit that when it comes to telling the 34 year old mother of four that she 
cannot get a liver transplant and she surely will die because the public 
resources are being used to build housing, utilitarianism feels a bit harsh. 
As suggested, utilitarianism weakens at the microallocation end of 
the scale. There is not a special place for the individual in utilitarianism. 
20H. Gilbert Welch, "Health Care Ticket for the Uninsured: First Class, Coach, or 
Standby?" New England Journal of Medicine. 321 (1989): 1264. 
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The objective is to maximise aggregate utility (viz., pleasure, satisfaction, 
happiness, or the realisation of preferences), but the theory is unconcerned 
with how the utility is distributed. Two examples illustrate this point. 
The first is the "Christians and lions" problem.21 Picture a society where 
there is a small minority group that is relatively outcast from the rest of 
society; Rome in the first couple of centuries will do, but take notice there 
are easy contemporary analogies. In this society the majority are greatly 
pleased by watching lions devour humans. Utilitarian calculations show 
that the happiness of the majority far outweighs the suffering of the 
Christians. Therefore, utilitarian justice mandates that the Christians be 
thrown to the lions. The repugnance most of us feel when an individual 
is ruthlessly sacrificed for the sake of a social goods/he cannot share is the 
strongest case against utilitarianism. A rule utilitarian might avoid the 
Christians and lions problem by invoking a rule that "Citizens cannot be 
killed for entertainment" because, although there are examples where 
utility favours it, on the whole it is a utility decreasing activity. Hence, 
utilitarianism is not necessarily guilty of cruel treatment of vulnerable 
minorities, but its critics are wary because it still endorses sacrificing the 
individual for the general good. 
The second example is between "statistical" and "identifiable" 
lives.22 Take rescuing a trapped mine worker, for illustration. The 
resources necessary for an all out rescue party could be demonstrated to 
save three or four future lives if devoted to improving safety in the 
mining area. A simple utilitarian calculation might mandate leaving the 
mineworker for dead and spending the resources on improving safety 
standards to save more futures lives, but this would agree with few (if any) 
people's intuitive sense of what is right. Utilitarianism fails to explain the 
general preference of identifiable individuals over statistical individuals. 
A more sophisticated utilitarian might say that the calculation was in 
error. Ensuring to all members of society that a rescue party would be sent 
for them if they were in the mine does so much to increase overall utility 
2lcampbell, Gillett and Jones, Practical Medical Ethics. (Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1992), p. 5. 
22JohnKleinig, Valuing Life. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 148-
153. See also Roger Evans, "Health care technology and the inevitability of resource 
allocation and rationing decisions: Part II." Journal of the American Medical Association. 
249 (1983): 2216. See also Maxwell Mehlman, "Rationing Expensive Lifesaving Medical 
Treatments." Wisconsin Law Review. (1985): 253-6. 
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that the rescue party must be sent out. Surely the sophisticated utilitarian 
is correct, but his I her calculations are more difficult and the theory less 
practical. For a less dramatic illustration, consider intensive care versus 
preventative care. Clearly, most aspects of good preventative care save 
more lives per dollar, but are we ready to eliminate life-saving medical 
care? 
Another criticism of utilitarianism is when it is adding up 
individual preferences it does not distinguish perverse or manipulated 
preferences. There is something wrong with using preferences to guide a 
moral theory the critics say. Think of substance abusers or gamblers: even 
though they prefer to drink alcohol, do drugs or gamble, surely we are 
right in saying their preferences are morally lacking. Consider the 
following with regard to manipulated preferences: 
If I lived in Huxley's Brave New World, then I 
would prefer a life of convenient and shallow 
hedonistic pleasures to any struggle with the 
uncertainties of 'normal', uncontrolled and 
sometimes unpleasant human existence. But most 
of us regard the fact that I would have been 
conditioned to enjoy Brave New World from 
before my birth as morally odious. If it is morally 
odious, then that is not because it goes against my 
preferences.23 
Finally, there is a practical criticism of utilitarianism: how does 
one do the calculations? how can utility be summed? Since people vary so 
much in their values it becomes very difficult. Microeconomists are 
sceptical about intrapersonal comparisons let alone interpersonal 
preference rankings. Does this leave us hopeless? To be sure, this is a 
valid criticism of utilitarianism and a real problem for the theory, but it 
has been overemphasised. All theories face similar problems: how do we 
measure need? merit? how do we decide who is least advantaged? Much 
can be learned from the general trends (but not the specific numbers) 
arrived at from utilitarian questionnaires regarding health care and other 
public resource allocation. The services people strongly prefer should be 
provided; the services that get low preference scores should be minimised 
or eliminated; and the ones in-between should be considered further. The 
23campbell, Gillett, and Jones, Practical Medical Ethics. p. 5. 
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Utilitarian calculus is not a sharp instrument with which to answer all of 
our resource allocation questions, but it deserves serious consideration in 
allocation discussions, particularly at the macro end of the scale. 
Merit Theory 
The third interventionist theory to be examined is merit theory.24 
Meritocratic theories hold that the relevant difference between 
individuals is the amount of energy expended or the type of result 
achieved by either individual. Meritocratic theories show weaknesses 
throughout the resource allocation decision continuum, but the general 
importance of desert criteria in most people's intuitive thinking about 
justice should be emphasised. The intuitive logic as well as the practical 
difficulties of meritocratic theories will be outlined. Meritocratic theories 
come in at least three forms: 1) to each according to individual effort, 2) to 
each according to achievement, and 3) to each according to societal 
contribution. 
In some contexts it is worthwhile to separate efforts from 
achievements. With efforts one focuses on the amount of energy 
expended by the individual. When assessing achievements one measures 
actual performance, successes, and productive contributions. There really 
is a difference. Athletic awards like "most improved player" are given to 
recognise hard work and improvement, whereas awards like "top scorer" 
are given for achievement regardless of the amount of effort, good fortune 
or support work involved. For a scholastic example, the top academic 
award is given to the student with the best grades, regardless of the 
amount of work the student had to do. The greatest individual effort may 
have been demonstrated by a student in the middle of the class. 
To each according to his societal contribution has a utilitarian 
flavour about it. This conception gives moral pride-of-place to the 
common good and the welfare of the community; it is less individualistic 
than effort or achievement. 
24A distinction is often made between merit (frequently a forward-looking, 
consequentialist notion) and desert (typically a historically-based notion). Although 
there is clearly a difference, neither is particularly helpful in health care, and they are 
being treated the same for simplicity's sake. 
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Gene Outka expresses the general importance of merit 
considerations well: 
These criteria may serve to illuminate a number of 
disputes about the justice of various practices and 
institutional arrangements in our society. It may 
help to explain, for instance, the resentment a:~;nong 
the working class against the welfare system. 
However wrongheaded or self-deceptive the 
resentment often is, particularly when directed 
toward those who want to work but for various 
reasons beyond their control cannot, at its better 
moments it involves in effect an appeal to desert 
considerations. 'Something for nothing' is 
repudiated as unjust; benefits should be 
proportional (or at least related) to costs; those who 
can make an effort should do so, whatever the 
degree of their training or significance of their 
contribution to society; and so on.25 
Positive examples of how these meritocratic theories would operate 
in health care are few. One can imagine a person who labours to have 
optimum health being favoured should s I he become ill. And few would 
argue that a President or Head of State should not receive treatment with 
priority to an average citizen. What about the unfortunate ill who are not 
praiseworthy? Should they receive any health care? What about the huge 
grey zone of societal contribution? Who gets priority between a city 
council member and a teacher? What is being compared--past societal 
contribution or future potential contribution? How does one attribute 
merit to children? These examples hardly illustrate a theory for resource 
allocation. 
It is in their negative form that meritocratic theories take shape in 
health care; not only do merit theories highlight the praiseworthy, they 
point out the blameworthy. Many people feel that along with all rights, 
especially a right to health care, come responsibilities, and if one is not 
willing to live up to demands of the responsibilities s I he forfeits her I his 
25Gene Outka, "Social Justice and Equal Access to Health Care," in Ethics and 
Health Policy. Robert Veatch and Roy Branson, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976), 82-
3. 
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right.26 Anyone who believes in a penal system agrees with this line of 
thought to a point; our society accepts that a person's right to liberty may 
be forfeited by his/her criminal activity. Many feel that health needs 
resulting from what is seen as a voluntary decision to take a health risk 
are not worthy of public subsidy.27 Egalitarian Robert Veatch asserts it 
would be unfair to not treat these risk-takers differently: 
... that it is fair, that it is just, if persons in need of 
health services resulting from true, voluntary risks 
are treated differently from those in need of the 
same services for other reasons. In fact it would be 
unfair if the two groups were treated equally.28 
One of the most popular examples is the longtime smoker who 
develops lung cancer many years after public health warnings about the 
dangers of smoking appeared. As the argument goes, the person with 
lung cancer "got what he asked for." "Surely she knew it would happen." 
Unfortunately it is not that clear. If the conclusion is to be that smokers 
who develop lung cancer have no valid claim to public health care 
resources, then it must be demonstrated the risk was taken voluntarily. 
Smoking is certainly a public health villain. Lung cancer causes 
over 1200 deaths per year in New Zealand, and clearly the most important 
causative factor is cigarette smoking. And the negative effects of smoking 
do not stop there; it plays a large role in heart disease, emphysema, 
respiratory infections, etc. The world would be a healthier place without 
smoking. However, comparing smoking's effect through lung cancer to 
another, more socially acceptable, public health villain is informative. 
Let's compare lung cancer to the morbidity and mortality caused by 
automobiles. When is the last time you heard someone blame the victim 
of an automobile accident for his/her own demise? "Surely she knew lots 
of people are killed in cars every year." Of course, there are a minority of 
26Roger Evans, "Health care technology and the inevitability of resource allocation 
and rationing decisions: Part II." Journal of the American Medical Association. 249 (1983): 
2210-1. 
27 An exception is voluntary health risks taken for public good. For example, 
firefighters and police officers injured in the line of duty would certainly be worthy of 
public subsidy. 
28Robert M. Veatch, "Voluntary Risks to Health: The Ethical Issues." Journal of the 
American Medical Association. 243 (1980): 54. 
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motor vehicle deaths caused by wanton recklessness, drugs and alcohol, 
but the majority of accidents are caused by mistakes that are inherent to 
driving. Strengthening this argument is the fact that it is not always the 
reckless driver who is killed or injured; indeed, it is often a passenger or 
an innocent person in another automobile. Even in the "no fault" 
accidents, it can be said that all drivers (and indeed passengers) know there 
is a small risk every time one travels in an automobile; it is a calculated 
health risk. The intuitive retort is that the obvious health risks of 
smoking far outweigh the minimal risk involved with driving. But the 
actual numbers paint a different picture. Research has shown that 
approximately 4% of those who have smoked for 40 years develop lung 
cancer (is taking a one in twenty-five risk asking for it?). Statistically, 
someone will die in a motor vehicle crash in one of every eleven New 
Zealand families. Crashes are the leading cause of death for New 
Zealanders under age 45.29 Road accident statistics for New Zealand in 
1992 show that 16,767 people were injured or killed. That is approximately 
0.5% of the population EACH YEAR (the percentage would be higher if 
those people who never travel by car could be deducted). If minor injuries 
are deducted, the number of New Zealanders killed (558) or seriously 
injured (2741) is 3299 which is 0.1% of the population every year.30 Lung 
cancer takes about 1200 lives each year. The health risks of driving and 
smoking are not so disparate as the intuitive retort. Granted, lung cancer 
is only one of several disease states linked to smoking, and the total 
impact of smoking would be much higher. On the other hand, lung 
cancer is the disease most directly linked to smoking (in other diseases, 
heart disease for example, smoking is a culprit but the risk factors are 
multiple), and if there is any difficulty making a case for blaming 
bronchogenic carcinoma patients it will only be more difficult for other 
illnesses. This is not to say we should all avoid our cars and smoke more 
instead, but rather when blaming victims for voluntary health risks we 
need to ask, 'Where will we draw the line?' and 'What will the penalty 
be?' 
29'fed Millar and Jagadish Guria, The value of statistical life in New Zealand: 
market research on road safett;. (Wellington: Department of Land Transport, May 1991), p. 
1. 
30Motorcycle statistics were deliberately excluded as they are considered at least as 
culpable as cigarettes in many circles. However, if motorcycle accidents were included, add 
88 fatalities and 673 serious injuries. Statistics from The New Zealand Yearbook 1994. 
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The punitive side of desert theories has been criticised in four ways. 
The first argument I have already begun: the slippery slope or where to 
draw the line. First, smokers and drinkers will be singled out. Then it 
will be rugby players, trampers, skiers. Will society soon enough penalise 
those of us who eat too much, exercise too little and have irregular 
sleeping habits? The critics from this perspective ask if life would be too 
dull if we first had to assess all of our actions to see if they promoted 
health. Isn't it punishment enough that the health risk-takers are sick in 
the first place? 
The second criticism asks what the penalty will be, and whether it 
can be fair. All writers on the subject seem to agree that exclusion from 
the health system would be too extreme. Many opt for levies or taxes on 
the risky behaviours. It is a simple enough exercise to put a tax on 
cigarettes, alcohol and gasoline, but how would those who participate in 
high risk sports be levied? Would a levy on high risk sports reflect both 
the health risks and health benefits of exercise? And if we penalise those 
who play high risk sports (e.g., through ACC levies on sporting 
organisations), what about those who endanger their health with a 
sedentary lifestyle? Is it fair to levy easily taxable items and leave other 
culprits untaxed? 
The third criticism is that, while some voluntary behaviour is 
obviously bad for one's health, there is no practical system of 
enforcement.31 That brings to mind a family conversation. While giving 
one of my relatives the stop smoking routine at a family get together my 
mother flippantly commented to me that if she smoked she would never 
tell a doctor about it. Half of her point was to silence me, but the other 
half is worth thinking about. If we try to implement any sort of a punitive 
system it would encourage dishonesty between patients and the health 
service. This certainly would be a negative side effect of such a policy. 
How would such a system be enforced? Would it require 'health police' 
or some other Orwellian big brother surveillance? 
The final criticism is the strongest, and it asks if human behaviour 
is truly voluntary. There are a range of viewpoints in this area. The most 
31James Childress, "Rights to Health Care in a Democratic Society," In Biomedical 
Ethics Reviews 1984. James Humber and Robert Almeder eds. (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press, 
1984), 60-63. 
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extreme is the social causation model of health and disease. According to 
Victor Sidel, 
... most health and illness are socially determined 
rather than individually determined. I refer not 
only to the obvious instance of environmental 
pollutants and other unhealthy conditions, but also 
to the fact that most personal health practices are 
culturally and societally determined.32 
Holders of this viewpoint feel that since society failed to prevent the risky 
activities, society is responsible for the outcomes. At its worst, the 
punitive side of merit theories actively diverts public attention and 
governmental responsibility away from addressing the social forces which 
cause or encourage disease.33 Merit theories can be nothing more than 
poorly disguised prejudices: it is no coincidence that frowned upon 
diseases are often concentrated among the lower socioeconomic class. For 
example, successful, workaholic, middle-aged entrepreneurs who suffer 
coronary artery disease in their forties are revered as societal heroes while 
truck drivers or shearers with lumbar back disease are considered 
malingerers until proven otherwise. A more moderate stance is the 
multicausal model of health and disease.34 This theory has a place for 
genetic, psychological, and social causation as well as allowance for 
voluntary acts affecting health. However, the multicausal model posits 
that we cannot determine the degree each element contributed to disease; 
hence, it is not possible or practical to blame the individual for his/her 
disease. This set of theories recognises that certain diseases and 
'voluntary' behaviours have a strong correlation with socioeconomic 
class, and questions whether we can blame people for their illnesses. 
LIBERAL THEORIES (PROCESS-ORIENTED) 
In contrast to interventionist theories, liberal theories are more 
interested in having a just process of resource allocation than in the 
32Victor Sidel, "The Right to Health Care: an International Perspective," in 
Bioethics and Human Rights: A Reader for Health Professionals. Elsie Bandman and 
Bertram Bandman eds. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), p. 347. 
33John Allegrante and Lawrence Green, "When health policy becomes victim 
blaming." New England Journal of Medicine. 305 (1981): 528-9. 
34Robert M. Veatch, "Voluntary Risks to Health: The Ethical Issues." Journal of the 
American Medical Association. 243 (1980): 53. 
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eventual outcome of the distribution. Obviously, the procedural 
principles that a theory endorses are intimately associated with a vision of 
the good. That is, a process is chosen which will presumably lead to a 
certain vision of society. However, if the process is assiduously followed 
and the outcome is not in keeping with that vision of the good, then the 
outcome is unfortunate but not unjust. The process was not violated. 
Liberal theories do not sanction any State intervention to change the 
unfortunate outcome. Of course, the process could be amended as 
necessary to avoid future unfortunate outcomes. Liberal theories are 
more suited to fit Western democracies than interventionist theories. 
Rawls's Theory Of Justice 
One of the most influential recent works in philosophy is John 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice. Although Rawls's theory has many critics as 
well as fans, all would agree it is a book of considerable influence which 
has created much discussion. Rawls's theory is a process-oriented social 
contract theory with a distinctly egalitarian flavour. Many advocates 
generally sympathetic to egalitarianism appeal to this theory in part 
because it avoids heavy-handed government intervention. 
Rawls's theory is a direct repudiation of utilitarianism as the 
grounds of social justice. Rawls's principle objection to utilitarianism is 
that maximising utility allows a distribution of social goods that violates 
basic individual liberties and rights that should be guaranteed, regardless 
of their effect on overall utility. As pointed out above, utilitarianism 
secures no place for the individual. It is concerned with aggregate utility 
in a society and is indifferent to the distribution of utility among 
individuals (recall the Christians and Lions argument). 
Rawls's theory uses a novel procedure to arrive at the principles of 
social justice. The procedure involves an imaginary contract situation 
which Rawls calls the "original position." The individuals participating 
in the social contract are to be ordinary, rational citizens who stand behind 
a "veil of ignorance." The veil prevents the individuals from knowing 
anything about their eventual station (socioeconomic class, gender, 
religion, race, occupation, etc.) in society. They are not permitted to know 
about the society for which they are promulgating rules. Thus they will 
not decide matters of social justice in a self-serving way; they would not be 
able to. They are, however, permitted to know true general facts about the 
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human condition. Although the participants have been equalised to the 
point where they cannot be self-serving by the veil of ignorance, each 
participant remains distinct and can defend his/her vital interests. Thus 
no basic beliefs/values have been assumed by Rawlsian justice. 
It could be thought that the veil of ignorance reveals so little to the 
contract parties that they could not devise any rules for social justice. In 
response to this, Rawls develops the concept of primary social goods: 
goods or values that are of instrumental use to virtually any life plan. 
These are in contrast to primary natural goods (e.g., intelligence) which are 
certainly important, but beyond the purview of social justice. Thus, from 
the vantage point of the original position, contractors would seek rules to 
maximise his/her share of the primary social goods without actually 
knowing his I her station in society: contractors in the original position 
have everyone else's interests in common. For Rawls the primary social 
goods are: 1) basic liberties, 2) diverse opportunities and freedom of 
movement and choice of occupations, 3) powers and prerogatives of office, 
4) income and wealth, and 5) the social bases of self-respect. 
Rawls's theory of justice rests on two principles which he asserts 
would be unanimously agreed to by the social contractors in the original 
position. First, the principle of greatest equal liberty: each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. Second, social 
and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: a) to the 
greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference principle) and b) 
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity (principle of fair equality of opportunity). Thus, 
the contractors agree that liberties (negative rights) are to be distributed in 
an egalitarian manner, whereas the other primary social goods will be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution benefits the worst off 
individuals. For example, inequalities in income and wealth will be 
tolerated if the financial rewards for successful entrepreneurs stimulate 
the economy enough to make the income of the poorest higher than it 
would be under an equal income system. 
Notice that several obvious candidates are missing from the list of 
primary social goods, e.g., food, clothing and shelter. It is assumed that if 
everyone receives a just share of income and wealth then these necessities 
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can be purchased. Health care, too, is missing from the list. How one 
treats health care in terms of Rawlsian justice leads to different 
conclusions since Rawls himself was silent on the matter. Hence it is 
quite possible to read two "Rawlsian" accounts of just distribution of 
health care resources that are quite different. 
In one of his earlier articles35, Norman Daniels explains there are at 
least four ways to fit health care into the list of primary social goods. In 
the first two strategies, health care would be added as a sixth primary social 
good. As pointed out above, one of Rawls's primary social goods--the basic 
set of liberties--is not subject to the difference principle. In the first 
strategy, health care is added as a primary good on par with the basic set of 
liberties. Thus, a right to equal access to health care is generated similar to 
the right to equal basic liberties. Ronald Green takes this approach. Green 
writes: 
Access to health care is not only a social primary 
good, in Rawls's sense of the term, but possibly one 
of the most important such goods. I have already 
indicated the central place Rawls believes contract 
parties would give to civil liberties. But certainly 
the same can be said for health care. Even more 
apparently than governmental interference, disease 
and ill health interfere with our happiness and 
undermine our self-confidence and self-respect. 
Indeed, some who have disputed the priority that 
Rawls gives to the civil liberties have done so 
precisely because they believe that other values, 
especially physical well-being and security, are to be 
rationally preferred.36 
The conclusion from this application of Rawls's theory to health care is: 
"each member of society, whatever his position or background, would be 
guaranteed an equal right to the most extensive health services the society 
allows." Not surprisingly, this is the egalitarian argument revisited, and it 
is open to all the same criticisms. If health care is ranked as this centrally 
important, then how can we assess trade-offs between it and other social 
35Norman Daniels, "Rights to Health Care and Distributive Justice: Programmatic 
Worries." Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. 4 (1979): 174-91. 
36Ronald Green, "Health Care and Justice in Contract Theory Perspective," in Ethics 
and Health Policy. Robert Veatch and Roy Branson, eds. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 
1976), p. 117. 
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goods? Good health care alone does not make a life worth living--what an 
impoverished view of the good. 
In the second strategy, health care is added as a sixth primary social 
good, and is distributed according to the second principle. If distributed 
unequally, then it will be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. 
This construct is compatible with a two-tiered health system where those 
who can afford it receive max-tech care as long as benefit also accrues to 
the least advantaged. Obviously, Rawlsian principles are designed for an 
enduring, dynamic society; thus, there are limits on the gulf that can 
develop between the most advantaged and the least advantaged. Benefits 
need to be apportioned so as to guarantee a stable society. Take, for 
example, plans to build a new, private, state-of-the-art paediatric hospital 
and research facility. Public approval is needed for such an endeavour, 
and a freeze-frame application of Rawlsian justice might wrongly 
conclude that the 'public' benefit from new research at the facility would 
be sufficient to count as benefiting the least advantaged. However, 
looking at the private hospital in the context of an ongoing society shows 
the new research to be inadequate spin-off to the least advantaged. Such a 
facility would encourage an ever-widening gap between the most and the 
least advantaged. The hospital could still be built, but a more reasonable 
benefit to the least advantaged would be requiring some portion of the 
beds in the hospital to be dedicated to charity care. Thus, the benefit to the 
least advantaged would be more direct. The difference principle avoids a 
central criticism of egalitarian theories, viz., that people should be able to 
spend their private resources on expensive medical care. It leaves a 
problem with how to weight health care in the primary goods index. 
Some worry that the urgency of health care needs would give so much 
weight to health care as to return us to the black hole problem. 
The third strategy uses the principle of fair equality of opportunity 
to put health care on par with education; both provide a critical, necessary 
background condition for the realisation of other primary social goods. If a 
person is ill or uneducated, s/he is unfairly disadvantaged in the pursuit 
of occupations, positions of power and income and wealth. This is the 
approach Norman Daniels takes in Just Health Care. His account is 
designed to help answer two important health care resource allocation 
questions. First, what makes health care morally special? For Daniels the 
answer is that ill health is a barrier to normal species functioning which is 
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necessary to pursue opportunities, and (some forms of) health care can 
return individuals to their normal opportunity range. Daniels states that, 
the "moral function of the health care system must be to help guarantee 
fair equality of opportunity."37 Second, how are various health care 
interventions ranked relative to one another? Daniels suggests that those 
interventions which do most to return people to normal species 
functioning should be ranked highest. 
The fourth strategy is simply to leave health care as something to be 
purchased along with food, clothing and shelter with one's own fair share 
of income and wealth. This approach to health care is quite similar to the 
libertarian approach except one's share of income and wealth would 
theoretically be higher in Rawlsian justice than libertarian justice if one 
were 'least advantaged.' As in libertarianism, this account provides no 
guidance for how to treat children or the handicapped; obviously their 
income will be insufficient to acquire adequate health care. And those 
who have a low income secondary to their illnesses and inability to work 
seem to fall through the cracks, too. 
On the positive side, Rawls's theory avoids heavy-handed state 
intervention by being process-oriented. It carves out a special place for the 
individual not allowing individuals to be merely means to an end. It 
places liberties, negative in rem rights, on their own level above and more 
sacred than positive in rem rights which is roughly the conclusion arrived 
at in chapter two. However, while advantaging liberties, Rawls does not 
neglect positive in rem rights. And he takes quite seriously the idea that 
unequal distributions often benefit everyone. 
The strongest criticism against Rawls's theory of justice is quite 
fundamental. Critics ask whether contractors in the original position 
behind a veil of ignorance would actually choose the difference principle. 
Are people really so afraid to take a risk that they would demand 
distribution to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged? This Rawlsian 
concept of maximising the minimum one could possibly receive in society 
is questioned. Many feel most contractors would choose a distribution 
that allowed greater potential maximums with a safety-net minimum 
(below a Rawlsian maximin). There is certainly empirical evidence that 
37Norman Daniels, Just Health Care. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), p. 41. 
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people are quite willing to take substantial risks for possible gains. If this 
criticism is legitimate, then Rawls's theory gives us little guidance. 
Libertarianism 
Libertarianism is a pure process view which holds that the relevant 
difference between individuals is the entitlement created by past 
circumstance or actions. Justice to libertarians is confined to free and fair 
exchanges in the marketplace. It wants nothing to do with redistribution: 
The term 'distributive justice' is not a neutral one. 
Hearing the term 'distribution,' most people 
presume that some thing or mechanism uses some 
principle or criterion to give out a supply of things. 
Into this process of distributing shares some error 
may have crept. So it is an open question, at least, 
whether redistribution should take place; whether 
we should do again what has already been done 
once.38 
This theory is so opposed to all welfare rights that it is not useful in a 
discussion of establishing a right to health care. While I feel 
libertarianism can be successfully refuted, it would not advance the cause 
of demonstrating a right to health care. Hence, only a few comments will 
be made. The argument that a broadly conceived negative right to health 
care entails many positive entitlements was outlined in chapter two, and 
libertarians hold negative rights paramount. The case against the 
libertarian repudiation of welfare rights is strengthened by the argument 
that both positive and negative rights are legitimate moral rights. In the 
previous chapter, the error of only recognising negative rights was 
addressed. 
NON-IUSTICE APPROACHES 
Societal Investment And Return 
Tom Beauchamp frames an argument based on societal investment 
and return. The public can claim a right to health care because all of the 
institutions for health care research and education are heavily publicly 
subsidised. Beauchamp writes, 
38Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 149-50. 
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The collective social system that funds the 
education of physicians and medical research--and 
not merely the education and research of 
professionals in public health--is heavily subsidised 
by public funding. Like any system of protective 
insurance, investment, and return in which the 
public is involved, a decent return on one's 
contribution is anticipated, and that return should 
come in this case in the form of protection of health 
or alleviation of illness and injury.39 
While it is clear that these institutions are publicly subsidised, it is less 
dear the subsidy is intended to be in exchange for private medical services. 
A strong argument could be made that the expenditure is in the name of 
public health, and the funding is to provide new treatments and sufficient 
doctors--not medical services. It is unclear what sorts of positive in rem 
claims could be substantiated with this argument. 
While this line of thought may not help to establish a positive in 
rem right, it makes an important contribution to refuting a popular 
argument. To quote Robert Sade again, "In a free society, man exercises 
his right to sustain his own life by producing economic values in the form 
of goods and services that he is, or should be, free to exchange with other 
men who are similarly free to trade with him or not."4° Sade argues that 
health care services are an example of economic values that individual 
doctors create and should be free to exchange as each sees fit. Doctors, 
however, do not stand alone. Recognising that the great body of medical 
knowledge has been accumulated by the individual efforts of many past 
and present scholars coupled with the fact much of this work was publicly 
subsidised, makes Sade's view that medical services are the individual 
property of doctors appear ridiculous. 
Beneficence/Charity: Obligations Without Rights 
Because of the unsatisfactory results of applying general theories of 
justice to health care and a perception that justice is not the only relevant 
39-fom L. Beauchamp "Right to Health Care in a Capitalist Democracy/ In Rights 
to Health Care. T.J. Bole and W.B. Bondeson eds. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic, 1991), p. 65. 
4°Robert M. Sade, "Medical Care as a Right: A Refutation." New England Journal of 
Medicine. 285 (1971): 1289. 
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moral value in health care, some authors have emphasised beneficence or 
charity in health care resource allocation. There are two main proponents 
of this stand. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical 
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research argued 
that there is a societal obligation to provide "an adequate level of care 
without the imposition of excessive burdens."41 Although far from 
specific, arguing for an adequate level "acknowledges the need for setting 
priorities within health care and signals a clear recognition that society's 
resources are limited and that there are other goods besides health."42 
Allen Buchanan argues for enforced beneficence. The basic premises are: 
1. The provision of at least some of the more 
important forms of health care to the needy 
can be viewed as collective goods, and strictly 
voluntary schemes for securing them may 
succumb to familiar obstacles to successful 
collective action--in particular, the free-rider 
problem and the assurance problem. 
2. In some cases, enforcement of obligations to 
contribute is both necessary and sufficient for 
the successful provisions of collective goods, 
including important forms of health care for 
the needy. 
3. The fact that enforcement is necessary and 
sufficient for achieving such a morally 
fundamental collective good as the provision 
of the most important forms of health care to 
the needy is a strong prima facie justification 
for enforcement, independently of whether 
the individuals who will receive the good 
have an antecedent moral right to it.43 
As outlined in chapter two, our goal is to investigate the foundation 
for a moral positive in rem right to health care; thus, this approach is 
inadequate by definition. Beneficence or charitable obligations do not 
41President's Commission, Securing Access to Health Care, Vol I. (Washington, DC: 
US Government Printing Office, 1983) partially reprinted in Contemporary Issues in 
Bioethics third edition, Tom Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters, eds. (Belemont, CA: 
Wadsworth, 1989), 559. 
42[bid, p. 561. 
43Allen E Buchanan, "Justice and Charity." Ethics. 97 (1987). See also Buchanan, 
"Health-Care Delivery and Resource Allocation," in Medical Ethics. Robert Veatch, ed. 
(Boston: Jones and Bartlett, 1989), 322-325. 
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entail rights. There are two senses of obligation (also outlined in chapter 
two): strong obligations are correlative with rights, but weak obligations 
have no corresponding rights. Beneficence and charity are weak 
obligations. Bentham would call these self-regarding obligations; it is my 
duty to be charitable, but no one can make a claim against that duty. This 
is not to claim the argument is without merit. Indeed, much like the 
argument that health care is a natural extension of collective protection 
(i.e., a negative in rem right), this argument from beneficence/ charity 
carries a lot of weight. Hence we should take note of both positions. 
However, both approaches are destined to fall short of the goal which has 
been set: to find an appropriate foundation for a positive in rem right to 
health care which both establishes the right and assists us in rationing 
decisions. 
The Right To A Decent Minimum 
The right to a decent minimum is somewhat misplaced in this 
section of non-justice approaches. The advocates of a right to a decent 
minimum of health care envision it as a matter of justice, and would 
consider not fulfilling the right an injustice; hence, it is a justice approach, 
loosely defined. It is placed here because of its lack of a clear philosophical 
foundation and its lack of roots in any general theory of justice. 
As Allen Buchanan observes, a consensus that there is a right to a 
decent minimum pervades the philosophical literature as well as public 
policy debate.44 The concept has at least four strong points which have 
lead to its popularity. First, it is sufficiently vague as to bring people with 
significantly differing opinions on the topic under the same umbrella. 
The vague nature of the principle could also be seen as a weakness. 
Second, it recognises that some kinds of health care are more important 
than others; it avoids the excesses of what Buchanan calls the 'strong equal 
access principle' (exemplified in this chapter by Robert Veatch's 
egalitarianism and Ronald Green's application of Rawlsian justice). 
Third, the idea of decent minimum is to be understood in a society-
relative sense. Citizens of all nations can expect a decent minimum, but 
the specifics of the right will be notably different in Australia and 
44Allen E Buchanan, 'The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care." Philosophy 
and Public Affairs. 13 (1984), reprinted in Contemporan; Issues in Bioethics, third edition. 
Beauchamp and Walters, eds. (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1989), 572-577. 
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Bangladesh. Finally, since the right to health care must be limited, the 
right to a decent minimum suggests it should be limited to the 'most 
basic' services, those adequate for a 'decent' life. Obviously, this final 
strength of the theory is also a weakness. What exactly is adequate for a 
'decent' life? How do we define basic'? 
TABLE 2: What is BASIC Care? 
Basic 
inexpensive 
preventative 
low tech 
primary 
acute 
Non Basic 
costly 
curative 
high tech 
secondary or tertiary 
chronic 
Robert Veatch illustrates the difficulty in deciding what counts as basic.45 
As shown in the chart, inexpensive, preventative, low tech, primary, and 
acute care are each thought of as more basic than costly, curative, high 
tech, secondary or tertiary, and chronic care, respectively. How do we 
categorise care that cuts across these pairs? Is inexpensive, high tech, 
tertiary care basic or non-basic? Basic care may very well be the care 
entailed by a right to health care, but defining it is a difficult matter. 
As Buchanan states, "In spite of these attractions, the concept of a 
right to a decent minimum of health care is inadequate as a moral basis for 
a coercively backed decent minimum policy in the absence of a coherent 
and defensible theory of justice. "46 Buchanan then offers a hodgepodge 
supporting theory made up of the combined weight of four less 
encompassing arguments (prudential arguments and arguments from/ for: 
special rights, the prevention of harm, enforced beneficence). While it 
seems Buchanan is correct that the idea of a decent minimum has many 
advantages, this is an inadequate supporting structure. We require a 
theory that retains the advantages of this concept while being based in a 
stronger, clearer supporting framework. 
45Robert M. Veatch, "Should Basic Care Get Priority? Doubts About Rationing the 
Oregon Way." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. 1 (1991): 191-194. 
46Allen Buchanan, Contemporan1 Issues in Bioethics. p. 574. 
67 
Familiar Territory 68 
CONCLUSIONS 
The complexity of resource allocation has been emphasised 
throughout this chapter. The areas of relative strength as well as 
weakness have been illustrated in each theory of distributive justice 
examined. The three most plausible approaches are Robert Veatch's 
egalitarianism, Norman Daniels' application of Rawlsian justice, and the 
right to a decent minimum. By plausible I mean these theories are both 
reasonable (they have some intuitive appeal) and have a significant 
number of adherents. Still, none of these theories is adequate for all 
situations. The conclusion is that each theory of justice deserves a voice 
in resource allocation, but that it would be dangerous to lay the 
foundation for a right to health care in any one of these theories of justice. 
After all, one would assume an egalitarian right to health care would 
demand an egalitarian distribution of resources. A pluralistic approach to 
resource allocation is suggested giving each theory a voice where 
appropriate. This is further explored in chapter five. 
In his introduction to Rights to Health Care Thomas Bole, III warns 
us to avoid the "fanaticism of justice"47 Any canonical ranking of values 
inherent in a theory of justice is unlikely to be acceptable to someone who 
does not share that view of justice. There is no theoretical reason why 
multiple theories of justice cannot be employed to arrive at an acceptable 
allocation of health care resources. Indeed, it is this type of compromise 
that is most likely to succeed in gaining public approval. 
Where does that leave us with regard to establishing a right to 
health care? It would seem reasonable to say the total volume of evidence 
for a right to health care given by the justice and non-justice arguments is 
enough to persuade us a right to health care exists. I am willing to accept 
that, but it is wanting in terms of a systematic approach. To say a right to 
health care exists because the majority of the evidence says one should is a 
bit weak. In the next chapter the right to health care will be grounded in 
one version of human rights theory. This foundation is appropriate to 
allow each theory a voice in resource allocation where appropriate. 
47Thomas Bole III, "Introduction," in Rights to Health Care. Bole and William 
Bondeson eds. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1991), p. 10. 
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CHAPTER 4: NEW BEGINNINGS 
Human Rights theory provides the best foundation for a right to 
health care. Moreover, human rights theory provides an appropriate 
foundation for all moral (positive as well as negative) in rem rights. A 
straightforward initial question is, "What are human rights?" The 
literalist might reply, "The rights of humans, of course." Further 
explication of the concept, though, has proven elusive, and has been the 
subject of many volumes of work. Different authors express widely 
varying conceptions of human rights. In this chapter, the great range of 
human rights theories will not be mapped. Rather, attention will be 
focused on a single theory as the source of an appropriate right to health 
care (and other moral in rem rights). Several key issues for all theories of 
human rights will be outlined, and the specific strengths of the 
constructivist theory will be highlighted. Finally, the content of the right 
to health care will be addressed by examining the priority-setting 
mechanisms of the constructivist theory. 
First, some preliminary questions should be answered. It could be 
asked fairly, "Haven't we been discussing human rights throughout this 
thesis? Why are we just now getting to a theory of human rights? or 
What is the difference between these human rights and the rights to 
health care discussed in the last chapter?" To paint with dangerously 
broad strokes, there are four basic elements which most moral theories 
account for: duties (what one 'ought' to do), goals (consequentialist 
reasoning), virtues and rights. Different ethical frameworks place 
differing levels of importance on each of these elements. Utilitarianism, 
for example, makes goals paramount, but this is not to say there is no place 
for rights. Rights could be derivative from the central goals of the theory: 
a rule utilitarian theory might have a rule that entails a right to (at least 
some forms of) health care (because, on the whole, it serves to increase 
utility). Human rights theories, on the other hand, give pride of place to 
rights. A right in a theory of human rights is central to the theory--not the 
result of what one ought to do (like a right to health care based in 
beneficence or charity) or a consequentialist calculation. To be sure, 
though, rights all give certain entitlements to the right-holders. 
Furthermore, there is (some) room for rights in most moral theories. The 
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distinction is the relative importance of rights to the individual theory. In 
this chapter rights will be central to the moral theory, not derivative as in 
the rights discussed in the previous chapter. 
Doctrines of human rights have a long and impressive history 
dating from the Stoics and Roman jurists.l Human rights have enjoyed a 
particularly important spot in moral thought since John Locke (1632-1704). 
While important to moral reasoning, human rights are by no means 
beyond contention: they have been passionately defended and 
vehemently denied. Albeit debate continues, the importance of human 
rights to contemporary thought is witnessed by documents such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted in 1948 by the United 
Nations. 
NATURAL RIGHTS VERSUS HUMAN RIGHTS 
Occasionally, though not consistently, a distinction is made between 
natural and human rights.2 John Locke originally wrote of natural rights 
which were freedoms of the individual from the government in terms of 
Life, Liberty and Property. For Locke, natural rights were essentially 
negative rights. Over time, the idea of natural rights expanded and came 
to include many positive rights as well. When made, this distinction 
usually means that natural rights are the, essentially negative, rights of the 
early theorists and human rights are the, positive as well as negative, 
rights of the more recent theorists. 
The matter is complicated, though, by the fact that some use the 
distinction between natural and human rights to differentiate between the 
rights discussed by contemporary libertarians (natural rights) and 
contemporary human rights theorists} Clearly, libertarians and human 
rights theorists share a common heritage in the writings of John Locke. At 
some point there was a division in this line of thought where one group 
1Margaret MacDonald, "Natural Rights," in Theories of Rights. Jeremy Waldron 
ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 21-23. 
2Eugene Kamenka, "The anatomy of an idea," In Human Rights. Kamenka and Alice 
Erh-Soon Tay, eds. (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), p. 5. 
3John D. Arras, "Utility, Natural Rights, and the Right to Health Care," In 
Biomedical Ethics Reviews 1984. James Humber and Robert Almeder, eds. (Clifton, NJ: 
Humana Press, 1984), 23-45. 
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progressively enlarged the concept of natural rights to contain positive, 
social and economic rights. This group became the human rights 
theorists. The other group emphatically limited the idea of natural rights 
to negative, civil and political rights--today's libertarians. 
Inasmuch as it is unclear, the distinction between natural and 
human rights is not important, and, therefore, I will not employ it. The 
concept of human rights seems to have undergone a natural evolution to 
include positive as well as negative human rights. As discussed in chapter 
two, there is an inherent tension between positive and negative rights: 
the more resources society demands from each individual to honour 
positive rights, the more society infringes on the liberties of the 
individual. This tension has lead to reductionist arguments that only 
positive or only negative rights are truly moral rights. There is the 
argument that negative rights are essentially an instrument of the 
privileged to maintain the status quo. This side argues negative rights are 
meaningless without positive rights. The full-belly argument asks "how 
many starving people are concerned with freedom of religion?" From the 
other extreme, many libertarians argue there is simply no need for 
redistribution, no need for welfare rights at all. Consider Kuenzi's 
comments. 
A 'right' merely defines a freedom of action--free 
speech, peaceable assembly, press, etc. The only 
right that a government can guarantee, then, is that 
of freedom of action in those areas outlined by our 
constitution. Health Care [by contrast] is a service 
provided by doctors and others functioning in a free 
society, to people who wish to purchase it.4 
According to Kuenzi and others, the only valid rights are liberties, 
negative rights. In the atmosphere of free and fair market exchanges, 
there is no cause for redistributing goods. This, the libertarian argues, 
smacks of paternalism: if citizens wanted something they would acquire it 
in the marketplace. Why should society second-guess rational 
consumers? Both of these arguments seem to go too far. Consider the 
right to life of a child. Certainly, this encompasses both negative and 
positive rights like freedom from harm and a right to health care if 
seriously injured. Thus positive and negative rights are in a delicate 
4o.E. Kuenzi, "Health Care, a Right?" Missouri Medicine. 70 (1973): 111. 
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balance with one another: neither should dominate the other, and both 
are necessary. Both positive and negative rights will be referred to as 
human rights in this chapter. 
WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 
We return to the question, "What are human rights?" Human 
rights are the universal rights of humans: they are rights which are 
claimed on behalf of all people in all situations. Whether or not an 
individual enjoys her/his human rights, they are rights s/he should 
enjoy. Human rights are the moral (positive and negative) in rem rights 
of the second chapter. They are the things individuals can claim from 
society at large. 
Above it was mentioned that the four basic elements of any moral 
theory are goals, duties, virtues and rights. Can there be a right-based 
ethic? J.L. Mackie argues that there can and should.s We are all familiar 
with goal-based, consequentialist moral theories--most notably the many 
forms of utilitarianism. Duty-based, deontological theories (in their many 
forms) are well-known, too. However, while there are right-based 
political theories, there are no common examples of complete right-based 
moral theories. Mackie suggests that Rawls's theory of justice and 
(portions of) Mill's utilitarianism may be right-based, although neither is 
explicitly so. At the end of the day, there are no well-developed right-
based moral theories, but there are no theoretical prohibitions either. I am 
not sure I can or will advance beyond the contributions of Mackie in 
developing a complete moral theory below, but a right-based theory does 
make an appropriate foundation for a right to health care. 
Most authors agree the source of human rights must be our 
humanity, our common human nature. The problem lies in illuminating 
human nature and how it gives rise to rights. It has been popular to argue 
that human rights are based on human needs. This theory is attractive 
because it avoids the philosophical difficulty of defining human nature in 
order to promulgate a list of human rights. A simple operational 
definition of need would be "A needs x if and only if x is essential to the 
5J.L. Mackie, "Can there be a Right-Based Moral Theory?" in Theories of Rights. 
Jeremy Waldron ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984): 168-181. 
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proper functioning of A."6 Presumably a scientifically demonstrated 
human need entails a human right. This line of thought rests on a 
narrow biological view of humanity. Thus, one could run a controlled 
experiment systematically denying humans specific things to see if they 
are negatively impacted (presumably physiologically or perhaps 
psychologically). If the lack of a something, x, caused improper 
functioning (i.e., illness), then there is a human right to x. 
However, closer inspection shows this approach to be beset with 
difficulties, too. The list of scientifically demonstrable needs based on a 
narrow biological view is short indeed: minimum nutrition, basic shelter, 
minimal social interaction and life-saving medical care.7 Surely, there 
would be more rights on a complete list of human rights. Notice that both 
positive and negative rights are inadequate in this biological needs 
conception of human rights: liberty could be restricted nearly to the point 
of causing illness. In response, "soft" needs have been added to some 
theories. For example, Donnelly writes: 
[Abraham] Maslow recogises a wide range of 
hierarchically ordered needs, ranging from 
survival, safety, love and affection, to higher needs 
for 'belongingness', esteem and self-esteem, up to 
'metaneeds' of truth, goodness, beauty, wholeness, 
aliveness, uniqueness, perfection, completion, 
justice, simplicity, richness, effortlessness, 
playfulness and self-sufficiency.s 
Most would agree (at least some of) these things should be included in a 
list of human rights, but the principle contribution of the need-based 
theories was their empiricism. With the "soft" needs added the theories 
lose much of their empirical value. This underscores an important 
problem with using needs. Need demands either too much or not nearly 
enough. With a narrowly defined biological view of health needs there 
6Jack Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights. (Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd, 1985), 28. 
7While it does nothing to support or refute a need-based human rights theory, notice 
that this sort of reasoning closely resembles the egalitarian distribution of health care 
based on needs. It would lend itself to the same criticisms. Of course, health care would be 
the only area where the two theories would be identical: egalitarianism would distribute 
other goods equally and a needs-based human rights theory would only address goods 
which are scientifically demonstrated needs. 
8Donnelly, The Concept of Human Rights. p. 29. 
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are valid claims to very little. However, if we adopt something akin to the 
World Health Organization definition of health (viz., "health is a state of 
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity"9), then there are valid claims to a great 
deal more than any society could offer. Everyone realises the correct 
balance is somewhere in-between, but it is unclear how a theory of needs 
can suggest a reasonable list of human rights. We return to the problem of 
illuminating human nature and how it gives rise to rights. 
Along with the difficulty of explicating human nature there are at 
least three other problems or strong criticisms that human rights theories 
run up against. Each will be briefly mentioned here, and discussed further 
below. First, doctrines of human rights are accused of being too 
individualistic; some feel they deny community obligations. Second, 
explaining the universality of human rights is problematic when so many 
people obviously do not enjoy them. Finally, some denounce human 
rights as an impoverished moral notion. 
Jack Donnelly argues for a constructivist theory of human rights in 
political philosophy. He argues "the source of human rights is man's 
moral nature .... Human rights are 'needed' for human dignity, rather than 
health, and violations of human rights are denials of one's humanity 
rather than deprivations of needs. We have human rights ... to those 
things 'needed' for a truly human life."lO The items on a constructivist 
list of human rights will be those things necessary to lead a life of human 
dignity. The rights on the list are not idiosyncratic, however. They apply 
to all members of a given society. Donnelly envisions a dialectic between 
politics and ethics. This theory has several strong points. 
First, it is a 'constructivist' theory. It says, in effect, if you treat a 
person like a human, then you will get one. Constructivism is contrasted 
with essentialism which is defined as a belief in true essence--that which is 
most irreducible, unchanging and therefore constitutive of a given person 
or object. Constructivism insists that essence itself is a historical 
construction, and its proponents attempt to illustrate that many essences 
9World Health Organization, "A Definition of Health," from the Preamble to the 
Constitution of the World Health Organization. Reprinted in Contemporary Issues in 
Bioethics. Third Edition, Beauchamp and Walters, eds. (Belemont: Wadsworth, 1989), 79. 
1 Doonnelly, The Concept of Human Rights. p. 31. 
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are in fact the effect of complicated discursive practices. Constructivism 
has found its largest audience among feminist scholars. Many feminists 
have brought under suspicion the idea of an irreducible, immutable, 
metaphysical essence defining "Woman." They have suggested instead 
that we can speak only of specific "women" constructed by variable and 
historically specific sets of social relations.ll Donnelly is applying this line 
of thought to man's (and woman's) moral nature. The institution of 
slavery provides an example that our moral judgements are indeed, in 
some measure, constructed. Slavery in its least heinous form--in which 
slaves were well fed, not beaten and treated with some respect (although 
still treated as slaves)--was an institution accepted by many otherwise 
right-minded individuals in its time. Today we find it difficult to fathom 
an acceptable form of slavery. Our society has had an impact on our moral 
judgements. The constructivist theory has a clear place for the effect of 
society on human nature and vice versa. It recognises that human nature 
can reach its greatest potential with a little nurturing. 
The constructivist theory of human rights is not excessively 
individualistic. K.R. Minogue explains a standard criticism of human 
rights: 
The idea of an independent individual pursuing 
his own self-generated purposes has often been 
taken as an implausible account of human beings, 
because they are more realistically to be understood 
as the creatures of their society, framing purposes 
they draw from its traditions in a language they 
inherit from its collective creativity .12 
The constructivist theory of human rights accepts the societal heritage of 
the individual, but it also welcomes the idea that people differ radically 
about the type of life they elect to pursue. It embraces pluralism in the 
spirit of "we would not be where we are today without our history and our 
llDiana Fuss, Essentially Speaking: Feminism, Nature & Difference. (New York: 
Routledge, 1989). Fuss argues that feminists have been too eager to cast aside essentialism, 
and that most of the theories aimed to refute essentialism actually make important 
essentialist assumptions. Ultimately, she is pro-constructivism, but she envisions a place 
for essentialism also. This argument plays little role in our discussion, but her book defines 
the issues well. 
12K.R. Minogue, "Natural rights, ideology, and the game of life," in Human Rights. 
Eugene Kamenka and Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds. (London: Edward Arnold, 1978), p. 21. 
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society, but each individual deserves to be treated with dignity." 
Admittedly, community concerns are secondary to individual concerns. If 
human rights were exercised viciously, it could negatively impact the 
community. For example, if a right to health care entitled individuals to 
ambulance services and 24 hour emergency care (as most would feel it 
should), it is easy to envision abuse. Individuals with non-urgent 
illnesses might utilise ambulance and emergency services as a matter of 
convenience. Clearly, this would be an abuse of the system. We accept 
that it is the individual who must decide if his or her illness requires 
immediate attention, and with this as a premise it is difficult to construct a 
system that could prevent abuse. If we accept the patient's perspective 
there is no practical way to differentiate a misperceived symptom from 
abuse of the system (e.g., an individual could perceive non-cardiac chest 
pain as a possible heart attack or he/ she could just want something to help 
him/her sleep). Respect by the individual for the system is required to 
avoid wasting resources. The constructivist theory holds that, on the 
whole, individuals will respect society's institutions if society treats the 
individuals with dignity. Human rights theorists hold that it is more 
important to insulate the individual from a potentially vicious 
community than to protect the community from a potentially vicious 
individual. All the while, the constructivist emphasises that human 
nature and society are in dialectic. An important, though secondary, place 
for the community remains. 
The constructivist theory does not rely on an abstract vision of 
human nature. It makes the moral claim that human rights are founded 
in humanity's moral nature and are needed for human dignity. Any 
right-based theory has to face the issue of whether the rights it endorses 
are universally valid and determinable a priori by some kind of reason or 
are historically determined in and by a particular society. The 
constructivist straddles the fence: the package of rights needed for dignity 
are universal but the particular rights in the package only become specific 
in a society at a specific time. This explains the obvious historical 
particularity of some things we wish to claim as human rights without 
denying the universal nature of human rights. The universality of 
human rights means that all humans anywhere, anytime deserve to be 
entitled to the things necessary to lead a life with human dignity because 
they are human. However, different entitlements will be necessary in 
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different time periods depending on human knowledge, technology and 
financial constraints. 
Take health care, for example. There are differences in what we 
claim as a right both between societies and across time. The medical 
interventions necessary for human dignity are considerably more 
extensive now than they were at the turn of the century, and one could 
argue that no one would have made a human right-claim for health care 
just a few hundred years ago. Who would be interested in claiming a right 
to leeches and bloodletting? Few truly saw these modalities as beneficial--
they were just something to try when nothing could be done. Leeches and 
bloodletting--or any other commonly acknowledged quackery--are not 
required for a life of dignity. Today things are different. Medicine is seen 
as an effective science, and much of what it can offer is viewed as 
necessary for a life of dignity. 
Although knowledge and available technology are now essentially 
constant across the globe at a given time, financial constraints are not. 
Thus the content of the right to health care will be significantly different 
between affluent and impoverished societies at the same point in time. 
Interventions taken for granted in the Western world--like modern 
intensive care or CT scans--would be completely inappropriate in Rwanda, 
where potable water is a more pressing and appropriate concern. The 
differences in health care brought about by differences in wealth between 
nations does not suggest that the human right to health care is being 
violated in the poorer country. Such a stand would be absurd; the 
entitlements demanded for a life of dignity (particularly positive rights) 
only gain specificity within a given society during a specific time. 
The constructivist theory also allows for the less-laudable but 
undeniable potential of human nature. No one can deny the existence of 
evil in the world; evil that is often caused seemingly deliberately by 
humans. Human nature is a complex item made up of humanity's 
natural, social, historical and moral elements. The source of human 
rights is humanity's moral nature. While the constructivist theory is 
optimistic about the resulting moral character if one is treated with 
human dignity, it provides an explanation for the dark side of human 
nature. If you do not treat a person with human dignity, it is quite 
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possible to create something sub-human. The constructivist theory does 
not demand a rosy image of human nature. 
The constructivist theory of human rights is very optimistic: the 
underlying moral vision of human nature, if expressed and implemented 
in the form of human rights, will create the envisioned person. Thus 
human rights represent a special sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. They 
provide an environment where a truly human being can lead a life of 
dignity, developing and expressing the moral possibilities of human 
nature. 
Joseph Raz strongly criticises the notion of a right-based moral 
theory as impoverished.13 Raz says right-based moralities are deficient 
because rights are the grounds of duties and nothing more. He claims that 
three things do not enjoy their true moral significance. First, there are 
things that we ought to do which do not amount to duties; duties are only 
a subset of oughts. Second, right-based moralities cannot account for the 
nature of supererogation and its role in moral life.14 Third, right-based 
moralities do not allow intrinsic moral value to virtue and the pursuit of 
excellence. 
Raz's misgivings are misplaced; they may apply to some right-based 
theories, but not to the constructivist theory.15 The constructivist theory 
is right-based, yet it retains an important place for virtue and the pursuit 
of excellence as well as considerations of what one ought to do. Recalling 
the distinction between in personam and in rem, Raz is criticising the 
constructivist theory for not having in personam characteristics in an area 
designed for in rem considerations. Human rights are moral (positive and 
13Joseph Raz, "Right-based Moralities," in Theories of Rights. Jeremy Waldron ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 182-200. 
14To clarify, there are three levels of morally correct actions (as outlined in chapter 
two): required acts (with strong obligations), expected acts (with weak obligations) and 
supererogatory acts (with no obligations). Only strong obligations entail rights. Thus Raz 
is claiming that right-based moralities have no place for weak obligations (things we 
ought to do which do not amount to duties) and supererogation. 
lSin fairness to Raz, his essay was not discussing the constructivist theory. He was 
addressing the theory sketched by J.L. Mackie. Raz argues for a pluralistic understanding 
of the foundation of morality. There are, he says, fundamental goal, duty, right and virtue 
elements. The constructivist theory, as outlined here, may actually be close to what Raz 
envisioned: it places rights as central to society in general while retaining an important 
place for other moral elements with regard to the individual. 
78 
New Beginnings 
negative) in rem rights. They are the things required to live a human life 
of dignity which the individual can claim from society at Large. Donnelly 
is a political philosopher, and hence his attention is appropriately focused 
on in rem considerations--the area of political relevance. Naturally, there 
is little consideration of individual ought or virtue in this area of the 
theory. A complete constructivist theory (one extended beyond political 
morality), however, is not devoid of these important elements. 
A COMPLETE CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY 
At this point, a sketch of the overall moral theory I envision can be 
made. A complete constructivist theory includes each of the four 
fundamental moral elements--rights, duty, virtue and goals. The basic 
underlying assumptions of the complete constructivist theory are: 
1) There is a plurality of reasonable visions of the 
good that are mutually compatible within limits. 
2) Everyone should have the freedom to choose 
how to live (i.e., how to strive for his/her vision 
of the good). 
3) Human rights should guarantee individuals the 
things necessary to live a life of dignity. 
Human rights are central to the theory. Should positive and negative 
human rights be handled differently by the constructivist theory? 
Theoretical difficulties (outlined in chapter two) must be conceded. 
Negative in rem rights usually require governmental enforcement. Take 
the police and court system, for example. A large portion of what they do 
is assist people to enjoy their liberties as much as possible. However, the 
police and the court system require public revenues, a fact that obscures 
any straightforward positive/negative distinction. One is really asserting 
more than a negative in rem right when one asks for police assistance; one 
expects the state to protect citizens from crime with public resources--a 
positive in rem right. Thus, rights to protection contain both negative and 
positive rights within their broad scope. Furthermore, the positiveness or 
negativeness of a right is not set in stone; depending on changing 
circumstances, the same right can be considerably more or less positive. 
However, amid these theoretical difficulties, an important distinction 
remains. 
Positive and negative in rem rights are not two species of a 
common genus. By their very nature (almost by definition) positive rights 
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cannot be absolute; they must be limited. They are dependent on 
resources that are scarce, and the inherent exhaustability of positive rights 
needs to be addressed; a theory that neglects this feature would be 
inadequate. Negative rights are limited, also, but the constraints are less 
severe. Liberties are only limited inasmuch as they interfere with the 
liberties of others. 
It follows that negative human rights should be distributed so that 
everyone enjoys the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system for al1.16 Positive human rights should 
be distributed to allow individuals to lead a life of dignity. Separating the 
way positive and negative rights are distributed is important when 
considering human rights in an impoverished nation. While it has 
already been illustrated that positive rights in these societies will be 
severely limited without violating human rights, the same can not be said 
for negative rights. Members of poor societies should enjoy roughly the 
same liberties as their affluent neighbours. The right to free speech and 
the right not to be tortured do not shrink along with the right to health 
care in a developing country. 
Beyond social justice, considerations of ought and virtue weigh 
heavily in the individual's moral life. Individuals should be concerned 
with assisting other individuals to live a life of dignity. 
Ought and virtue prove important in the in personam aspects of 
the constructivist theory. Due to limited resources and the inevitable 
variation in personal opinion, individuals will perceive deficiencies in a 
society's human rights. That is, some individuals will feel that other 
individuals are not being enabled by society to live a life of dignity. 
Though the beneficiary would hold no entitlement to such treatment, 
individuals would have an obligation to (they ought to--a weak 
obligation) assist those in need. Those who assist fellow humans are 
morally praiseworthy, and those who do not are morally culpable. Some 
of the variation in behaviour, though, will be attributable to an honest, 
non-vicious difference in opinion. There are many health care examples. 
Take post-menopausal oestrogen replacement therapy, for instance. The 
16The constructivist theory handles negative in rem rights much the same way that 
Rawls's A Theory of Justice does, but the positive in rem human rights are treated 
differently. Both recognise the priority of liberties. 
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pain and suffering from advanced osteoporosis are easily demonstrable. 
And the daily administration of oestrogen to post-menopausal women 
has been demonstrated to slow the progression of osteoporosis. 
Furthermore there are other benefits from oestrogen for some post-
menopausal women. From these facts, two groups of physicians are 
formed. One feels that oestrogen replacement therapy (ERT) is warranted 
in all post-menopausal women (for whom there is no contraindication). 
The other feels that only certain women at high risk for osteoporosis 
should be given oestrogen. Both stands are reasonable. Hence, within a 
limited budget, it is reasonable for a health system to fund publicly ERT for 
high risk women only. Some in the former group might feel this is 
substandard medicine and endeavour to treat all post-menopausal 
women. They might argue that life with advanced osteoporosis is a life 
lacking human dignity; hence, all efforts should be made to prevent 
advanced osteoporosis. Others would not. While the jury is out on which 
group is medically correct, both the aggressive and the conservative 
doctors are acting on their reasonable interpretation of the data. Despite 
their actions being opposite, neither group is morally superior to the 
other. 
This serves as an example that our incomplete knowledge of the 
human situation will result in different individuals treating the same 
people in different ways. This is not to opt for an extreme moral 
relativism, because some actions are unequivocally morally wrong. 
Rather it is to highlight that where knowledge of the situation is 
equivocal, opposite actions can both reasonably be treated as morally 
virtuous. 
I would push the role of virtue in the constructivist theory one step 
further. Virtue and well-being are intimately connected.17 The 
constructivist theory holds that human nature and society are in dialectic. 
If a person is treated like a human being (by recognising that person's 
human rights) then the positive aspects of human nature are fostered and 
the person becomes a truly human being. The next step is to include the 
notion that the individual must treat other people with human dignity to 
foster his I her own human nature. Conversely, if one denies another 
person something needed for human dignity, then one's moral character 
17Grant Gillett, "'Ought' and Well-being." Inquiry. 36 (1992): 287-306. 
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is harmed. Having a regard for what one ought to do, living a virtuous 
life, is essential to human well-being. 
THE CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY AND HEALTH CARE 
Having endeavoured to demonstrate the richness of the 
constructivist theory, our attention should be focused again on the more 
narrow problem of how the constructivist theory treats health care, and 
whether it provides any advantages over rival theories. We are now in a 
position to answer the question 'Does a moral positive in rem right to 
health care exist?' As argued in this chapter, we all have human rights to 
the things that are needed to live a life of human dignity. Clearly, health 
care meets this standard. The adolescent with a sprained ankle, the elderly 
person with pneumonia, the middle-aged man having a heart attack, the 
young adult with acute appendicitis, the young pregnant woman and her 
unborn child, the elderly man with arthritis, the middle-aged woman 
with hypertension, and the man with dyspepsia all require medical 
attention to lead a life of human dignity. There is a human right to health 
care; without health care individuals are reduced to a pathetic and 
sometimes hopeless state. Although in no particular order, the above list 
contains right-claims for health care which merit different priorities. The 
man with dyspepsia has less of a claim on our resources than his 
neighbour who is having a heart attack. This is not to trivialise dyspepsia; 
it may be the early symptoms of a stomach ulcer which may later pose him 
with a life-threatening problem. However, as has been repeatedly 
emphasised, no society can afford to pay for all desirable health care 
interventions. Priorities must be set. Nor is it suggested that dyspepsia 
should be left untreated, but it does merit a lower priority than a heart 
attack. 
We have examined other justifications for the right to health care. 
Egalitarian Robert Veatch argues we have a right to health equal to the 
health of others; health care is necessary to attain this. Utilitarians argue 
that health care does so much to alleviate pain and suffering that there 
must be a right to some forms of health care because of its 
overwhelmingly positive affect on utility. And Norman Daniels applied 
Rawlsian justice to health care, and argued that health care is necessary to 
guarantee fair equality of opportunity. Each of these are compelling 
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arguments, but each must operate under the same budgetary constraints as 
any other theory. Again, due to limited resources, priorities must be set. 
Have we gained anything in applying the constructivist human 
rights theory to health care? We have another justification for the right to 
health care, but we still operate under a limited budget. Was it worth the 
effort? The constructivist approach to the right to health care is superior 
in setting priorities for health care. As argued in chapter three, there are 
three arguments for the right to health care which stand out from the rest: 
Veatch's egalitarianism, Daniels' account of equality of opportunity, and 
the right to a decent minimum. Utilitarianism has many strong points, 
but it is an inferior approach because it does not respect the individual. 
The priority-setting mechanisms of these three main rival theories will be 
outlined, and then the superior human rights approach will be sketched. 
Starting with the simplest case first, the right to a decent minimum 
suggests that priority be given to the "most basic" services. As pointed out 
in chapter three, it is a difficult task to define "basic." Veatch has 
explained that "basic" is thought of as encompassing several different 
criteria, and health care interventions may be basic by one criterion yet 
non-basic by another. If the right to a decent minimum were to be 
employed, much greater specificity would have to be added to the idea of 
"basic." 
Egalitarianism, per Veatch, is much clearer about how to set 
priorities. Veatch's statement of egalitarian justice in health care is 
"Justice requires everyone has a claim to health care needed to provide an 
opportunity for a level of health equal, as far as possible, to other persons' 
health."18 For Veatch, the worst-off patients get first priority. He writes, 
Those whose health is worst are entitled to enough 
health care to get them as healthy as others. We 
should target our efforts on the sickest.. .. The 
medically worst off have a complete claim of justice 
on health care resources in order to bring them, as 
far as possible, up to the level of health of 
others .... the egalitarian claim is that, difficult 
though it may be, we must include those conditions 
18Robert Veatch, "What is a 'Just' Health Care Delivery?" in Ethics and Health 
Policy. Veatch and Branson eds. (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1976), p. 134. 
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which constitute the greatest assault on one's 
health.19 
While this is lucid, it is not very helpful. We already expend a 
tremendous amount of resources on the worst off. Consider the following 
quotes from various American sources over a number of years: 
By the early 1980s some 30 to 35 percent of Medicare 
expenditures were devoted to that 5 percent of the 
total number of recipients who were in their last 
year of life, and similar provocative figures were 
emerging about the cost of care for the dying and 
critically ill in all age groups.20 
In any year, the sickest 1 percent of patients account 
for about 30 percent of health spending and the 
sickest 5 percent of patients account for 58 percent of 
costs, report analysts Alan Monheit and Marc 
Berk .... The healthiest 50 percent of Americans 
account for 3 percent of annual costs. Nor are the 
sickest 1 percent just the very old; slightly more 
than half are under 65.21 
In 1977, per capita expenditures for those over 65 in 
the US were $1745; they were $661 for those age 16-
64 and $253 for those under 19 (Gibson and Fisher 
1979:3-16) ... 0ne study shows that 50% of all hospital 
charges are to some 13% of the patients, the 
seriously chronically ill. About 40% of these 'high-
cost' patients are over 65, whereas only 15% of the 
low-cost patients are (Zook and Moore 1980: 996-
1002).22 
19Jbid., pp. 133, 141. 
20Daniel Callahan, What Kind of Life: The Limits of Medical Progress. (New York: 
Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 226. 
21The Editors, Newsweek. (October 4, 1993): 35. 
22Norman Daniels, Just Health Care. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 86-7, paraphrasing RM Gibson and CR Fisher, "Age Differences in Health Care 
Spending, Fiscal Year 1977." Social Security Bulletin. 42 (1979): 3-16, and CJ Zook and FD 
Moore, "High-cost Users of Medical Care." New England Journal of Medicine. 302 (1980): 
996-1002. 
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Almost 30% of all Medicare expenditures are 
devoted to the 6% of enrollees who are in the last 
year of life. 23 
If we shift priorities to further favour the worst-off, there would be 
nothing left for anyone else. This is not to advocate abandoning the worst 
off, but giving them a complete claim on health resources does not seem 
rational. Where do pregnant women fit into this kind of priority list? 
Surely they cannot be considered among the worst off, but do we want to 
give maternity care a low priority? How about people with chronic 
diseases? And because healthy individuals are clearly not the worst-off, 
prevention does not enjoy its proper place in this prioritization, either. 
It is tempting to think this is a misreading of Veat.;:h. The above 
quotes are approaching twenty years old, and the conclusions flowing 
from this argument seem too unreasonable. However, Veatch has 
remained steadfast in his views. Consider his more recent discussion of 
the infinite demand problem and its effects on preventative medicine: 
Surely the blind are not as healthy as others and 
egalitarian justice would require diverting some 
resources to try to help them, but if enough 
resources were diverted so that it cut into the 
healthy persons' supply of polio vaccine, the 
healthy would be medically worse off. In fact, if 
enough doses were diverted, polio could become 
rampant and all would be at serious risk. At some 
point the previously healthy would be at a high risk 
and might actually be worse off than the group of 
blind persons. Justice would then require diverting 
resources from the better off blind persons in order 
to benefit the now least well off persons at high risk 
for polio. Justice itself sets its own limits to the 
infinite demand problem.24 
If prevention can only merit a high priority as the risk of acquiring a 
completely avoidable disease increases, there is something faulty with the 
theory of justice. It would seem Veatch has taken a good idea--giving 
23Victor Fuchs, "The health sector's share of the GNP." Science. 247 (1990): 536. 
24Robert Veatch, "Justice and the Right to Health Care: An Egalitarian Account," in 
Rights to Health Care. Thomas Bole and William Bondeson, eds. (Dordrecht, The 
Netherlands: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 98-99. 
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some priority to the worst off--and allowed it to destroy the workability of 
his theory of egalitarianism. 
Now we turn to the strongest of the rival theories, Norman 
Daniels' application of Rawlsian justice. In Just Health Care Daniels starts 
with the assumption that equality of opportunity is an element of justice. 
He does not argue for that principle, but says that Rawls offers a good 
account in A Theory of Justice. Daniels asserts that, while he draws from 
Rawls, his work is compatible with any theory of justice which holds 
equality of opportunity as a principle. 
Daniels argues that the moral importance of health care needs lies 
1n their effects on opportunity. Health care needs are analogous to 
educational needs: "The combination of their unequal distribution and 
their great strategic importance for opportunity puts these needs in a 
separate category from those basic needs we can expect people to purchase 
from their fair income shares, like food and shelter."25 For Daniels, the 
"moral function of the health care system must be to help guarantee 
equality of opportunity."26 For Rawls, equality of opportunity is connected 
with individuals' ability to secure jobs and positions of power. As this 
does not assist us in ascribing value to health care for non-workers 
(children, retired people, etc.), Daniels broadens equality of opportunity to 
include all the things individuals want to do, and he adds the idea of an 
age-relative opportunity range. 
Daniels proposes a sensible criterion for setting priorities. He 
recognises that some kinds of health care are more important than others, 
and suggests health care interventions should be prioritised by their 
relative ability to correct impairments of the normal opportunity range. 
This, of course, does not answer all questions. Do we favour completely 
effective treatments for mild disorders over significantly (but not 
completely) effective treatments for serious disorders? Is preventing a 
disorder preferred to curing it? 
25Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 46-7. 
26Jbid., p. 41. 
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Some of these questions are answered when Daniels lists the 
following "layers" of health care services:27 
i) preventative services 
ii) curative services 
iii) chronic care 
i v) terminal care and care for the seriously 
mentally and physically disabled. 
This ranking is quite problematic. It runs the risk of overvaluing 
prevention, undervaluing chronic care, and category iv is inappropriately 
ranked. Each problem is discussed in tum. 
Prevention may be overvalued here. Many of the greatest successes 
of medicine have been in the area of prevention: immunisations, for the 
best example, have had a profound impact. However, most prevention is 
not as effective as immunisations, and some things billed as prevention 
are simply wasteful. This example will illustrate. Pregnant women with a 
history of genital herpes require screening to ascertain whether they have 
an active infection close to the time of birth of their child. If they do, a 
caesarean section is required to avoid transmitting the infection to the 
child. Nearly half of neonates who contract herpes die or are left severly 
disabled from the infection. This obviously is a preventative screen for 
the child. There are two ways to carry out the screening. The considerably 
less expensive option is simply undergoing a physical examination. 
Unfortunately, this will not detect cases of subclinical infection. The 
second option is to undergo weekly viral cultures in the final weeks of 
pregnancy. This more expensive approach will detect additional cases of 
genital herpes and prevent some cases of neonatal herpes (and hence save 
the lives of some neonates). However, it is very expensive. One study 
suggests that the cost of each case of neonatal herpes prevented by such 
screening is US$1,840,000.28 Is this sort of prevention to be ranked above 
chronic care for hypertension or arthritis? 
27Jbid., p. 48. 
28Nancy J. Binkin, et al, "Preventing Neonatal Herpes: The Value of Weekly Viral 
Cultures in Pregnant Women with Recurrent Genital Herpes." Journal of the American 
Medical Association. 251 (1984): 2816-2821. For another example of wasteful prevention 
see Duncan Neuhauser and Ann Lewicki, "What Do We Gain from the Sixth Stool Guaiac?" 
New England Journal of Medicine. 293 (1975): 226-228. 
New Beginnings 88 
The category of chronic care suggests similarities where none exist. 
Much chronic care merits ranking behind (some) preventative services 
and curative services, but some chronic care deserves a high ranking. 
Consider insulin treatment for type I diabetes mellitus. It is a daily, 
lifelong treatment--certainly chronic, but it is highly effective and life-
saving. Without insulin, type I diabetics would die, and with it they can 
lead a reasonably long, relatively normal life. Surely, insulin treatment 
should be ranked highly. 
While it would seem Daniels' theory could be adjusted to suitably 
accommodate the previous concerns, it contains a fatal weakness exposed 
by a final criticism: A theory of justice in health care that rests on equality 
of opportunity cannot give appropriate consideration to the terminally ill 
and seriously disabled. Returning these people to "the normal 
opportunity range" is nonsensical, yet caring for similarly-placed 
individuals has always been one of the most important things the health 
system does. Caring for these individuals is an important mission of the 
health service, and it deserves a much higher relative priority. Daniels is 
aware of this problem; he writes that treatment of the terminally ill and 
seriously mentally and physically disabled raises "serious issues which 
may not just be issues of justice. Indeed, by the time we get to the fourth 
layer virtues other than justice become prominent."29 A better theory of 
justice would give caring for these patients its proper priority without 
appealing to "other considerations." 
That brings us back to the constructivist theory of human rights. 
We have human rights to those things necessary to live a life of human 
dignity. While all needed health care is important, some kinds of health 
care are more important than others. This approach holds that health care 
interventions should be prioritized by their relative ability to allow 
individuals to live a life of dignity. This approach does not leave the 
obvious gaps like preventative medicine (for Veatch) and care for the 
terminally ill (for Daniels). Admittedly, though, the increased usefulness 
of this approach is p1:1rchased at the expense of specificity. Arguing over 
what dignity entails could be lengthy. Consequently, we require a 
community definition of dignity in order to set priorities. Consider the 
following example. We all think that having a dignified death is 
29Daniels, Just Health Care, p. 48. 
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important. Comfort care for the terminally ill would be highly ranked by 
this dignity standard in every society known to me. However, the setting 
of the comfort care might be very different for different cultures. Some 
groups may highly value dying at home in the presence of their extended 
family, while others may prefer to die in the hospital. In either case the 
priorities of home care versus hospital care for the terminally ill would be 
different. Neither is preferred without knowing the values of the society. 
Setting priorities by this theory and developing community definitions of 
dignity calls for explicit and public rationing: by now a familiar cry in the 
medical literature.30 
Allowing individuals to live a life of human dignity is the unifying 
feature of many health care interventions that we hold to be important 
which seem to have little else in common: the hospitalisation of an 
acutely psychotic young man, reconstructive surgery following 
mastectomy for a fifty year old woman, hospice care for a Maori woman 
with inoperable lung cancer, habilitative services for the congenitally 
handicapped, nursing home care for the elderly, rehabilitative services for 
a young man following a serious auto accident. These widely different 
health care interventions all assist the patients to live a life of dignity. 
Health care's ability to enhance the dignity of people's lives is more than a 
least common denominator--it truly gets at the essence of the health care 
system. Maintaining dignity should be the goal of the health system. It is 
health care's ability to do so that gives it moral importance. The other 
theories have only gained a glimpse of the real purpose of the health 
system. Sometimes maintaining dignity involves saving life; sometimes 
it is returning individuals to the normal opportunity range; sometimes it 
is caring for the terminally ill; sometimes it involves providing basic care; 
and sometimes it can also mean not saving life. The unifying concept is 
dignity. 
30There are far too many proponents of public, explicit rationing (where rationing is 
necessary) even to attempt to cite them all. A sampling from several countries follows: 
Chris Heginbotham, "Rationing." British Medical Journal. 304 (1992): 496-499. 
Richard Smith, "Rationing: The Search for Sunlight. Rationing Decisions Should be 
Explicit and Rational." British Medical Journal. 303 (1991): 1561-1562. 
Stephen Leeder, "All for one or one for all? The ethics of resource allocation for health 
care." The Medical Journal of Australia. 147 (1987): 68-71. 
The Core Services Committee, The Core Debater. Wellington, New Zealand: National 
Advisory Committee on Core Health and Disability Support Services, October 1994. 
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Dignity is a concept which requires a communal definition. It is not 
an "objective" criterion such that we can assign values to various health 
care interventions and rank them. Discussing openly where community 
health care priorities lie is valuable both for the community and the 
health service. The community can become more familiar with the 
difficulties of rationing, and the health service can be told explicitly which 
types of services the community wants to be targeted. Community 
priorities based upon health care interventions' effect on living a dignified 
life is not a disguised way to discriminate against minority groups. 
Prioritizing health care interventions would require extensive input from 
patients and health professionals, as well as the public. Thus very general 
information as to priorities would be sought from the public not public 
input about specific diseases. The majority would not be put in a position, 
for example, to give all HIV I AIDS treatments a low priority simply 
because they do not agree with the types of lifestyles which often result in 
transmission of the virus. Rather, public input might result in chronic 
treatments which improve quality of life being funded and intensive care 
for the terminally (within so many weeks of death) ill not being funded. 
Thus, many treatments for HIV I AIDS would receive a high priority, but 
artificial ventilation for pneumocystis pneumonia would receive a low 
priority. Community definitions of dignity, properly understood, are not 
an excuse to victimise minorities. 
Dignity is such a lofty standard that it could be asserted that it is not 
compatible with any forms of rationing. This, of course, would be a 
perversion of the argument. Although health care rationing is both 
difficult and painful, it is necessary. Indeed, implicit rationing has been 
with us for a long time through capped budgets in some countries and 
prohibitive pricing in others. The constructivist account of the right to 
health care holds that the moral importance of health care lies in its ability 
to assist individuals to live a life of dignity. Explicit rationing with this 
principle in mind should yield far superior results to implicit, random 
rationing. Thus, to argue that rationing infringes upon dignity entirely 
misses the thrust of the constructivist argument. 
Explicit and public priority setting is better than the alternatives, but 
it raises two questions with no obvious answer: What if the public does 
not/will not participate? and What if the input from the public is 
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unreasonable? Examples of each come from the American state of 
Oregon's experience with setting priorities.31 
The Oregon Medicaid Priority-Setting Project Health Services 
Commission was established in September 1988, and from the outset the 
project was headline news. Over a year later (presumably sufficient time 
to raise public awareness) from January through March 1990, Oregon 
Health Decisions held 47 public meetings across the state to assess public 
values in priority setting. Although over a thousand Oregonians 
attended, it was far from a cross-section of the population. Two-thirds 
were university graduates and fewer than 50 people were Medicaid 
recipients (the group being rationed to). More than two-thirds worked in 
the health care sector! What can be concluded from any consensus 
reached by such a group? Perhaps the methodology could be improved 
somewhat, but it did seem, on the whole, to be a fair process. Would a 
process that forced certain groups (e.g., Medicaid recipients) to represent 
themselves be any more valid? If representatives are to be chosen, what 
will be the process? How can we guarantee the public will participate in a 
public process? 
What do we do with unreasonable public input? In an attempt to 
further elicit public values, Oregon ran a phone survey starting in 
February 1990. Residents were asked to judge on a scale of 0 (death) to 100 
(perfect health) what the impact would be of having to live the rest of 
their life with some physical or mental impairment or symptom. Some of 
the results were surprising. For example, wearing eyeglasses was rated 95 
out of 100, which is about the same rating assigned to not being able to 
drive a car or use public transportation and to having to stay at a hospital 
or nursing home! Can we blame poor methodology for this result? If not, 
i.e., if this rating reflects actual attitudes, must (or should) we accept it? 
Those who have experienced any particular disability often give it a higher 
rating (i.e., indicate it has had a less negative impact on their life) than 
those who have not. Noting this, whose rating should count as more 
relevant? 
31Jnformation on Oregon in the next two paragraphs comes from three sources: 
Michael Brannigan, "Oregon's Experiment." Health Care Analysis. 1 (1993): 15-32; Norman 
Daniels, "Four Unsolved Rationing Problems: A Challenge." Hastings Center Report. 24 
(1994): 27-29; and Jennifer Dixon and H. Gilbert Welch, "Priority Setting: Lessons from 
Oregon." The Lancet. 337 (1991): 891-894. 
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Putting these problems aside, the human rights approach to priority 
setting calls for explicit and public rationing. Although the criterion of 
living a life of dignity was not invoked by Oregon, we should briefly 
examine Oregon as the only example of priority setting to date which has 
generated a ranked list. Oregon's prioritization is not being presented as 
the moral answer to rationing decisions; however, as the only example of 
an explicit, public ranked list it provides a basis for discussion of the kind 
of prioritization being advanced here. Furthermore, the list generated in 
Oregon roughly corresponds to my concept (as a member of a developed 
nation) of what is required to live a life of dignity. 
Oregon generated seventeen categories for condition/treatment 
pairs, then assigned each condition/treatment pair32 to a category. Then 
the categories were ranked from highest to lowest priority. Next all of the 
condition/treatment pairs were ranked within each category using an 
assessment of net benefit and cost, and a list of condition/ treatment pairs 
was generated such that the lowest ranking pair from, say, category seven 
was immediately above the highest ranking pair from category eight. 
Finally, the list of pairs was adjusted to a "standard of reasonableness." 
The final step was required due to the obvious fact that, while one category 
may generally be above another, individual pairs may merit particularly 
high or low priority. While this seems a good methodology and Oregon 
may have benefited from even greater specificity, examining the ranking 
of categories is detailed enough for our discussion of priority setting. 
Oregon's category prioritization is listed in table three. 
32Because they are the codes used to bill for third party reimbursement, the Oregon 
commission used codes from the International Statistical Classification of Diseases, 
Injuries, and Causes of Death, Ninth Revision (ICD-9) to define conditions and codes from 
Current Procedural Terminology, Fourth Edition (CPT-4) to define treatments. While this 
has administrative benefits, it did limit the specificity of the list. 
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TABLE 3: Oregon's Categories 
1. Acute Fatal, prevents death, full recovery 
2. Maternity Care (including care for the newborn in first 28 days of life) 
3. Acute fatal, prevents death, without full recovery 
4. Preventative care for children 
5. Chronic fatal, improves life span and Quality of Well Being (QWB) 
6. Reproductive Services (excluding maternity and infertility) 
7. Comfort Care 
8. Preventative dental (children and adults) 
9. Preventative care for adults (A-B-C) 
10. Acute nonfatal, return to previous health 
11. Chronic nonfatal, one time treatment improves QWB 
12. Acute nonfatal, without return to previous health 
13. Chronic nonfatal, repetitive treatment improves QWB 
14. Acute nonfatal, expedites recovery 
15. Infertility services 
16. Preventative care for adults (D-E) 
17. Fatal or nonfatal, minimal or no im rovement in QWB 
This list was developed for the unique American situation in Oregon. 
These are personal health services for recipients of Medicaid only, and two 
important categories were exempted: nursing horne care for the elderly as 
well as mental health and substance abuse services. A complete list would 
need to incorporate these two categories. It is interesting to note that these 
categories were exempted because they were thought to be important yet 
likely to be undervalued by the cost-benefit/net benefit analysis Oregon 
was employing. That is, policy makers felt these areas were more 
important than a cost-benefit analysis would indicate. Employing a more 
useful standard like the importance of a given health service to living a 
life of dignity would yield a high priority for these two categories without 
giving them special treatment. Another thing to note, especially before 
criticising the top of the list, is that resources were sufficient to fund 
through category twelve and well into category thirteen. Accordingly, it 
was not particularly relevant to Oregon whether a condition/ treatment 
pair was in category three or seven; either way it was sure to be funded. 
Here we are discussing priority setting for a human right to health 
care: a right that all men and women everywhere should be able to claim. 
As already emphasised, the priority ranking should reflect the conception 
of dignity in each individual society. Also, different societies will have 
greatly varying amounts of resources to devote to health care. 
Consequently, even some of the higher priority categories may not receive 
funding in all societies. Another point to mention is that sanitary, safe, 
unpolluted living and working conditions contribute much to health. 
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While this was not relevant to Medicaid priorities in Oregon, it is 
important in many countries. As a result of the these facts, several 
adjustments should be made to the list. 
From a more global perspective than Oregon needed to apply, 
comparatively high tech, hospital care is overvalued on Oregon's list. 
Sanitary living conditions like a safe water supply, edible food and 
adequate sewage disposal should probably top the list. Then maternity 
care, preventative care for children (at least immunisations) and comfort 
care for the dying should probably rank above services which require 
expensive hospitals and highly trained personnel to operate (like many 
acute fatal, prevents death, full recovery interventions). To reiterate, these 
are not criticisms of the list for Oregon, but for Oregon's list for the whole 
world. Otherwise, the list is reasonably intuitive: the most serious 
conditions we can treat effectively are ranked above others, and the 
"caring" and preventative aspects of medicine receive proper priority, too. 
CONCLUSION 
By holding we have a right to the things necessary to lead a life of 
dignity, the constructivist human rights theory provides many advantages 
over rival theories. It outclasses the right to a decent minimum for three 
reasons. It has a clear philosophical foundation which the right to a 
decent minimum does not. Our human rights theory tells us how to 
make macro allocation decisions between health care and other goods: we 
need to enhance human dignity in our distribution. Finally, the 
constructivist theory suggests a clearer prioritization than the "basic" care 
suggested by a right to a decent minimum. 
This human rights approach yields a much more sensible priority 
list than Robert Veatch's egalitarianism. For this reason alone, it 
represents a great advantage. It also seems stronger with macro allocation 
decisions. While egalitarianism offers little or no help in comparing 
allocations to food, shelter and health care, the constructivist theory 
suggests maximising dignity. Thus, we should not pursue health care to 
the detriment of food or shelter. 
Norman Daniels' theory espoused in Just Health Care is the 
strongest rival for the human rights theory. Daniels gives reasonable 
advice on macro allocation decisions: different areas like education, police 
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protection and health care are funded as to maximise equality of 
opportunity. No area should be pursued to the detriment of the others. 
Daniels theory also yields a sensible criterion for prioritization: the effect 
on the service of guaranteeing equality of opportunity. Daniels, however, 
undervalues the caring aspects of medical care--those areas where patients 
cannot be returned to the normal opportunity range. For this reason, the 
human rights approach is superior. Furthermore, the constructivist 
approach gives us further guidance with rationing, as illustrated in 
chapter five, which Just Health Care does not provide. 
The constructivist human rights approach posits that health care 
interventions should be prioritized by their relative ability to allow 
individuals to live a life of dignity. This approach suggests public and 
explicit priority setting consistent with the societal conception of dignity. 
Since funding is limited, priorities must be set and the list will be funded 
as far as possible within a society. This does not trivialise the health care 
needs of individuals whose conditions are low on the list, it merely claims 
that it is better to systematically deny care with less impact on a life of 
dignity than to randomly deny care. This ranking reflects both the limits 
of health care and the limits of the budget. 
To reiterate, it would be desirable to fund all needed health care, but 
this is simply not possible. Some beneficial care must be denied. It is not 
enough to rank condition/treatment pairs and effortlessly fund the list as 
far as the budget will allow. Every attempt must be made to allow the 
budget to fund as much of the list as possible. That is to say, simply 
because a condition merits high priority it does not necessarily receive 
limitless resources. For example, it was argued that maternity care and 
preventative services for children merit a high priority for their impact on 
living a life of dignity. Thus, the example of screening for genital herpes 
during pregnancy outlined above is a high priority condition. However, 
this does not require funding the expensive viral cultures; serial physical 
examinations are adequate to meet the dignity standard. Furthermore, 
some rationing techniques should be applied to the whole list, regardless 
of priority ranking. The dignity standard assists in this task also, and these 
rationing tools are outlined in chapter five. 
Controlling the Leviathan 
CHAPTER 5: 
CONTROLLING THE LEVIATHAN 
When approaching the question of a moral right to health care, two 
main questions were identified at the outset: 1) What is the foundation of 
a right to health care? and 2) What is the content of the right? As pointed 
out in the introduction, the philosophical underpinnings of a right to 
health care would presumably say a lot about the content of the right. The 
constructivist human rights theory holds that human rights are those 
things needed for human dignity. Enhancing the dignity of people's lives 
is what gives health care moral importance and is the foundation of our 
right. Thus, health care interventions should be prioritized by their 
relative ability to allow individuals to live a life of dignity. The relative 
prioritization of services suggested by the dignity standard is consistent 
with what we want from health care. Health care serves many purposes 
for us--prevention, cure, chronic care, disability support, and comfort care 
for the dying--and the dignity standard allows each its proper priority. The 
human rights approach yields a high priority for important health care 
services which are undervalued when prioritized by other standards. 
If we argue that the standard of health care demanded by the moral 
right is all health care needed to live a life of human dignity, then it may 
seem this will not help us to put limits on the right to health care 
whatsoever. What kind of health care is not dignified? Misconstrued, the 
dignity standard might suggest society must provide everything. We must 
admit that ill health is an affront to individual dignity; for the sick 
individual, all needed health care is required to enhance his/her dignity. 
However, the constructivist theory does not claim that we have a human 
right to all possible health care in every situation. The constructivist 
theory holds that the content of positive rights must be in reference to the 
resources available. Health care must be rationed, and the treatment that 
is forgone will be to the detriment of those who do not receive it. This 
theory is not intended to trivialise the legitimate health needs of 
individuals whose conditions are low on the list because needed, low 
priority health care does make a positive contribution to individual 
dignity. However, health care must be rationed, and it is the community's 
(not the individual's) conception of dignity that is important in setting 
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priorities. Certain illness/ treatment pairs make a more significant 
contribution to leading a life of human dignity than others, and, although 
important, some illness/ treatment pairs will necessarily get a low priority. 
Since resources are limited, public and explicit rationing is morally 
acceptable because, despite rationing's negative effect on some individuals, 
it is morally preferable to deny care (with less impact on living a life of 
dignity) systematically than to deny care randomly. Arguing that all 
rationing violates dignity misses the point of the constructivist stand. 
It is important to see illnesses and treatments as paired. If we 
ranked only illnesses or only treatments by their effects on dignity, the 
results would be ridiculous. Regardless of the illness, our obligation to 
treat is less when the treatment is ineffective (consider further 
chemotherapy for terminal cancer). Conversely, some conditions, like 
maternity care, demand priority despite the likelihood all will go well 
even without medical care. Society finds it unacceptable to put mothers 
and infants at risk. 
When setting priorities, the initial question is usually: "If we 
cannot treat everyone, who should we treat first?" It doesn't take long to 
realise, though, that the real question is "Who do we treat last, and why?" 
This is the more relevant way to phrase the question because those who 
receive lowest priority aren't going to be treated. The dignity standard . 
does not easily point out services which can be excluded from the right to 
health care, although it yields the relative prioritization roughly outlined 
in chapter four. The categories near the bottom of the list are obviously in 
jeopardy of not being funded. 
Assuming that there is a fixed amount of money available to ·be 
spent on health care, a greater portion of the prioritized list could be 
funded by saving resources higher on the list. This is where the dignity 
standard is additionally helpful in rationing discussions. It has been 
argued that it is a smaller infringement on dignity to forego interventions 
at the bottom of the priority list than it is to forego interventions high on 
the list; however, it is regrettable that the entire list cannot be funded. 
Low yield medicine is not no yield medicine, and sick individuals want 
every gain that can be offered. Thus, we should attempt to use all of our 
resources as wisely as possible to fund as much of the list as possible, i.e, 
even for interventions high on our priority list, spending should be 
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tightly controlled. The dignity standard assists us on two levels: first, it 
suggests a prioritization, and, second, it allows us to examine rationing 
techniques that apply to all interventions. All of the health service should 
be subjected to similar rationing constraints, but as money runs out it is 
the low priority interventions that will not be funded. By this system all 
health care is rationed to some extent and some health care is not 
available. The concept of dignity is useful to examine all of the rationing 
tools; all forms of rationing are morally acceptable to the point which they 
excessively infringe upon the health service meeting its goal of enhancing 
the dignity of people's lives. 
This chapter is in two sections. In the first part, our tendency to 
overvalue health care is discussed. No exact amount of allocation to 
health care is mandated, but it is suggested that we can do well with less 
than we usually think we can. In the second section, various rationing 
techniques are analysed with the dignity standard. Some of the ways in 
which it would be ethically acceptable to employ the techniques are 
outlined, and unacceptable applications are highlighted as well. In chapter 
three it was argued that the various general theories of justice should 
have a voice in resource allocation where appropriate; these areas are 
explored in the second section. 
OUR TENDENCY TO OVERVALUE HEALTH CARE 
One frequent criticism is that those applying economic analysis and 
discussing limiting health care have made a fundamental error: they 
have failed to recognise that life is infinitely more valuable than money. 
Since medical care is necessary (in some instances) for life, limiting what is 
spent on it is absurd. As the argument goes, life, and hence medical care as 
(sometimes) a necessity for life, is infinitely more important than other 
values. While persuasive, this argument is wrong if we accept our 
behaviour as any reflection of our true values. 
Some people misapply an economic argument to show that life is 
infinitely valuable. They say the principle of revealed preference 
demonstrates the value of life. How many people would consent to being 
killed tomorrow in exchange for a million dollars, or even twenty-five 
million? This, they argue, demonstrates that our value for life is very 
high and perhaps infinite. It does not illustrate that at all; it shows that 
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money is of no value to a dead man.l Consider this example. Let us take 
the value of $25 million, and further consider what revealed preference 
suggests. Imagine we want to set-up a study of the pharmacokinetics of a 
new medication. We are going to give the drug at such a subtherapeutic 
dose that it will have virtually no physiological effect; however, the small 
risk of fatal allergic reaction to the medication remains. Assume the risk 
of anaphylaxis one in one hundred thousand (0.001%), and we would offer 
$250 to be in the study; or that the risk is one in one thousand (0.1%) and 
we are offering $25,000 to be in the study. In either case, our intuition is 
that many people would be willing to accept the risk, and both instances 
place the value of life at $25 million. The value of life is discontinuous; it 
is not until the risk of death becomes large that we place a large value on 
it. Unfortunately, we allow our value for the certain loss of life to inflate 
how much we value low benefit interventions. We adopt the 'spare no 
expense' mentality even though the interventions may yield very little 
benefit. The failure to recognise the discontinuous value of life is one 
cause for overvaluing health care. 
A second reason for overvaluing health care is the economics of 
insurance or risk-sharing. The tendency to use more health care when in 
an insurance arrangement has been termed "moral hazard." Insurance 
writers have tended to look upon this phenomenon (of demanding more 
at zero price than at market price) as an ethical problem, using emotive 
words such as malingering and hypochondria and lumping it together 
with fraud. However, it is a result predictable by standard economic 
theory.2 Insurance works well when the event being risk pooled is beyond 
the control of the insured (e.g., insuring one's home against a natural 
disaster), but health care demand is under the control of the insured. The 
effect of insurance which covers all medical care expenses is to reduce the 
price charged to the individual at the point of service from the market 
price to zero. Thus it is expected that individuals would consume more 
because the incremental benefit to them for excess use is great, while the 
1 David Friedman, "Should Medicine Be a Commodity? An Economist's Perspective," 
in Rights to Health Care. Bond and Bondeson, eds. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic, 1991), 283-286. 
2Mark V. Pauly, 'The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment." American Economic 
Review. 58 (1968): 531-537. 
99 
Controlling the Leviathan 
additional cost of their use is largely spread over other insurance holders. 
The individual only bears a tiny fraction of the cost of his/her use. 
This is not merely economic theory; studies have shown it to be 
true. A study of nearly 8000 people over several years demonstrated that 
persons fully covered for medical services spent about 50. percent more 
than similar people with income-related catastrophe insurance. Full 
coverage lead to more people using services and more services per user. 
Both ambulatory services and hospital admissions increased.3 Insurance 
increases our tendency to overvalue health care. 
I am suggesting that we can obtain acceptable health care results 
with less resources than demand seems to indicate. There is no 
convincing moral argument that we should spend 6, 9, 12 or 15 percent of 
gross domestic product on health care, but comparing countries with 
themselves across time and comparisons between countries at the same 
time indicates that more health care is not tantamount to better health. 
Thus a public health system need not be lavishly funded. 
HOW CAN WE RATION ETHICALLY? 
Are simple lists acceptable? 
The argument until now has been based on generating a priority list 
and using resources as wisely as possible to fund as much of the list as 
possible. Consequently, services will either be included or excluded from 
the public health system. Some call this the 'simple list' approach. The 
criticism of the simple list is straightforward and valid: not all indications 
for health services are equal, and, as a result, a simple list would exclude 
services even for a patient with a pressing indication. Surgery for varicose 
veins offers a good example. This is a procedure which would be likely to 
get a low priority on a list because the majority of cases are for softer 
indications like discomfort late in the day and/ or cosmesis. Once again, 
this example is not to trivialise these individuals' health needs, but to 
indicate that these indications have a smaller impact on living a life of 
dignity than many other health needs. However, consider Helen, a 62 year 
old nurse who spends long hours on her feet. She has a history of severe 
3Joseph P. Newhouse, et al, "Some Interim Results From a Controlled Trial of Cost 
Sharing in Health Insurance." New England Journal of Medicine. 305 (1981): 1501-1507. 
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varicose veins and nonhealing venous stasis ulcers. She has been 
repeatedly admitted to hospital for infections of the ulcers. For Helen, the 
surgery could bring great benefits, but the procedure is excluded from the 
public health system by the simple list approach. The simple list is unfair 
to Helen. 
There are two ways to blunt the force of this criticism; both of which 
are relatively simple to implement. The first is to make the list more 
sophisticated and specific. Certainly, in this example the softer and harder 
indications could be considered different diagnoses. The presence of ulcers 
is a clear distinguishing feature. However, increasing the detail of the list 
should only go so far. It is no one's desire to create an inflexible 
excessively bureaucratic list. The second approach is to have an 
"unusual/ atypical indications" fund/ committee which clinicians and 
patients could appeal to when they feel the list had wrongly excluded 
them. Even with both of these improvements in place, however, the 
criticism still packs some punch. A list would inevitably exclude some 
people with greater needs than others whose condition was higher up the 
list because not all indications are equal. The New Zealand Core Services 
Committee rejected the simple list approach for this reason. As Core 
Services Committee Chairman, Lynette Jones says, "A 'yes/ no' or 'in/ out' 
list approach is just too simplistic. It would either have to be so broad and 
lacking in definition as to be meaningless, much the situation the 
Committee inherited, or its explicitness would make it too arbitrary and 
inflexible resulting in people being unfairly excluded from services. Either 
way it would fail."4 But, despite its weaknesses, the simple list remains 
superior to its alternatives for three reasons. 
First, a list is better than forcing the dual role of patient advocate 
and keeper of societal resources onto physicians. This is a remarkable 
burden for right-minded clinicians.s It also should be recognised that this 
approach lends itself to being remarkably random, far more random than 
the unequal indications of a simple list. Some doctors will accept this 
responsibility and attempt to fulfil it well. Others will attempt it with 
4core Services Committee, The Core Debater, Issue 3, October 1994, p. 1. 
5 A.D.B. Chant, "Practising Doctors, Resource Allocation and Ethics." Journal of 
Applied Philosophy. 1 (1989): 71-75. See also Daniel P. Sulmasy, "Physicians, Cost 
Control, and Ethics." Annals of Internal Medicine. 116 (1992): 920-926. 
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(deliberate or unintentional) prejudice; it exposes patients to all the 
prejudices and ill-conceived notions of less noble health professionals. If 
all rationing is done by doctors, the results are likely to reflect their 
respective values. The ageist will ration by age, sexist by gender, racist by 
race, etc. Finally, some doctors will refuse to ration out of a sense of duty 
to their patients. Such a system results in a very inequitable distribution 
of resources. 
Second, even if we can assume all individual doctors will carry out 
rationing decisions well, a list is better suited to administering community 
agreed rationing decisions because no doctor has an adequate scope of 
practice to make the appropriate rationing tradeoffs. Health professionals 
can only encounter a relatively small number of patients in a day, week, or 
even year. As a result no single professional can make sufficiently 
informed rationing decisions. Specialists only see cases in their field, and 
have little basis for deciding relative funding for their field versus 
another. This would not necessarily result in the specialist overvaluing 
her field. She might operate by the policy of treating the worst-off patients 
only while society might decide that the conditions she treats should be 
funded more broadly. She may not be treating patients for whom 
treatment would yield a significantly more dignified life when patients in 
comparatively better positions are being treated in other fields. 
Generalists, while they see a diverse range of clinical conditions, have less 
experience with the range of impairment possible from a given condition. 
The final reason the simple list approach is superior to abandoning 
the list and looking at the merits of each individual case is the most 
important. Abandoning the list seems largely to abandon the public and 
explicit approach to rationing and return to implicit rationing. Leaving 
doctors to weigh the individual merits of each individual case is the same 
sort of implicit rationing we have now. The financial constraints and 
need to ration remain, but the explicit nature of the rationing is lost. How 
can community values be adequately assessed and reflected when the 
rationing is done behind closed doors? 
Can we ration by cost? 
"Is cost important?" is a question we must ask. Should expensive 
interventions be given a lower priority than inexpensive interventions? 
It may seem ridiculous to ask the question: it is obviously the fact that the 
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cost of health care has exceeded the resources available which has lead us 
to a discussion of rationing. However, what underlies the question is an 
intuition that it might be unfair to single out expensive health care for 
rationing; perhaps all health care, inexpensive as well as expensive, 
should be rationed in a similar fashion. Furthermore, most see cost as an 
incomplete picture of a health care intervention. Our judgment of a 
health care intervention should have some reference to the benefit gained 
from that intervention. An expensive drug that brings great benefit to 
those who receive it seems a better target for funding than a medium-
priced drug that brings little benefit. 
Responses to the issue of cost tend to be at one extreme or another. 
Robert Veatch represents one extreme. To quote him: 
Historically, health workers have been committed 
to consequentialist modes of ethical reasoning .... It is 
utilitarian consequentialism that provides the 
moral foundation for the cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness analysis that has dominated the 
movement for rationing care .... But the question 
remains whether it is necessarily correct to treat 
care as basic (morally prior) simply because it is cost-
effective. That is what utilitarian ethical theory 
calls for, but it is at odds with many of the most 
significant moral traditions of our culture .... Among 
the most conspicuous of such moral considerations 
[that are lacking in this analysis] are the duties of 
preserving life, respecting autonomy, and 
promoting a just or equitable distribution of 
benefits.6 
It is easy to misunderstand this group, and accuse them of being naive for 
not accepting the need to ration health services. But Veatch and others do 
recognise the need to ration health care, and want explicit rationing based 
on the moral priority of the care. However, they question whether cost-
effectiveness is the fundamental, morally prior criterion to ration by. 
However, if we up the stakes high enough most will agree that at 
some point costs become relevant. As Peter Pillans writes, "Hospitals or 
health care institutions fulfil a community service ... !£ a decision to 
6Robert M. Veatch, "Should Basic Care Get Priority? Doubts About Rationing the 
Oregon Way." Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal. 1 (1991): 196-7. 
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purchase a new pharmaceutical for an individual patient renders the 
facility fiscally unsound, it is endangering its larger mission. In such 
circumstances to forego the drug is regrettable but ethically sound. "7 
Certainly, it would be a rare circumstance where the treatment of a single 
patient threatened the solvency of a hospital, but should such a situation 
arise, the costs of treating the patient would indeed be too high. 
costs: 
David Eddy represents the other extreme, the group that emphasises 
The central problem that underlies the concept of 
essential care is that different interventions have 
different worths, determined by their benefits, 
harms and costs. While few would debate the 
importance of benefits and harms, some might 
object to including costs. But cost is the very 
problem that drives the concept of essential care. If 
costs were of no concern, there would be no 
problem; everyone could get everything that has 
benefit, and the distinction between essential and 
'luxury' care would never arise. To remove costs 
from the definition of essential care would not only 
be unrealistic, it would separate the concept of 
essential care from the problem it is designed to 
solve.8 
Eddy (and others) emphasise cost, but it is clear from this passage that cost 
is not the only factor. Benefits and harms are also seen as important. 
The contrast between Eddy's and Veatch's approaches leads to a 
more basic question. How do we define costs? Just looking at the price tag 
of a given intervention is far too simple an account of costs. That is 
because any single intervention is part of an overall plan of management 
for a given problem. That plan of management can, artificially, be split 
into various components but in any moderately comprehensive public 
health system, the resulting picture is unhelpful in planning services and 
costing treatment. In order properly to make use of health qollars we need 
to consider the costs of various packages including in hospital, out-of-
7Peter Pillans, "Control of high cost medicines." New Zealand Medical Journal. (26 
January 1994): 5. 
8oavid M Eddy, "What care is 'essential'? What services are 'basic'?" Journal of 
the American Medical Association. 265 (1991): 782, 786. 
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hospital and follow-up care in order to place a given intervention in 
context. Strictly rationing all health care over X thousand dollars is an 
ineffective way of keeping health care within its budget. For example, 
imagine that it was decided to strictly ration the most expensive treatment 
modalities for all disorders, either by capping the number of expensive 
modalities within each health service or by eliminating all expensive 
modalities for which a less expensive alternative exists. The rationale 
would be that ''basic" care should be made available to all, but more 
expensive care is a luxury. In the treatment of schizophrenia, the drug 
clozapine (Clozaril®) would likely be singled out. Clozapine is an 
expensive pharmaceutical indicated for the treatment of resistant 
schizophrenia.9 Estimates of the proportion of patients with 
schizophrenia who are refractory to treatment vary because there are no 
firm guidelines on what constitutes treatment-refractory schizophrenia, 
but it is a significant minority of patients (with estimates around 30%).10 
And 30 to 60% of treatment-refractory schizophrenic patients benefit from 
clozapine therapy. While clozapine is expensive, it reduces the length of 
inpatient psychiatric care for those patients who respond to it. For those 
who respond, the costs saved by reduced inpatient care would clearly 
outweigh the price of clozapine. What is more, clozapine is less expensive 
in simple financial terms; no value need be assigned tq the increased 
quality of life the patients would enjoy. Therefore, excessive limitation of 
the availability of clozapine would actually be more expensive for the 
health service. A more comprehensive view of costs would take into 
account the cost of alternative treatment as well as the cost of suffering or 
the value of health for the patient. 
Although rationing by cost can be fiscally unwise as illustrated by 
clozapine, the real ethical problem is that it violates the concept of dignity. 
Patients with rigorously demonstrated refractory schizophrenia require a 
trial with clozapine, and those who respond need it to live a, life of human 
dignity. It is dangerous to look for quick fixes to budgetary difficulties 
exclusively among the expensive health care services. Consider the 
9The published dosage range for clozapine is 200-900 mg/ day. The acquisition costs 
thus range from $2226 to $10,019 per year (information from Dunedin Public Hospital 
Pharmacy). Obviously, this does not include the substantial expense of regular 
haematological monitoring. 
10 Anne E. Farmer and Andrew Blewett, "Drug Treatment of Resistant Schizophrenia: 
Limitations and Recommendations." New Ethicals. 30 (1993): 105-111. 
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following real-life example from America. In June 1987 the Joint Ways 
and Means Committee of the Oregon legislature voted unanimously to 
discontinue funding for all transplants (except kidneys and corneas). 
Expanded coverage of basic medical services for low-income children and 
pregnant women (approximately 1500 people) was substituted in place of 
transplants. It had been estimated that 34 patients would require 
transplants (namely, bone marrow, heart, liver and pancreas) during the 
1987-89 biennium, at an estimated cost of US$2.2 million. The argument 
was essentially that the money was better spent on children and prenatal 
care than transplants.11 The Oregon case is an example of utilitarian 
reasoning gone badly awry. Many will agree, as I do, that the money was 
better spent on children and prenatal care than on transplants, but we 
should not be choosing between the two.12 Clearly, organ transplants 
(when rigorously indicated) are required to live a life of human dignity. 
One should not be asked to die for the cause of better prenatal care. But 
prenatal care is high priority, also, for its contribution to the dignity of 
mothers and babies. It was the direct result of this poor decision to curtail 
funding for transplants that lead to the legislation mandating the 
prioritization of services outlined in chapter four. As Oregon's 
subsequent ranking shows, both transplants and prenatal care are highly 
valued (of seventeen total categories, maternity care is category two and 
transplants are in category five), and this agrees with the prioritization the 
dignity standard produces. We should not curtail transplants to better 
fund child and prenatal care. More appropriate cutbacks to better fund 
prenatal and paediatric care would be, for example, some types of adult 
preventative medicine, hernia surgery, hip replacements or cataract 
surgery. Although these interventions do not cost as much individually 
as transplants, they are more appropriate trade-offs. Rationing by cost does 
11 H. Gilbert Welch and Eric B. Larson, 'The Oregon Decision to Curtail Funding for 
Organ Transplantation." New England Journal of Medicine. 319 (1988): 171-173. 
12Decision making in Oregon is often attacked (as I just did), but we are really 
criticising Oregon out of context. While Oregon's mistakes are real and provide us all with 
examples, Oregon, properly seen, is making the most of a bad situation, the unique 
American situation. Oregon came to this bad decision (to curtail transplant funding) 
because of the constraints that are placed on it by Federal Medicaid laws. Only certain 
services are optional (transplants being one), and several obvious better candidates for 
cutbacks are not optional. Furthermore, transplants cannot be partially funded with, say, a 
cap on the number funded because the law says patients in similar circumstances must be 
treated equally. Resource allocation is difficult, and Oregon's situation is made worse by 
some of the conditions imposed on it. 
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not advance the cause of the health service. Enhancing the dignity of 
people's lives is what gives health care moral importance. Cost, on the 
other hand, is not a morally relevant factor. Rationing by cost ignores any 
conception of human dignity and is not an ethically acceptable rationing 
tool. 
Is cost effectiveness an acceptable rationing tool? 
Cost effectiveness is an improvement over simple cost when 
looking at health care interventions. Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) 
seeks to determine the least cost solution for a particular objective, or how 
to maximise beneficial outcomes in a particular program of service within 
a given fixed budget. Thus CEA is designed to compare different 
approaches to the same problem: examples would be, the comparative 
cost of treating end stage renal disease (ESRD) by transplant, hospital 
haemodialysis or home dialysis; or, the least expensive way to maximise 
the number of patients with seizure disorder who are seizure-free. 
This approach is better than simply looking at the price tag of an 
intervention, but it has its own deficiencies. CEA makes no contribution 
to defining the goals of a program. It merely gives us a way to compare 
approaches to a predetermined goal. Also, CEA does not help us to 
compare different treatments for different diseases. For example CEA 
yields no information which would enable us to comJ?are spending 
limited pharmaceutical resources on erythropoietin for anaemia of ESRD 
with ondansetron for nausea associated with chemotherapy for cancer. 
Moreover, CEA does not take quality of life into consideration. A 
straightforward example of CEA analysis is comparing open and 
laparoscopic cholecystectomies.13 For hospitals, it comes down to 
weighing the higher costs of laparoscopic equipment against the lower 
costs due to shorter post operative length of stay. Thus, if a certain 
number of laparoscopic procedures are done, the aggregate savings in post 
operative stays exceeds the one-time expense of the equipment, and the 
13K. Kesteloot and F. Penninckx, "The costs and effects of open versus laparoscopic 
cholecystectomies." Health Economics. 2 (1993): 303-312. The analysis was simplified in 
the text. Hospitals actually must weigh the cost of equipment, increased theatre times, 
electrocautery or laser, and disposable or reusable equipment against the cost savings of 
shorter post operative stays. In this series, total costs were lower for t.h.e hospital if 140 
cholecystectomies were done annually with the electrocautery technique, or 300 with laser 
(using disposables in either). 
107 
Controlling the Leviathan 
laparoscopic procedure is more cost-effective. For society, clearly the 
laparoscopic procedure saves cost because patients return to work sooner. 
But nowhere is the decreased suffering (shorter recovery period) of the 
patient factored in. A better measurement would differentiate the benefits 
to the patient of the different methods of removing the gall bladder. 
CEA has its underpinnings in utilitarianism, and, although it has 
weaknesses, it is utilitarianism at its finest. Once the goals of our health 
system are defined, CEA points us to the least cost solution to reach those 
goals. If we prioritise our goals, CEA helps do the greatest good for the 
greatest number by bringing down the cost of the high priority goals thus 
enabling us to address lower priority goals. CEA is valuable because it uses 
utilitarian reasoning to help us attain our goals without allowing 
utilitarianism to infect our goal setting. 
Can we ration with cost-benefit analysis? 
It is difficult to make decisions when one is comparing things 
qualitatively. Which should receive priority, ondansetron, an expensive 
new medicine that significantly decreases nausea and vomiting following 
cancer chemotherapy, or clozapine, an expensive new drug for the 
treatment of resistant schizophrenia? Both drugs represent more effective 
and more expensive alternatives to previous pharmaceuticals, but the 
illnesses these patients face are quite different. How can we compare the 
benefits for such different diseases? As outlined above, CEA does not 
assist us with this problem, and the prospects are not bright for an analysis 
which will allow us to compare across treatments. The problem of 
incommensurable gains has bedevilled several attempts to suggest a 
defensible analysis yielding equitable distribution of resources for different 
clinical problems. 
Nevertheless, the idea of constructing a formula for making such 
comparisons is attractive. One feels reassured (however falsely or 
justifiably that may be) by assigning quantitative values to the various 
health care interventions. Certainly, ranking interventions allows for 
prioritisation, the orderly introduction of new interventions as funding 
becomes available, and coherent longitudinal planning.14 If we properly 
14felix Bochner, eta I. "How can hospitals ration drugs?" British Medical Journal. 
308 (1994): 901-908. 
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weight the important elements of a health care intervention, then perhaps 
we could give each intervention a score for each element and rank the 
interventions by overall score. Usually such a formula yields a cost per 
unit benefit ratio. Thus, rationing decisions are made easy: the lowest 
ranking items (i.e., the items with the highest cost per benefit) can be 
eliminated. We arrive at a generic formula something like the following: 
Net Costs 
Net Benefits 
= price per unit benefit. 
Net costs include the total cost of the intervention less the costs of 
treatment that is forgone, and net benefits assigns a value to the benefit 
gained with a factor for the chances of success less a value for potential 
harms with a factor for the chance of harm. In short, a good cost benefit 
analysis will attempt to take into account all of the possible short-comings. 
It will use a well-reasoned account of costs and a rich conception of 
benefits that values both survival and quality of life. The detail of how to 
derive and weight each element is not important to us here. Our interest 
is whether such a model is consistent with our ethical standards. 
A major attempt at defining benefit has been Quality Adjusted Life 
Years (QALYs) which attempt to combine length of survival and quality of 
life. The best description of a QAL Y is provided in the following passage 
by its inventor, Alan Williams. 
The essence of a QAL Y is that it takes a year 
of healthy life expectancy to be worth 1, but regards 
a year of unhealthy life expectancy to be worth less 
than 1. Its precise value is lower the worse the 
quality of life of the unhealthy person (which is 
what the 'quality adjusted' bit is all about). If being 
dead is worth zero, it is in principle, possible for a 
QAL Y to be negative i.e. for the quality of 
someone's life to be judged worse than being dead. 
The general idea is that a beneficial health 
care activity is one that generates a positive amount 
of QALYs, and that an efficient health care activity 
is one where the cost per QAL Y is as low as can be. 
A high priority health care activity is one where the 
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cost per QAL Y is low, and a low priority activity is 
one where the cost per QAL Y is high.15 
QALYs represent an attempt to compare different treatments for different 
diseases, but the concept contains serious ethical deficiencies. 
Consider the following chart which shows the results of an actual 
attempt at prioritisation in Oregon prior to Oregon adopting the method 
previously outlined.16 The chart illustrates an inherent weakness in cost-
benefit analysis. 
TABLE 4: An Example of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
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TREATMENT NET DURATION COST PRIORITY PRIORITY 
BENEFIT (YEARS) (US$) RATING=!= RANKING 
tooth capping .08 4 38.10 117.6 371 
surgery for ectopic pregnancy .71t 48 4015.00 117.8 372 
splints for temporomandibular joint disorder .16 5 98.51 122.2 376 
appendectomy .97 48 5744.00 122.5 377 
t The net benefit is relatively low because Oregon's consultant physicians estimated that (only) 70% of 
patients with ecto~ic pregnancy would die if not operated on. Increasing the estimated benefit from surgery to 
1.0 would move t · s treatment to 326 on the draft priority list. 
=I= Priori% rating;s were obtained using; the following formula: Priority Rating = Cost of Treatment/ (Net 
Expecte Bene t X Duration of Bene t). Ratings ranged from 1.45 (highest priority) to 999.998 (lowest 
I priority). 
The estimates in the chart appear reasonable. The denominator of the 
Priority Rating (i.e., Net Expected Benefit X Duration of Benefit) is 
obviously a QAL Y -type measurement of benefit. Dental caps were 
estimated to produce an average quality-of-life improvement of about 8%, 
whereas an appendectomy was expected to produce a 97% improvement 
(virtually the difference between being alive and being dead). The 
reasonable estimates, however, did not translate into reasonable relative 
priority rankings.17 Albeit both surgical procedures for appendectomy and 
ectopic pregnancy were correctly estimated to entail a far higher level and 
duration of benefit than either of the two minor treatments, the relatively 
15Alan Williams, "The value of QALYs." Health and Social Service Journal. (18 
July 1985): 3. 
16David Hadorn, "Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-effectiveness 
Meets the Rule of Rescue." Journal of the American Medical Association. 265 (1991): 2219. 
17These results were from the initial ranking in Oregon. For a number of reasons, one 
of which was nonsense results like these, the priority list was significantly reworked. In 
the final ranking surgery for appendicitis and ectopic pregnancy were both ranked in the 
top ten services, while splints for temporomandibular joint disorder were dropped near the 
bottom of the list and dental caps were eliminated. 
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high costs of surgery effectively neutralised these outcome considerations, 
producing nearly identical priority rankings for all four treatments. The 
question that needs to be answered is "How much benefit is enough, even 
when the intervention is cheap?" Cost benefit analysis cannot help 
answer the question. Surgery for appendicitis and ectopic pregnancy 
deserve a priority ranking well above dental caps and splints for 
temporomandibular joint disorder, but cost benefit analysis does not 
discriminate between them. 
Norman Daniels has called this the aggregate problem.l8 When 
should we allow an aggregation of modest benefits to larger numbers of 
people to outweigh more significant benefits to fewer people? As David 
Eddy points out, our moral intuitions are largely based on comparing 
conditions on a one-to-one basis.19 Thus a single appendectomy is more 
important than a single tooth capping because it saves a life rather than 
merely reducing pain. Our intuitions are much less well developed when 
it comes to making one-to-many comparisons. Moral views on this topic 
are complex and difficult to express as clear principles, but it is clear the 
formulas have steered us in the wrong direction in this case. We 
recognise that aggregate maximising is appropriate in some circumstances, 
but maximising can lead to unacceptable policies. Jonsen has rightly 
observed that people cannot stand idly by when an identifi~d person's life 
is visibly threatened and effective rescue measures are available, and has 
dubbed this powerful human proclivity to rescue endangered life "The 
Rule of Rescue."20 The rule of rescue helps to explain our intuitions in 
comparing small benefits to many with large benefits to few, but our 
inclinations contain more than highly valuing survival. Some be.nefits 
are too minor (perhaps tooth capping, for example) to deserve a high 
priority no matter how low their cost per QALY. 
18Norman Daniels, "Four Unsolved Rationing Problems: A Challenge." Hastings 
Center Report. 24 (1994): 27-29. 
19David Eddy, "Oregon's Methods: Did Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Fail?" Journal 
of the American Medical Association. 266 (1991): 2135-41. 
20Albert Jonsen, "Bentham in a box: technology assessment and health care 
allocation." Law, Medicine, and Health Care. 14 (1986): 172-174. See also David C 
Hadorn, "Setting Health Priorities in Oregon: Cost-effectiveness Meets the Rule of 
Rescue." Journal of the American Medical Association. 265 (1991): 2218-25. 
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Another thorny issue for QAL Y s is that, all other things being equal, 
QALYs explicitly prefer a longer period of survival to a shorter period, no 
matter the length of either period. For this reason, many accuse QAL Y-
type calculations of being ageist. Consider the following example. Rachel, 
31, is suffering from cervical spondylosis, causing her severe pain in the 
neck, head and arms. Her doctors have decided that she requires a cervical 
disk operation. Wendy, 63, is suffering from the same condition and her 
doctors have decided that she too needs a cervical disk operation.21 Let us 
consider the QALY value of the operation for both Rachael and Wendy. 
Rachael has a longer life expectancy than Wendy solely because she is 
younger. This means she has a much greater number of years for which 
we must calculate the quality adjusted value. The QAL Y value of the 
operation will be much higher for Rachael than it is for Wendy, solely on 
the basis of the differences in their ages. Now imagine QAL Y s being 
applied to all candidates for cervical disk operations and we can see that 
they would tend to value this operation higher for younger people. 
QALYs do, in practice, discriminate on the basis of age. Daniels calls this 
the fair chances/best outcomes problem.22 Most of us see the logic in 
preferring someone who will survive 25 years over someone who will 
only benefit for 3 months, or perhaps even 5 years versus 6 months. What 
about 18 years versus 13 years? At some point we decide that both of the 
candidates are going to live long enough to warrant the intervention, 
despite the fact one candidate is likely to live longer. At this point, many 
argue that each candidate deserves a fair chance at the intervention even if 
only one of the two can receive it. 
To summarise, cost-benefit analysis contains too many ethical 
difficulties to guide us very far with rationing decisions. The problem of 
incommensurable health benefits for different conditions is probably 
insurmountable. Furthermore, since the range of benefits is relatively 
small (O to 1) and the range of costs is great, cost assumes disproportionate 
importance. The utilitarian underpinnings of CBA makes the greatest 
good for the greatest number into no expensive goods for anyone. 
21Aiastair V Campbell and Grant R Gillett, "Defining Effectiveness and Benefit," in 
Ethical Issues in Defining Core Services: Discussion Papers prepared for The National 
Advison; Committee on Core Health and Disabilitt; Support Services. (Wellington: 
National Advisory Committee, July 1993), p. 33. 
22Norman Daniels, "Four Unsolved Rationing Problems: A Challenge." Hastings 
Center Report. 24 (1994): 27-29. 
112 
Controlling the Leviathan 
Ignoring important, but expensive, benefits for the individual returns us 
to the problems of rationing by cost and violates the goals of the health 
service. 
Are waiting lists an ethically acceptable way to ration? 
Due to limited resources, waiting for non-urgent surgical and 
medical procedures is a characteristic of all publicly funded health care 
systems. Presumably all patients who are on the waiting list meet the 
indications for the procedure. Queuing is the way non-urgent procedures 
are rationed. Properly managed, waiting lists do not violate the dignity 
standard, but, improperly managed they raise ethical problems. 
Waiting lists affect a large number of people. There are about 60,000 
people recorded on waiting lists in New Zealand (at a given point in time). 
Elective procedures represent about 35% of a hospital's workload 
(although this proportion varies considerable between specialties).23 
Hence policies for running waiting lists are important for the health 
system. 
Waiting serves important purposes. It allows the patient to adjust 
to the idea of surgery, gives him/her a chance to organise his/her life 
around it, and it gives an opportunity for him/her to change his/her 
mind. Waiting also allows for the health system to have reasonable 
control of patient load. Moreover, it allows for the kind of prioritization 
which Robert Veatch would advocate: directing our attention to the most 
needy. Waiting lists function on patients' ability to wait. The top priority 
patients are those who have the greatest need (and ability to benefit from 
the procedure). Waiting lists consisting of well chosen patients with 
reasonable waiting times where the neediest are given priority are 
ethically sound. 
Unfortunately, they do not always work that well. In New Zealand 
there is a heterogeneous mix of cases and policies for waiting lists. This 
leads to unnecessary uncertainties for all who are concerned,24 and fails to 
meet the standard of a health system required for a life of dignity. 
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Their Nature and Management. (Wellington: Core Services Committee, July 1993), p. 12. 
24Jbid., p. 18. 
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Consider this example. Dennis is a 63 year old dairy owner who has 
suffered from osteoarthritis for years. His pain is worst in his right knee, 
and he and his GP decide he should see an orthopaedic surgeon for 
possible joint replacement. He attends the orthopaedic outpatient clinic 
(after a wait of several months), and is advised he will be placed on the 
waiting list. A letter to his GP f-ollows a few days later. Then the awful 
wait begins--nothing is heard for weeks, months. Dennis wonders quite 
frequently where he is on the list. Has his file been misplaced? He 
considers ringing the surgeon, but decides not to bother her. He does ask 
his GP whether she has heard anything. She has not. She may, if she 
considers it her responsibility, enquire on behalf of her patient. In the 
meantime, Dennis's life is on hold: he does not go on even a short 
holiday for fear he will miss the important call. Optimistic and full of 
hope, Dennis waits. Fraser, Alley and Morris have called the waiting list 
an outdated, insensitive process, and when it operates like this example it 
certainly is. Dennis should not be in such a vague position. There is 
nothing objectionable to waiting for an explicit (even lengthy) period until 
surgery in a non-urgent case, but waiting for an indeterminate period is 
unacceptable. Fraser, Alley and Morris have advocated explicit criteria for 
priority assessment for elective procedures and "booking" a time for the 
procedure. Thus, patients are only on the list if indicated, patients are 
treated in order of need, and they are not left waiting indefinitely. This 
seems a vast improvement. 
Is rationing technology ethically acceptable? 
Daniel Callahan has argued that rationing medical progress is an 
essential ingredient to making health care affordable in the long-run. His 
argument is compelling: 
As fast as we try to remove high costs, we are 
adding a steady stream of new, usually expensive 
forms of technology. If one takes 1970 as the base-
line year, the number of new forms of technology 
introduced since then is astonishing; there are so 
many that I, at least, have not even been able to list 
them fully. Our commitment to unlimited medical 
innovation has not been seriously hampered by 
cost-containment efforts. How, then, are we 
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supposed to hold down costs while constantly 
adding new forms of technology?25 
Callahan's question is all the more legitimate when we add to the picture 
that medicine has been reluctant to eliminate old technology. It is not as 
though new, better, more expensive technology replaces older, inferior, 
less expensive technology; it is simply added to the armament at the 
doctors' disposal. 
There is more than one way of addressing this issue. The weakest 
claim is to say that we must demand better assessment of new technology. 
This will provide a remedy insofar as it allows us to discover and 
eliminate useless and marginally useful forms of technology. To be sure, 
some types of medical technology are subjected to more stringent 
assessment than others. Pharmaceuticals have to undergo a long and 
arduous process to gain approval while many diagnostic tests undergo 
only minimal evaluation before their introduction into clinical medicine. 
There should be no ethical objection to more rigorous assessment of 
technology. While this is clearly a cost-saving exercise, it could, in fact, 
also be viewed as protecting patient safety. Requiring thorough testing of 
new medications before they are introduced to the market is obviously in 
the interest of safety. Assessing new diagnostic tests for sensitivity and 
specificity as compared with old technology before introducing them to the 
market would also be in patients' best interest. By knowing the 
limitations of a test, misdiagnoses and inappropriate treatment would be 
avoided. And requiring new treatment modalities to be examined and 
have demonstrated efficacy before being covered in the public health 
system would also spare patients unnecessary procedures (as well as save 
the health system money). There is a small issue regarding the patients 
for whom treatment is unavailable while the technology is being assessed. 
This was highlighted by the outcry of HIV patients at the lengthy FDA 
process of evaluating new HIV drugs. In some situations (like HIV) the 
process must be truncated, but, on the whole, technology assessment is 
potentially cost-saving exercise that increases patient safety. This approach 
25Daniel Callahan, "Rationing Medical Progress: The Way to Affordable Health 
Care." New England Journal of Medicine. 322 (1990): 1812. See also Callahan's Setting 
Limits: Medical Goals in an Aging Society. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), and 
What Kind of Life: The Limits of Medical Progress. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990). 
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is excellent for eliminating useless technology, but it does little to guide us 
with new technology that is truly effective but expensive. 
A stronger claim is to say that we need better assessment of 
technology, and it must be demonstrated to be both effective and cost 
effective. Many authors want to eliminate/ never introduce useless and 
marginally useful technology as well as technology with costs that 
outweigh benefits. Andreas Laupacis et al argue for such an evaluative 
system.26 They propose five grades of recommendation depending on the 
cost and effectiveness of the new technology compared with existing 
technology. The highest recommendation is for more effective, less 
expensive technology, and rejection is recommended for less effective, 
more expensive technology. The other three grades are combinations of 
less expensive, less effective and more expensive, more effective as 
outlined in table five. 
TABLE 5: Grades of recommendation for the adoption and appropriate 
utilisation of new technologies27 
A. Compelling evidence for adoption and appropriate utilisation 
The new technology is as effective as or more effective than the existing one 
and is less costly. 
B. Strong evidence for adoption and appropriate utilisation 
a) The new technology is more effective than the existing one and costs less 
than $20,000 per quality-adjusted life-year (QAL Y) gained. 
b) The new technology is less effective than the existing one, but its 
introduction would save more than $100,000 I QAL Y gained. 
C. Moderate evidence for adoption and appropriate utilisation 
a) The new technology is more effective than the existing one and costs 
$20,000 to $100,000IQALY gained. 
b) The new technology is less effective than the existing one, but its 
introduction would save $20,000 to $100,000 I QAL Y gained. 
D. Weak evidence for adoption and appropriate utilisation 
a) The new technology is more effective than the existing one and costs more 
than $100,000IQALY gained. 
b) The new technology is less effective than the existing one, but its 
introduction would save less than $20,000 I QAL Y gained. 
E. Compelling evidence for rejection 
The new technology is less effective than or as effective as the existing one 
and is more costly. 
This is a helpful framework; it helps us to maintain patient safety as in the 
weaker claim, and it points out advancements that may be too expensive. 
26 Andreas Laupacis, et al, "How attractive does a new technology have to be to 
warrant adoption and utilization? Tentative guidelines for using clinical and economic 
evaluations." Canadian Medical Association Journal. 146 (1992): 473-481. 
27Jbid., p. 475. 
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Thus costs are further contained. This approach is possibly consistent with 
the goals of the health service, but like the cost benefit analysis approach 
(in which it is based) if should not be applied blindly. One example of 
technology in the article that would receive the weakest recommendation 
for adoption is universal precautions to prevent HIV transmission to 
health care workers. It has been estimated that universal precautions costs 
about Can$565,000 per life-year saved.28 Eliminating universal 
precautions, I would suggest, would not be consistent with a communal 
definition of dignity. Employed discriminately, however, technology 
assessment is consistent with maintaining a health care system that aims 
to enhance the dignity of people's lives. 
The strongest claim--the one Callahan seems to make at times--is 
that we need to ration all advances in technology that will increase the 
total spent on health care. Callahan is not against advaf\ces that lower 
costs, but he says "we cannot possibly afford every medical advance that 
might be of benefit."29 This could be read as a claim similar to Laupacis et 
al, but Callahan seems to be saying more. He seems to think we already 
spend too much, or at least enough, on health care, and further expansion 
is unacceptable: "We risk becoming a hypochondriacal society, one that 
has sacrificed much that is good and necessary for a rounded life out of an 
obsession with health."30 Perhaps Callahan is only asserting that we 
should spend no more on health care overall which is less objectionable. 
But to put a wholesale ban on technological advances which increase costs 
is going too far. Some advances, like many new pharmaceuticals, will 
have such an impact on living a life of dignity that they merit high 
priority. Consider this example. Jennifer is a 25 year-old with seizure 
disorder. She had her first seizure at age 14 and has been on a range of 
anti-convulsant medications over the past 11 years. She is a compliant 
patient, but her seizure control comes and goes. She has enjoyed as much 
as two years without a seizure. During these seizure-free periods she leads 
a relatively normal life except the burden of following her medication 
28sR Stock, A Gafni and RF Bloch, "Universal precautions to prevent HIV 
transmission to health care workers: an economic analysis." Canadian Medical Association 
Journal. 142 (1990): 937-946. Cited in Laupacis et al. 
29Daniel Callahan, "Rationing Medical Progress: The Way to Affordable Health 
Care." New England Journal of Medicine. 322 (1990): 1812. 
30Jbid., p. 1813. 
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regimen. When she is having seizures and during the months that 
follow, however, her life is far from normal. She cannot drive, she visits 
her neurologist more frequently, and she must explain her illness to many 
people she encounters, a disorder that still has a stigma attached to it. 
Being quite certain all of the standard treatments have been tried, the 
neurologist wants to try treating Jennifer with a new anti-convulsant 
medication which will cost several times more than the standard 
alternatives, several thousand dollars per year. The health system has 
refused to fund all new medications which cost more than the older 
alternatives. It seems Jennifer merits a trial on the new medication. 
Eliminating seizures from her life would have a tremendous impact on 
her quality of life, and despite the cost a trial is warranted. If seizure 
control is not obtained, there is a good case for returning her to the less 
expensive alternatives. Of course, we are discussing setting priorities 
within a fixed budget, and if this drug is paid for, something else will not 
be. But it seems better to remove an intervention of lower priority than to 
ban technological advances, and this approach is more consistent with a 
life of dignity. If the new technology receives a low priority, it may never 
be funded, but that is a result of its low priority not its status as new 
technology. 
The case against a strong ban on technological progress is 
strengthened by the fact that new, expensive, high tech care is only partial 
explanation of the increasing cost of health care. Expanding indications 
for older technology are a large contributor: for example, the number of 
patients undergoing coronary artery bypass graft surgery in America has 
increased dramatically. As surgeons become better at the technique and 
the risks are decreased, they can offer net benefit to a wider range of 
patients. Furthermore, it is not just expensive interventions that are 
driving costs up. Moloney and Rogers have argued that regulating 
technology will do less to control costs than the advocates suggest. They 
"present evidence that technologies such as the CT scanner account for far 
less of the growth in medical expenditures than do the collective expenses 
of thousands of small tests and procedures."31 They advocate the more 
discerning use of all technology. This may be more difficult to achieve, 
but it is more acceptable than narrowly rationing new technology only. 
31Thornas Moloney and David Rogers, "Medical Technology--A different view of the 
contentious debate over costs." New England Journal of Medicine. 301 (1979): 1413. 
118 
Controlling the Leviathan 
CONCLUSION 
Certainly there are other ways to ration that have escaped my attention or 
are yet to be devised. The same sort of analysis should precede the 
application of each approach. Of each new rationing device we must ask 
"Does this method, as being applied, assist or detract from the health 
service reaching its goal of enhancing the dignity of individuals' lives?" 
In this chapter it was argued that a priority list of interventions (with 
sufficient detail and latitude for clinical decision making) and cost-
effectiveness analysis are very important rationing tools. Waiting lists 
and technology assessment are also useful tools which have important 
applications, but each can be applied inappropriately. Finally, rationing by 
cost and cost-benefit analysis contain too many ethical difficulties to guide 
us very far with rationing decisions; neither method assists the health 
service in reaching its goals. 
119 
Conclusions 
CHAPTER 6: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In summaryr the moral importance of health care lies in its ability 
to maintain and enhance the dignity of individual lives. That was true 
fifty years ago when medical science could treat effectively or cure far lessr 
and it remains true today. The constructivist stand is that we have 
human rights to those things needed for human dignity and that 
conceptions of dignity vary importantly from community to community. 
Thusr we have a human right to health care because of the significant 
impact many forms of health care have on living a dignified life. Hencer 
health care interventions should be prioritized by their relative ability to 
enhance the dignity of people's lives. 
The right to health care being discussed is a moralr positive in rem 
rightr i.e.r a morally-justifiedr resource-intensive entitlement to health 
care which can be claimed against society at large. There are also 
interesting and persuasive moral arguments for health care as a broadly 
conceived negative in rem right and as a weak obligation of beneficence. 
While the idea that health care is a natural extension of our right to 
collective protection and the argument that we all have obligations to help 
those in need are both solid arguments which hold waterr neither 
argument holds as much water as most proponents of a right to health 
care would like. To dispense with the metaphorr while both arguments 
morally justify certain health care interventionsr neither can be logically 
extended to include all of the personal entitlements to private health 
services which most proponents feel a right to health care should include. 
This is not meant to undermine either argument but rather to make a 
stronger claim. Hencer discussing the right to health care as a morat 
positive in rem right approaches the subject head-on and is sure to include 
treatment for the full range of diseases. 
There are some theoretical difficulties with positive rights. Rights 
have been given considerable moral statusr and they are entrenched in our 
system of moral justification such that considerations of rights "trump" all 
non-rights considerations. Howeverr positive rights are dependent on 
resources to be fulfilledr and these resources are scarce. As a resultr the 
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content of a positive right is dependent on the amount of resources 
available to a given community. Negative rights (i.e., liberties), by 
contrast, are not subject to the shifting sands of resource availability. 
While the claim that positive rights are dependent on available resources 
seems intuitive, extreme situations are problematic. During a famine, for 
example, we might conclude that there is no right to food. Some rights 
proponents would argue that rights are inalienable, and, hence that this is 
an unacceptable theory. Perhaps the resolution of this conflict may lie in 
broadening the boundaries of our in rem community during extreme 
circumstances, although this requires further exploration. At any rate, 
making the content of positive rights subject to the resources of the 
community makes sense under less extreme circumstances. Thus we 
arrive at the reasonable conclusion that positive rights entail different 
things in a developed nation than in a developing one. 
Prioritization is necessary because no society has sufficient resources 
to provide all potentially dignity-enhancing health care. This is probably 
true in the sense that we simply cannot afford all beneficial health care (if 
we insist on even small benefits), but it is certainly true if we consider that 
we have human rights to all of the various things needed for a life of 
dignity. Health care is one of many things (along with food, shelter, 
education, etc.) which is required for dignity, and, with limited resources, 
health care should not be funded to the detriment of these other human 
rights. 
The necessity of prioritization is made clearer when one examines 
the trends of the last thirty-five years. Health care expenditures are rising 
far faster than overall economic growth in all of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. In New 
Zealand, health care expenditure rose from 4.4 percent of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) in 1960 to 7.3 percent of GDP in 1990; in the USA health 
expenditure went from 5.2 to 12.4 percent of GDP over the same period! 
Health care is consuming a progressively larger portion of the economy. 
There have been so many advances in health care that we have reached a 
point where we cannot afford all beneficial health care. Implicit rationing 
has been with us for some time, and, as resource constraints remain with 
us while new health care technologies become available, the need for 
more explicit rationing becomes more pressing. There is no reason to 
think this trend will cease. 
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Furthermore, the morally relevant criterion for rationing, dignity, 
does not lend itself to implicit rationing. Dignity requires a community 
definition, and extensive input from the public will be required to 
prioritise health care interventions by this criterion. Rationing is a 
difficult and painful, though necessary, process, and it will require 
considerable effort from the community to be carried out well. This time 
and effort, however, will be well spent as the prioritization and the 
methodology used to determine it will allow the systematic rationing of 
health care and the proper prioritization of future technology. This is sure 
to be superior to random and implicit rationing. 
No less important than the prioritization of services are the 
rationing tools which should be applied to all services, regardless of 
priority. Simply because society places a high priority on certain services, 
it does not follow that those services are exempt from any rationing. It 
should be kept in mind that low priority services make some contribution 
to dignity also, and we should labour to fund as much of the list as 
possible. Controlling costs high on the priority list is a vital way to fund 
more of the list. Thus, coronary artery bypass grafting may be given a high 
priority, but it may still be subject to a waiting list or waiting time of 
reasonable length. Rationing tools identified in chapter five as ethically 
acceptable in some of their applications include cost-effectiveness analysis 
(CEA), waiting lists and technology assessment. The envisioned system is 
to prioritise all health care interventions 1 through, say, 1000, and then to 
apply various constraints (e.g., CEA to the treatment of various disorders, 
capped numbers of specific elective surgeries, etc.) to the entire list. Then 
it could be actuarially determined how far the list would be funded. If 
society could afford funding through, say, 846, then items 847 through 1000 
would not be funded. Such a project would be open to wide public 
negotiation and scrutiny. 
The system which ultimately is being advanced as best to fulfil the 
moral right to health care in a liberal society is a publicly funded system 
which people can either join or not join regardless of the individual's 
financial situation. More specifically, the public system should not be a 
health care system only for the poor and "uninsurable." Presumably, this 
system would be funded by general tax revenues, and even those who opt 
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out of the public health care system would share (to some extent)l in the 
communal obligation to fund that system. Such a system would retain 
freedom of choice and freedom to spend one's private resources as 
desired--a value identified as important when discussing egalitarianism 
and the idea of levelling all health care up or down to match society's 
resource constraints. A system which demands participation and prohibits 
purchasing health care outside the public system seems to violate these 
basic premises. 
Standard applications of several theories of justice to health care 
were examined in chapter three, and strengths and weaknesses of the 
standard theories were illustrated. Resource allocation decisions were 
presented as falling along a continuum from macro allocation to micro 
allocation, and the claim was made that a well founded right to health care 
would take into account the full spectrum of allocation decisions. While 
the bulk of what has been presented about the constructivist theory and 
health care has concerned macro allocation decisions, the constructivist 
theory accommodates the full spectrum of allocation decisions well. 
To conclude, the constructivist theory can be seen to be applicable 
across the spectrum of resource allocation. At the extreme macro end of 
the spectrum, the constructivist theory of human rights asks the question 
"What are the entitlements necessary to live a life of human dignity?" 
This is a strong starting point as it captures the big picture: it is not just 
freedoms, shelter, food, education, or health care that enables each of us to 
have a truly human life. We should apportion our resources to positive 
in rem rights so as to reflect the vital importance of each of these areas. 
Focusing on health care, the constructivist theory asserts that we should 
prioritise health services with specific reference to the ability of health care 
1 Deciding how to spread the burden of financing this public health system is a 
difficult matter beyond the scope of this thesis. If one opts out of the public system, it seems 
reasonable to say one has a smaller responsibility to fund the public system; however, 
differing tax rates for those who opt in and those who opt out amounts to an incentive for 
the rich to leave the public system. This oversimplified example should illustrate. 
Assume this health system will be funded by a 5% income tax on those who participate and 
3% on those who do not. Someone who earns $20,000 would pay $1000 as a participant or 
$600· as a non-participant, and someone who earns $100,000 would pay $5000 as a 
participant or $3000 as a non-participant. As it is difficult to purchase health insurance for 
$400 but relatively easy to buy it for $2000, it is not unlikely that the more wealthy person 
would opt out while the less wealthy would opt in. This seems an undesirable outcome, but 
it is also worth noting that the wealthy person who opted out of the system would still 
constribute three times the amount the less wealthy person would. This is a complex issue 
which I will not explore further. 
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Conclusions 
to maintain dignity. Finally, at the extreme micro end of the spectrum, 
the constructivist theory asserts that the doctor-patient relationship 
should have the dignity of the patient as its focus. 
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